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Summary 
This thesis comprises three papers contributing to the research on tax preparers’ tax 
aggressiveness. Within this context “tax aggressiveness” represents tax preparers’ tax risk 
propensity, i.e., the accepted likelihood that a recommended tax position will not prevail 
before a tax court in case of giving a positive recommendation for a deduction or structuring 
under review.  
The first paper focuses on the impact of personality traits, professional experience, and 
the risk of suffering reputational losses on tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness. A survey based 
sample comprising tax preparers and tax students shows direct effects of these factors as well 
as indirect effects of personality traits. 
The second paper investigates the effectiveness of preparer penalty provisions that 
shall punish exaggerated tax aggressiveness by referring to a reporting standard that defines 
the maximum risk allowed to be included in a deduction or structuring. The results of a 
survey experiment among German tax preparers show that the effectiveness of such penalties 
depends on whether tax preparers have a high or low inclination to provide aggressive tax 
advice prior to the introduction of these rules.  
The third paper explores whether regulation of tax advisory markets has an impact on 
tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness. A survey based sample comprising tax preparers of the 
same Big Four Firm from the USA and Germany shows a difference in participants’ tax 
aggressiveness that could be the result of regulative differences between these countries. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation beinhaltet drei Beiträge mit denen die Einflussfaktoren 
unterschiedlicher steuerlicher Aggressivität im Beratungsverhalten von Steuerberatern 
untersucht werden. „Steuerliche Aggressivität“ stellt dabei auf die steuerspezifische 
Risikobereitschaft eines Steuerberaters ab, also auf den Grad zu dem ein Steuerberater bereit 
ist, legale Positionen zu vertreten, die bei einer Überprüfung durch die Finanzbehörden und 
einem anschließenden gerichtlichen Verfahren nur mit geringer Wahrscheinlichkeit Bestand 
haben. 
Im Fokus des ersten Beitrags stehen dabei der Einfluss von Persönlichkeitsmerkmalen, 
beruflicher Erfahrung und der Gefahr etwaiger Reputationsschäden auf das 
Beratungsverhalten. Für einen befragungsbasierten Datensatz aus Steuerberatern und 
Steuerstudenten zeigen sich direkte Einflüsse dieser Faktoren sowie indirekte Einflüsse von 
Persönlichkeitsmerkmalen.  
Der zweite Beitrag untersucht die Effektivität von Strafvorschriften, die zu aggressives 
Steuerberatungsverhalten sanktionieren sollen, indem sie nach amerikanischem Vorbild auf 
ein objektiviertes Höchstmaß an Risikobereitschaft abstellen. In einem befragungsbasierten 
Datensatz aus deutschen Steuerberatern zeigt sich, dass die Wirksamkeit von Strafvorschriften 
abhängig ist von der vor Einführung einer Strafbewehrung bestehenden Neigung für 
aggressives Beratungsverhalten.  
Der dritte Beitrag beleuchtet den Einfluss den die Regulierung eines 
Steuerberatungsmarkts auf das Beratungsverhalten von Steuerberatern hat, die in diesem 
Markt tätig sind. Für einen im Wege einer Befragung erhobenen Datensatz aus Steuerberatern 
ein und derselben Big Four Gesellschaft in den USA und Deutschland zeigt sich ein 
Unterschied im Beratungsverhalten zwischen den beiden Jurisdiktionen, der auf 
regulatorische Unterschiede zurück zu führen sein könnte. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The taxation process is a game of cat-and-mouse between taxpayers and the tax 
authorities. The latter are interested in maximizing tax compliance while taxpayers seek to 
minimize their tax burden within the latitude that is allowed by their inner obligation to 
behave as a good citizen and to contribute to the common good. Serving primarily the interest 
of tax authorities and standard setters there is a vast amount of studies investigating the 
determinants of individuals’ compliance or designing tax avoidance measures that might be 
useful to identify firms that behave less compliant than others (for a review see, e.g., Kirchler 
et al. 2008, or Dyreng et al. 2009 respectively). However, referring to public debates in recent 
years, e.g., with regard to “Luxemburg-Leaks”, or “Panama Papers” it seems as if especially 
big multinational firms and a few super-rich individuals were still a step ahead of the revenue 
agencies. Consequently, there are various national and international initiatives to counter tax 
avoidance between countries that are currently discussed.  
An important “subgame” (Pickhardt & Prinz 2014) within the bigger picture of the tax 
game remains predominantly unattended in these discussions and is furthermore insufficiently 
studied when compared with the number of studies concerned with taxpayer behavior. This 
subgame comprises the role tax practitioners play within the compliance process. Their role is 
at least twofold as they should be client advocates representing taxpayers’ interests against the 
tax authorities on the one hand, but are also obliged to obey tax laws or even act as a kind of 
“longa manus” of the tax authorities (dependent from jurisdiction), on the other hand. Hence, 
the level of tax aggressiveness included in tax preparers’ advice should be subject to different 
influences which are predetermined by the particular preparer herself, client characteristics, 
task characteristics and the expected actions and perceived capacity of the tax authorities to 
detect or punish aggressive tax behavior. In line with these deliberations there are a couple of 
studies investigating tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness which are mainly authored in the 
nineties or late eighties of the last century. A valuable review of these studies is provided by 
Roberts (1998). However, as there is conflicting evidence among the studies it still remains 
unclear whether the overall impact of tax preparers on tax compliance is positive or not and 
which determinants are decisive for determining tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness. While 
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the first question has to be left for further research this thesis shall shed light on two of the 
most discussed determinants of tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness and shall furthermore 
extended prior studies by adding supplementary variables impacting tax aggressiveness not 
discussed in this research stream up to now. 
1.2 Contribution and Main Findings 
Comprising three separate but related experimental (survey) studies
1
 performed among 
tax professionals from a Big Four Firm this thesis contributes to tax aggressiveness research 
as described in the following.  
1.2.1 The Impact of Personality Traits, Experience, and Reputation Risk 
The second chapter of this thesis investigates whether tax preparers’ aggressiveness 
depends on the length of their professional experience, their personality traits, like risk 
aversion or the “Big Five”, and reputation risk. Prior research has either not paid attention to 
these potential determinants of tax professionals’ advice aggressiveness or does only provide 
conflicting evidence. The results show that personality traits have direct and indirect effects 
on tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness. While the direct influence is limited to a negative effect 
of extraversion we find several indirect effects via experience and general risk propensity that 
lead to the conclusion that the Big Five could help predicting the level of experts’ tax 
aggressiveness and should therefore be considered in future compliance research. With 
respect to professional experience, risk propensity, and the danger of suffering reputation risk, 
we demonstrate that experts’ tax aggressiveness declines with the length of working 
experience, risk aversion and reputation risk. Moreover, we propose that future research 
should reconsider the relation between overall risk propensity and advice aggressiveness. 
Our findings are of interest for different parties involved in the tax compliance 
process. First, we find that tax aggressiveness varies largely between tax preparers even if we 
consider preparers of the same accounting firm. Thus, it may be reasonable for the revenue 
agency to introduce tax preparer registration programs that enable the revenue service to 
match tax returns and tax preparers. This would allow the revenue service to identify tax 
preparers that recurrently recommend very aggressive tax positions. Second, knowledge about 
the relation between experience and personality traits and preparers’ aggressiveness can help 
clients selecting the tax preparer that best matches their own preferences. Third, our results 
                                                     
1 The research papers that are the basis for Chapters 2 and 3 were co-authored with Prof. Dr. Kay Blaufus, Leibniz 
University of Hanover, email: blaufus@steuern.uni-hannover.de. 
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are useful in preventing accounting firms from reputational losses or claims resulting from 
advisor’s liability or preparer penalties. The firm could monitor the tax aggressiveness of its 
employees by observing relevant personality traits, or experience which also holds for the 
staffing of projects.  
1.2.2 The Impact of Tax Preparer Penalties 
In the United States tax preparers are subject to preparer penalties if a tax preparer’s 
recommendation is considered to be too aggressive when compared to a given reporting 
standard. Within this context “reporting standard” means a minimum likelihood of sustaining 
a tax position on its merits that must be established (Hansen & White 2012: 141). Before 
introducing tax preparer penalties also in other countries, it is worth to study the effectiveness 
of these penalties, especially as prior research on the effectiveness of these sanctions only 
provides conflicting evidence. Thus, the study included in the third chapter tests whether the 
introduction of preparer penalties referring to a certain reporting standard results in the effect 
intended by the legislator, i.e., a reduction in tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness.  
Motivated by Doran (2009) and the “theory of expressive law” (e.g., Cooter 1998) we 
expect that the introduction of preparer penalties will result in two opposing effects. First, in 
line with deterrence theory we hypothesize that penalty provisions including a certain 
reporting standard will fulfill their instrumental role by deterring tax preparers having a high 
inclination to recommend aggressive tax positions from doing so. Hence, the risk of being 
subject to penalties will reduce tax aggressiveness of these high-risk preparers. Second, at the 
same time, newly introduced penalties will have a definitional function as they express what 
activities are accepted to be tax compliant behavior. As a result tax preparers having an 
inclination to provide aggressive tax advice that is below the threshold defined by the 
reporting standard will internalize this new boundary of compliant behavior and will therefore 
increase their level of tax aggressiveness. Our results confirm the expected interaction 
between preparer penalty and the individual inclination towards aggressive advice. Therefore, 
legislators of other countries intending to introduce preparer penalties along the lines of the 
U.S. rules should balance the advantages for tax compliance resulting from the deterrence 
effect against the disadvantages resulting from the definitional effect. Overall, this study 
should be a first step into gaining a more detailed understanding of the effects of preparer 
penalties.  
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1.2.3 The Impact of Regulation of Tax Advisory Markets 
The fourth chapter contributes to prior tax aggressiveness research by providing the 
first study that investigates cross-country differences in tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness. 
Referring to a sample of tax professionals working at a Big Four firm in the USA and 
Germany we analyze whether market regulation has an impact on tax preparers’ behavior. For 
this purpose, we first discuss the major differences between the two tax preparation markets 
flagged as the Full Regulation Model (Germany) and the Partial Regulation Model (USA). 
The latter are suggested to essentially differ with regard to (1) admission to the profession, (2) 
maintenance and enforcement of quality standards (e.g., penalties), (3) mandatory early 
disclosure rules, (4) the freedom to determine advertising, and fees, and (5) differences in the 
boundaries of multidisciplinary professional practice like provisions governing the possibility 
to collaborate with providers of other legal services. Hereinafter, given the plurality of 
differences between the two regulation models we test the hypothesis that market regulation 
matters, i.e., has an impact on tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness. In line with this hypothesis, 
we find a difference in participants’ tax aggressiveness between the countries that cannot be 
explained by differences in sociodemographic factors, client advocacy, personality traits, 
attitudes towards and perceptions about the tax system, cultural differences, or tax morale. We 
furthermore show that tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness is determined by different factors 
in the two countries under review. 
As prior studies on tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness have almost exclusively been 
conducted in the USA our result raises the question whether the determinants found in prior 
research are also valid for tax professionals working in other jurisdictions or regulatory 
environments respectively. Hence, future research should take a deeper look into the role of 
regulatory differences when studying tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness. This might enable 
legislators and standard setters interested in the role of tax professionals on the tax revenue to 
assess the potential effect of specific regulatory actions. Furthermore, governments, 
professional supervisions as well as the setters of tax standards should be interested in the 
latitude of tax aggressiveness that is predetermined by the institutional and regulatory 
framework in their country.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2 Aggressive Tax Planning Advice: The Effects of Personality Traits, 
Professional Experience, and Reputation Risk
2
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this study, we investigate whether tax preparers’ aggressiveness depends on the 
length of their professional experience, on their personality traits such as risk aversion or the 
“Big Five”, and on reputation risk. Previous compliance research examines taxpayers’ and tax 
system characteristics to explain differences in taxpayers’ compliance behavior. An excellent 
overview of this research is provided by Pickhardt & Prinz (2014). However, firms usually 
purchase tax advice. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that their behavior is also driven by tax 
professionals providing the required advice. These tax professionals support the taxpayer’s 
compliance with all sources of legal authority and assist her in dealing with the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). At the same time, tax professionals are free to minimize the client’s 
tax liability within the latitude allowed by the tax code because they should be client 
advocates in tax matters (AICPA 2008). Consequently, the OECD identifies tax advisers to 
be, at least in part, a driver of tax avoidance by designing and offering aggressive tax planning 
schemes (OECD 2008). Empirical (e.g., Lisowsky 2010, McGuire et al. 2012) and 
experimental (e.g., Schmidt 2001) research supports this claim. It is, therefore, important to 
understand the determinants of tax professionals’ behavior regarding tax compliance 
recommendations. 
Personality research has shown that individual personality can be described by the five 
superordinate (“Big Five”) dimensions of Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (McCrae and Costa 1990). Although the Big 
Five traits can successfully predict behavior in many different fields, e.g., occupational 
choice, wages, job performance, health behavior, teenage pregnancy, and crime (for a review, 
see Borghans et al. 2008), tax compliance research to date has not focused on the influence of 
the Big Five personality traits on professionals’ actions. One exception is the study of 
Korndörfer et al. (2014) who find that the Big Five did not affect (self-reported) tax evasion. 
However, Korndörfer et al. (2014) investigate the effect on illegal behavior of taxpayers, 
whereas we study the effect on the aggressiveness of legal tax advice. Because legality can 
                                                     
2 The research paper that is the basis for Chapter 2 was co-authored with Prof. Dr. Kay Blaufus, Leibniz University of 
Hanover, email: blaufus@steuern.uni-hannover.de. 
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alter behavioral responses with respect to tax minimization (Blaufus et al. 2016a), it is an 
open empirical question whether the Big Five help predicting tax planning recommendations 
of tax experts.  
Prior research already indicates that individual personality traits may directly affect 
the level of tax avoidance. Dyreng et al. (2010) demonstrate that individual executives play a 
significant role in determining the level of a firm’s tax avoidance. Olsen and Stekelberg 
(2016) find that CEO narcissism increases the likelihood of the CEO’s firm engaging in 
corporate tax shelters. Besides potential direct effects of personality traits, we, however, also 
expect indirect effects. First, it is well documented that the Big Five personality traits
3
 affect 
subjects’ risk propensity (e.g., Nicholson et al. 2005, Soane & Chmiel 2005) and that risk 
propensity may increase tax aggressiveness (Hansen & White 2012). Thus, we expect that 
personality traits, which increase (decrease) risk propensity, indirectly increase (decrease) tax 
aggressiveness. Second, we hypothesize that professional experience in the tax advisory area 
relates to specific personality traits and that professional experience itself reduces tax 
aggressiveness. We, therefore, expect additional indirect effects of personality traits on advice 
aggressiveness, via professional experience. 
Our study also contributes to the ongoing discussion about the effect of reputation risk 
on the level of corporate tax avoidance (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2016, Klassen et al. 2016). In line 
with Graham et al. (2014), who report that almost half of the surveyed tax executives agree 
that potential reputational damage to their firm is a very important factor in deciding among 
different levels of tax aggressiveness, we expect reputation risk to decrease advice 
aggressiveness.  
To study the effects of experience, risk aversion, personality traits and reputation risk 
on tax preparers’ aggressiveness, we conducted an online survey experiment among 123 tax 
experts comprising 66 German tax professionals of one Big Four accounting firm as well as 
57 students studying tax and accounting at different German universities. Subjects were 
presented a hypothetical client who asks for an opinion regarding a tax planning idea. In line 
with U.S. preparer penalty provisions (IRC Sec. 6694 (a) (2)), we measure tax aggressiveness 
as the likelihood that a recommended tax position will not prevail before a tax court, i.e., 
subjects had to state the highest failure probability which they are willing to accept in case of 
a positive recommendation regarding the tax planning idea. Subjects were randomly assigned 
                                                     
3 Being aware of the fact that overall risk propensity is a personality characteristic as well, we only refer to the Big Five by 
talking about personality traits in the following and to overall risk propensity by talking about risk propensity or risk 
aversion. 
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to one of two treatments either including or excluding a risk of reputation damage due to 
negative press coverage. 
Our results show that personality traits have a direct effect on tax aggressiveness. 
However, the influence is limited to a negative effect of extraversion. With respect to 
professional experience, risk propensity, and reputation risk, we demonstrate that tax 
aggressiveness declines with the length of working experience, risk aversion and reputation 
risk. Furthermore, we find several indirect effects of personality traits on tax aggressiveness. 
Conscientiousness (neuroticism) is positively (negatively) related to professional experience 
and thus indirectly decreases (increases) tax aggressiveness. Regarding neuroticism there is an 
opposing negative indirect effect, via risk propensity, because neuroticism is negatively 
related to risk propensity which in turn is positively associated with tax aggressiveness. 
Finally, there is also an indirect positive effect of openness on tax aggressiveness, via risk 
propensity. Overall, we conclude that despite the limited direct effect, the Big Five could help 
predicting the level of tax avoidance and should thus be considered in future compliance 
research. The same holds for general risk propensity as we find a direct effect on tax 
aggressiveness. 
Our findings are of interest for different parties involved in the tax compliance 
process. First, we find that tax aggressiveness varies largely between tax preparers even if we 
consider preparers of the same accounting firm. Thus, it may be reasonable for the revenue 
agency to introduce tax preparer registration programs that enable the revenue service to 
match tax returns and tax preparers. This would allow the revenue service to identify tax 
preparers that recurrently recommend very aggressive tax positions. Second, knowledge about 
the relation between experience and personality traits and preparers’ aggressiveness can help 
clients selecting the tax preparer that best matches their own preferences. Third, our results 
are useful in preventing accounting firms from reputational losses or claims resulting from 
advisor’s liability or preparer’s penalty. The firm could monitor the tax aggressiveness of its 
employees by observing relevant personality traits, or experience which also holds for the 
staffing of projects.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we describe some 
institutional details about the German tax advisory business. Second, we provide a review of 
prior literature and formulate our hypotheses. Third, we describe the sample and survey 
instrument as well as the estimation strategy employed. Fourth, the results of the empirical 
analysis are presented and discussed. Fifth, we present conclusions and suggestions for future 
research. 
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2.2 Institutional Background 
Because we investigate the tax aggressiveness of German tax professionals, it is 
necessary to understand the framework of their business. The German market for tax advisory 
services is highly regulated. A complex examination must be passed to be allowed to provide 
tax advice. In 2015, approximately 80,000 examined tax advisors were registered in Germany. 
Having successfully passed the exam, tax advisors are subject to professional supervision and 
are bound by certain professional ethics such as discretion or conscientiousness. The latter 
also comprises the need for a disclosure of all connected risks when providing advice to 
clients. At the same time, tax advisors are client advocates who are free to recommend every 
tax position that can be defended by evidence from law, literature, or case law. Even very 
aggressive tax positions can be endorsed as long as the tax advisor complies with professional 
ethics - in particular, unlimited client enlightenment - and does not support the client in tax 
evasion. Tax evasion is defined as the taxpayer or the advisor providing intentionally 
inaccurate or incomplete information to the tax authorities to reduce the tax burden. Tax 
advisors, who assist their clients evading taxes, do not only have to pay penalties but also bear 
the risk of losing their allowance to provide tax advice. Thus, it should be noted that the 
current study only covers legal tax avoidance. Preparer penalties, which are prevalent in the 
US, do not exist in German law. Furthermore, German law does not provide for mandatory 
early disclosure rules. Hence, in comparison to other countries such as the US, German tax 
preparers are less regulated when choosing the level of aggressiveness in providing advice to 
their clients. 
2.3 Hypotheses Development 
Previous research shows that tax preparation services directly affect taxpayers’ tax 
compliance (Lisowsky 2010, McGuire et al. 2012, Schmidt 2001). Against this backdrop, we 
aim to study determinants of tax preparers’ advice aggressiveness. These determinants have 
been divided into three broad classifications by Milliron (1988): client-related features, 
decision-context determinants, and preparer related features. Relevant client-related features 
include characteristics such as client’s preference (Ayres et al. 1989, Helleloid 1989), 
aggressiveness (Kaplan et al. 1988, Duncan et al. 1989), importance (Reckers at al. 1991), and 
withholding status (Schisler 1994). Furthermore, the relationship with the client is crucial 
when predicting the tax aggressiveness of professionals. Differences in their advice 
aggressiveness depend on the risk of client loss (Newberry et al. 1993) or the reasonableness 
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and cooperativeness of the client (Kadous & Magro 2001). Decision-context determinants 
observed to influence tax aggressiveness include features such as preparer penalties (for a 
review see Hansen & White 2012), planning versus compliance tasks (Spilker et al. 1999), the 
level of ambiguity (Carnes et al. 1996, Klepper and Nagin 1989, Kaplan et al. 1988), or the 
order of information presentation (Pei et al. 1990). Relevant preparer-related features include 
educational level (Carnes et al. 1996), political ideology (Blanthorne et al. 2013), gender (e.g., 
Roberts & Cargile 1993), firm type (e.g., Carnes et al. 1996), client advocacy (e.g., Johnson 
1993), overall risk propensity (e.g., Hansen & White 2012), tax risk propensity (Carnes et al. 
1996), ethical judgments (Cruz et al. 2000), and moral reasoning (Blanthorne et al. 2013). 
The purpose of this study is to complement the abovementioned research stream by 
investigating potential direct effects of the Big Five personality traits on tax preparers’ 
aggressiveness as well as indirect effects of the Big Five personality traits via the impact on 
professional experience and risk propensity. In addition, contributing to the ongoing 
discussion about the effects of reputational costs on tax avoidance, we study the effect of 
potential reputation damages on tax advice aggressiveness. 
2.3.1 The Direct Effects of Reputation Risk, Professional Experience, and Risk Propensity 
2.3.1.1 Reputation Risk 
Whether aggressive but legal tax advice could lead to reputation costs for tax advisory 
firms is an open empirical question. We are not aware of any prior study directly addressing 
this issue. However, there is an ongoing discussion about reputational effects on corporate tax 
aggressiveness. The empirical evidence, so far, is mixed. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) conduct 
an event study to examine stock price reactions to news concerning corporate tax shelter 
usage. They find negative stock market reactions, particularly for firms in the retail sector, 
which suggest a consumer backlash. However, using advertising costs as another proxy for a 
potential consumer backlash, they find no significant effect. Austin and Wilson (2013) find 
that firms with exposure to potentially significant reputation costs do not significantly differ 
in their tax avoidance level. Gallemore et al. (2014) find no evidence for significant reputation 
costs measured by increased CEO and CFO turnover, auditor turnover, lost sales, increased 
advertising costs, and decreased media reputation. Blaufus et al. (2016b) even find positive 
stock market responses to tax avoidance news. However, Graham et al. (2014) surveyed tax 
executives and nearly half of the participants agree that a potential reputational damage for 
their firm is a very important factor for deciding on different levels of tax aggressiveness. 
Moreover, Dyreng et al. (2016) find that new disclosure rules requiring the publication of a 
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firm’s full subsidiary list decreases a firm’s tax avoidance. The authors interpret this as 
evidence of an effect of “public pressure” on corporate tax policy. 
The abovementioned studies concern the firm’s reputation, which conducts tax 
avoidance, but not reputational costs of tax advisory firms. In this respect, there is only the 
indirect evidence. Incardona et al. (2014) demonstrate that the sale of tax shelters by 
accounting firms leads to a reputational spillover effect on the audit profession. Klassen et al. 
(2016) find evidence indicating that an external tax preparer gives less aggressive advice if 
the preparer jointly provides tax and audit work for a firm. They argue that an auditor-
preparer’s work is more visible to the firm’s top management and thus the reputation and 
litigation risk of an auditor-preparer is higher.  
In theory, there could be two opposing effects of reputation risk on advice 
aggressiveness. As tax advisory firms are clients’ advocates, news in the media about a tax 
advisory firm offering aggressive tax advice could attract new clients. However, very 
aggressive tax positions also bear the risk that they repeatedly are not sustained upon 
examination of the revenue agency. This could lead to severe negative media coverage 
claiming consulting errors. Moreover, tax advisors act as repeated players in a tax compliance 
game with the revenue agency. Thus, also the firm’s reputation to the revenue agency is of 
importance. For example, the Big Four firms where we conducted the survey require every 
tax advisor to yearly confirm that she did not pursue any tax constructions or declared 
information in tax returns that could potentially derogate the firm’s good reputation in the 
German revenue service. Overall, we therefore expect that reputation risk decreases advice 
aggressiveness and formulate the first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: Reputation risk reduces advice aggressiveness. 
2.3.1.2 Professional Experience 
Previous tax research uses different indicators of experience. On the one hand, 
preparer related features, such as task familiarity (Duncan et al. 1989, Newberry et al. 1993, 
Reckers et al. 1991), prior IRS audit experience (Cloyd 1995, Duncan et al. 1989, Kaplan et 
al. 1988), and having passed the CPA or bar exam (Ayres et al. 1989, Cuccia 1994, Erard 
1993) increase tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness. On the other hand, other studies using age or 
years of experience in the field of taxes as a proxy for experience report evidence that the 
latter may increase (LaRue & Reckers 1989) or decrease (Helleloid 1989, Cloyd 1995) tax 
aggressiveness or that there is no association at all (Duncan et al. 1989, Schisler 1994). 
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Despite this conflicting evidence, we expect that experience is negatively related to tax 
aggressiveness. It should be noted that we aim to measure the willingness to recommend 
aggressive (“risky”) tax positions given an exogenous chance that the position does not 
prevail in a tax dispute with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Thus, the arguments for a 
positive impact of experience indicators such as IRS audit experience (McGill 1988, Ayres et 
al. 1989, Pei et al. 1992) or procedural knowledge (O’Donnell et al. 2005) should not be 
applicable to the setting at hand because they refer to an adjustment of the outcome 
expectations and not to the willingness to recommend tax positions with a given risk level.  
Furthermore, Kohlberg’s (1981) theory of moral development suggests that the 
perceived ethical costs of recommending overly aggressive tax structures rise with increasing 
experience. According to this theory and related empirical evidence (e.g., Emerson et al. 
2007), individuals may experience a moral maturation over the course of their lives. 
Moreover, previous research shows that tax partners rate their firm’s ethical environment as 
being stronger and report having encountered more “ethical dilemmas” when compared to the 
rates of non-partners (Bobek et al. 2010). In addition, experienced tax advisors are “repeat 
players” who should also be interested in maintaining a trustful relationship with the revenue 
service and should, therefore, avoid overly aggressive tax recommendations. Finally, with 
increasing experience, tax preparers of large firms should not only be responsible for their 
own results but also for the success of their firm and the job security of subordinate 
employees. Responsibility for the wealth of others, however, reduces risk taking as previous 
experimental studies show (e.g., Charness & Jackson 2009). These aspects should lead 
experienced tax preparers take lower tax risks. Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
H2: There is a negative relation between professional experience and advice 
aggressiveness. 
2.3.1.3 Risk Propensity 
Subjects risk attitude is certainly one of the most important predictors of risky 
behaviors in economic research (Dohmen et al. 2011). Providing risky tax advice should also 
be related to a subject’s risk attitude. In line with this assumption, Hansen and White (2012) 
find that the willingness to recommend an uncertain tax position increases with subjects’ risk 
propensity. We, therefore, expect that an increasing risk aversion reduces tax aggressiveness. 
H3: Increasing risk aversion decreases advice aggressiveness. 
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2.3.2 The Direct and Indirect Effects of Personality Traits 
Personality research shows that a comprehensive characterization of personality can be 
achieved by considering five factors – the so-called Big Five personality traits (e.g., Barrick & 
Mount 1991, McCrae & Costa 1997).  
The first two factors are Extraversion (E) and Neuroticism (N, also known as 
emotional stability with inverse meaning), formerly known as the “Big Two” (Wiggins 1968). 
People scoring high in E are generally described as being sociable, gregarious, assertive, 
talkative, and adventuresome, whereas N involves traits such as being depressed, angry, 
embarrassed, emotional, anxious, and insecure. The third factor has generally been labeled as 
Agreeableness (A). Traits associated with A include being courteous, flexible, cooperative, 
forgiving, and tolerant. The fourth factor, Conscientiousness (C), reflects traits such as being 
hardworking, dutiful, orderly, and organized. The last factor, Openness to Experience (O), 
involves traits such as curiosity, imaginativeness, or open-mindedness and can often be 
observed among people who have a preference for art, literature, classical music, or new 
experiences in general.  
This five-factor structure has proven to be stable with respect to a broad range of used 
instruments and methodologies in measuring personality traits (e.g., Goldberg 1990). In 
addition, substantial convergence has been observed between an individual’s self-reported 
trait ratings and ratings of others who know the individual well (Soldz & Vaillant 1999). Most 
importantly, however, the Big Five have shown to be a considerable predictive value for key 
socioeconomic outcomes. 
With respect to the current study, it is important to note that prior research finds risk 
propensity to be strongly rooted in personality (Nicholson et al. 2005). Researchers find 
evidence for the fact that A, C, and N are inversely related to risk taking, whereas E and O 
have been found to increase risk propensity (e.g., Nicholson et al. 2005, Soane & Chmiel 
2005). Thus, we expect an indirect effect of personality traits on advice aggressiveness 
because personality traits affect risk propensity which itself is related to advice aggressiveness 
according to H3. We test the following two hypotheses: 
H4: The Big Five personality traits affect subjects’ risk propensity. 
H5: The Big Five personality traits indirectly affect advice aggressiveness via the effect 
on risk propensity. 
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However, risk research also shows that risk taking behavior is domain-specific (e.g., 
Soane et al. 2010). There are important differences between risk taking in general and tax risk 
taking. First, the choice to take on tax risks by professional tax preparers is not a “private” 
decision such as playing the lottery or investing in shares, but must be defended in an internal 
revision processes as well as against claims of the fiscal administration. Second, even in the 
absence of preparer penalties, non-pecuniary costs of recommending tax positions might be 
perceived that will not be upheld by a court. Although tax advisors are, on the one hand, 
clients’ advocates and therefore aim to minimize clients’ taxes, they are, on the other hand, 
restrained by their ethical obligation to act as “law enforcers”. Research shows that 
personality traits significantly affect the perceived costs of social and ethical risk taking 
(Soane et al. 2010). In sum, we expect that tax risk taking decisions differ from general risk 
taking decisions. Thus, we hypothesize that the Big Five personality traits have direct effects 
on advice aggressiveness, i.e., they have predictive power even if we control for general risk 
taking propensity. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis: 
H6: Advice aggressiveness will be directly affected by the Big Five personality traits. 
Finally, no prior study recognizes that high experience in the field of tax advisory 
might itself be dependent on certain personal characteristics. As in this paper, most previous 
studies have examined the behavior of professionals working in a Big Four firm. These 
companies are known for their up-or-out system accompanied by long working hours and 
demanding professional examinations. Therefore, it is reasonable that employees who remain 
in such an organization differ with respect to their personality traits from those who leave the 
firm. However, not only the decision to remain in a specific organization but also the decision 
to remain working as a tax professional should be affected by individual personality traits. 
Two basic factors that cause people to stay longer and be promoted to the next employment 
level are job performance and job satisfaction. Therefore, we are able to draw inferences from 
the vast literature concerning personality traits and job performance (for a review see Johnson 
et al. 2011) and job satisfaction (for a review see Tokar et al. 1998). Research shows that 
conscientiousness is directly (Alessandrini & Vecchione 2012, Johnson et al. 2011, Barrick & 
Mount 1991) and neuroticism is inversely (Johnson et al. 2011, Tokar et al. 1998 with further 
references) related to job performance. Because the direction of influence of these traits is 
equal to their impact found for job satisfaction (Furnham et al. 2002, Tokar et al. 1998 with 
further references), we assume that conscientiousness and emotional stability have a positive 
effect on experience (measured as years working as tax professional). 
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Evidence for the influence of extraversion indicates that extroverts perform better 
(e.g., Alessandrini & Vecchione 2012) or are more likely to choose managerial career paths 
(Garden 1997). Studies indicating the contrary (e.g., Hayes et al. 1994) are not concerned with 
professions comparable to those in the tax field. Again, because the studies examining the 
impact of extraversion to job satisfaction confirm the results observed for job performance 
(e.g., Furnham et al. 1999), we expect extraversion to have a positive effect on our experience 
measures. 
Although evidence is underrepresented, agreeableness has also been found to facilitate 
higher job performance (Rothmann & Coetzer 2003). Because there are no results regarding 
agreeableness and job satisfaction stating the opposite and we assume that agreeable 
employees are more adaptive and do not easily tend to criticize the status quo, the overall 
impact on our experience measures should be positive. 
Prior studies only find conflicting evidence with respect to the influence of openness 
on job performance (Rothmann & Coetzer 2003, Hayes et al. 1994) and no significant impact 
on job satisfaction. However, concerning the idea that people scoring high in openness have a 
preference for new experiences, we suggest that such people are more likely change firms or 
jobs. Hence, we expect an inverse relation between openness and our experience measures. 
In sum, we expect that experience is affected by personality traits and therefore 
anticipate an indirect effect of personality traits on tax aggressiveness, which leads to our final 
hypotheses: 
H7: The Big Five personality traits affect professional experience. 
H8: The Big Five personality traits indirectly affect advice aggressiveness via the effect 
on professional experience. 
Our hypotheses are summarized in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1: Hypotheses Overview. 
2.4 Sample and Survey Instrument  
2.4.1 Sample 
We invited 650 tax employees of a Big Four firm and 250 economics or business 
administration students, who take tax and accounting classes at four different German 
universities, to participate in an online survey.
4
 We received answers from 69 tax 
professionals and 71 tax students. We removed three subjects from the professional sample 
and 14 subjects from the student sample because these subjects did not answer the questions 
seriously or they are identified as outliers.
5
 Therefore, our final sample consists of two peer 
groups comprising 66 tax professionals as well as 57 tax students.  
The tax professionals work in different areas of the service line “Tax” for the same 
Big Four firm in Germany and have at least a managers’ degree6 (manager: 37, senior 
manager: 20, partner/director: 8). The professional group consists of 20 females and 46 males, 
with only two subjects having not passed a professional exam to become a tax advisor, 
lawyer, or CPA. The tax student group consists of 19 females and 38 males. Thereof, 33 
                                                     
4 The survey has been designed and performed by using LimeService a service platform of Carsten Schmitz - 
LimeSurvey.com: http://www.limeservice.com. 
5 The following cases were identified as not having been answered seriously: One tax professional recommending 
approving a tax-structuring idea that bears a 100% risk of failure, and thirteen students demanded fees below the given 
costs of the firm. Outliers were detected by applying the method of mean plus or minus three SD to the tax 
aggressiveness and the sums of the items indicating the particular personality trait of the Big Five. There are no outliers 
with respect to tax aggressiveness, whereas the scores regarding conscientiousness and agreeableness each showed two 
outliers. Because one subject was classified as being an outlier with respect to both personality traits, the total number of 
outliers is three. We furthermore compared the time the particular subject needed to answer the questionnaire to a 
threshold that we suggest to be the required minimum time. However, no observations have been removed from the 
sample in course of this plausibility test. 
6 One participant did not indicate her degree. 
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students are bachelor students and 24 master students with an average absolved length of 
study of 4 (bachelor students) and 9 semesters (master students).  
2.4.2 Survey Instrument 
All subjects were asked to perform an online survey whose questions can be found in 
Appendix A. Subjects did not receive any payments. First, we presented a tax planning setting 
to the subjects and asked whether they were willing to propose the execution of a specific tax 
planning idea to a client. The probability that the financial administration challenges the 
restructuring and wins in the case of litigation (failure probability) was supposed to be 
approximately 50%.  
The second question asked the subjects to indicate the maximum risk that they allow 
to be inherent in the tax planning task if they were willing to provide a positive 
recommendation for the implementation. We use the answer to the second question as our 
measure of tax aggressiveness. This corresponds to U.S. preparer penalty provisions (IRC 
Sec. 6694 (a) (2)). Moreover, this approach of directly measuring the willingness to take tax 
risks offers the advantage of being able to isolate the direct effects of experience and 
personality traits on the willingness to take tax risks. If we had given participants a specific 
tax case and then asked for their recommendations, experience and personality traits would 
have also affected the outcome expectation (e.g., subjects’ estimated probability to prevail in 
negotiations with the IRS). Indeed, as noted by O’Donnell et al. (2005), a vast majority of 
previous studies do not control for the interactions of experience and outcome expectations. 
Our approach avoids this potential drawback because we ensure that the tax risk objectively 
included in the task of our study equals the tax risk subjectively recognized by the 
participants. To control if the subjects seriously answer the questionnaire we added a third 
question that asks them to quote the fee they would charge to the client for preparing a memo 
with the indicated failure probability. For this purpose we provided information about the 
effort necessary for the preparation. In case of the students, we provided the given costs for 
the memo. Subjects quoting fees below the given costs have been removed from the sample 
due to a lack of seriousness when answering the questionnaire. 
To measure the effect of reputation risk, subjects were randomly assigned to either a 
treatment including reputation risk or a treatment excluding potential reputation damage. In 
the latter (former) case, subjects were explicitly told that the firm would not have to fear 
reputational losses (would have to fear reputational losses due to negative press coverage that 
claims a consulting error). 
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The utilized tax planning setting controls for a set of variables that have been observed 
to influence tax aggressiveness in previous studies, namely reputational losses, the importance 
of the client, the value of tax savings, client loss, the ambiguity and the kind of prior evidence, 
the possibility of being liable to client, as well as the effort needed to provide advice to the 
client. Hence, there should be no differences in perceptions about these variables and 
therefore no influence on tax aggressiveness.  
The second chapter of the questionnaire asked the subjects to provide personal 
information such as sex, age, work experience, professional examinations, and general risk 
attitudes. We use the years working as a tax professional and, alternatively, in robustness 
checks the years working at the accounting firm to measure the subjects’ experience. We use 
an experimentally validated question to measure general risk attitude for which data of a 
representative sample of the German population exist (Dohmen et al. 2011). Thus, we are able 
to compare the risk attitude of the sample to the general risk attitude in the population. 
In the third chapter of the questionnaire, we used a 15-item design developed by 
Gerlitz and Schupp (2005) - the so called “BFI-S” - to control for the Big Five personality 
traits. Within the BFI–S, each of the five personality factors is measured with 3 items on a 7-
point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The reliability and validity 
of this short version of the Big Five approach has been approved by the aforementioned 
authors and is used in different waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) survey 
(Lang et al. 2011). The German SOEP (Wagner et al. 2007) is a representative household 
panel study with probability sampling that has been conducted annually since 1984. As with 
the general risk attitude, we are able to compare sample results with attitudes observed for the 
population. To obtain a parsimonious representation for the five personality traits, we 
conducted a principal components factor analysis followed by varimax rotation because this is 
the most prevalent method in prior research (for a review see Caruso & Cliff 1997). Our 
results confirm the results of Gerlitz and Schupp (2005) because the same three items mainly 
represent one of the aggregated five personality factors. The five dummy factors emerged 
with eigenvalues of OPENNESS = 1.945, CONSCIENTIOUSNESS = 1.650, 
EXTRAVERSION = 2.281, AGREEABLENESS = 1.690, and NEUROTICISM = 2.161 
explaining 65% of the total variance in the data. The respective factor loadings are shown in 
Appendix B.  
18 
 
2.5 Estimation Strategy 
2.5.1 Direct Effects 
To test for the proposed direct effects, we estimate the following system of equations 
using maximum likelihood: 
EXPERIENCE   = 𝛼10 + 𝛼11OPENNESS + 𝛼12CONSCIENTIOUSNESS + 𝛼13EXTRAVERSION
+ 𝛼14AGREEABLENESS + 𝛼15NEUROTICISM + 𝜀1 
(1) 
  
RISK_PROP       
= 𝛼20 + 𝛼21OPENNESS + 𝛼22CONSCIENTIOUSNESS + 𝛼23EXTRAVERSION
+ 𝛼24AGREEABLENESS + 𝛼25NEUROTICISM + 𝜀2 
(2) 
  
TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS  
= 𝛼30 +  𝛼31REP_LOSS +  𝛼32EXPERIENCE +  𝛼33RISK_PROP
+  𝛼34OPENNESS + 𝛼35CONSCIENTIOUSNESS + 𝛼36EXTRAVERSION
+ 𝛼37AGREEABLENESS + 𝛼38NEUROTICISM + 𝜀3 
(3) 
EXPERIENCE reflects participants’ professional experience measured as years 
working in the field of tax advisory services. As subjects only indicated whether they already 
work in this sector for less than three years, between three and five, five and ten, ten and 
fifteen, fifteen and twenty, or more than twenty years, we chose the particular class-middle to 
design an experience measure that allows for a metric interpretation.
7
 OPENNESS, 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, EXTRAVERSION, AGREEABLENESS and NEUROTICISM 
represent participants’ Big Five personality traits as determined by the aforementioned factor 
analysis. RISK_PROP indicates subjects risk propensity on the given scale from zero (“not at 
all willing to take risks”) to ten (“very willing to take risks”). TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS 
measures participants’ tax aggressiveness as indicated by the maximum risk the participants 
are ready to accept. The dummy variable REP_LOSS controls for the effect of reputational 
losses by indicating the treatment to which the particular subject was assigned (“1”= “setting 
with reputational losses”; “0” = “setting without reputational losses”). There are no significant 
differences between the two treatment groups regarding age, overall risk propensity, 
experience or the personality traits (Mann-Whitney-U-Tests) and no significant differences 
regarding grade, professional exam and main field of working expertise (Chi-squared tests).
8
 
                                                     
7 The value of EXPERIENCE is 0 for the tax students as we investigate the impact of professional experience, and 1.5, 4, 
7.5, 12.5, 17.5, and 25 for participants working less than three years, between three and five, between five and ten years, 
between ten and fifteen years, between fifteen and twenty years, and more than twenty years in the field of tax advisory. 
8 Chi-squared testing shows significant differences between the treatment groups regarding gender (p = 0.049, married vs. 
not married subjects (p = 0.084) and the question whether subjects hold a CPA exam or not (p = 0.093). However, we 
obtain qualitatively the same results to the ones presented in the following if we include these controls in our models. 
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2.5.2 Indirect Effects 
Next, we calculate the hypothesized indirect effects by multiplying the corresponding 
direct effects (Baron and Kenny 1986). For example, we obtain the indirect effect of openness 
via risk propensity by multiplying  𝛼21 and 𝛼33. The calculation of asymptotic standard errors 
of the indirect effect is based on the multivariate delta method (Bishop et al. 1975, Sobel 
1982, 1986). Statistical significance is derived through a comparison of the indirect effect 
divided by the asymptotic standard errors to a standard normal distribution (see MacKinnon et 
al. 2007 for a review). 
2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 presents descriptive results for TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS. On average, 
subjects are willing to provide a positive recommendation for the tax planning structure up to 
a failure probability of 35.53%. Panel A of Table 2.1 displays the average tax aggressiveness 
levels depending on the treatment, i.e., with or without potential reputation risks. The results 
show that the existence of a potential reputation loss significantly reduces tax aggressiveness 
(p = 0.001, Mann-Whitney-U) which is in line with hypothesis H1. Panel B of Table 2.1 
shows tax aggressiveness for different levels of experience. The results indicate that tax 
aggressiveness decreases with increasing years of experience and thus support hypothesis H2. 
Tax students are more aggressive than tax professionals (p = 0.033, Mann-Whitney-U) and 
subjects with more than five years of working experience are less aggressive (p = 0.025, 
Mann-Whitney-U). Moreover, in line with H3 the descriptive results indicate that tax 
aggressiveness is positively related to overall risk propensity as participants, who demonstrate 
a high risk aversion take lower tax risks than participants with a low risk aversion (p = 0.003, 
Mann-Whitney-U). 
Panel D of Table 2.1 displays tax aggressiveness for different levels of personality 
traits. We find that less extraverted subjects are less tax aggressive (p = 0.010, Mann-
Whitney-U). The difference in accepted tax risk between high and low extraverted subjects is 
large and amounts to nine percentage points. However, the direction of this effect is surprising 
because extraversion is generally associated with higher risk taking and sometimes also 
aggression. An explanation might be that extraverts have a preference to receive attention or 
to be in the spotlight. This tendency might be connected with a high preference for face-
saving. Hence, actions resulting in potential losses of personal reputation could be unpopular 
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for people scoring high in extraversion. Regarding the other personality traits we do not 
observe any significant differences. Overall, these results provide limited evidence for 
hypothesis H6. 
Panel A of Table 2.2 compares risk aversion and personality traits between our sample 
and the German population. Subjects in our sample are significantly less conscious 
(p = 0.000, Mann-Whitney-U) and less neurotic (p = 0.068, Mann-Whitney-U). Regarding the 
other personality traits and risk aversion, we find no significant differences between our 
sample and the German population. Panel B of Table 2.2 presents the values of risk 
propensity and personality traits for different levels of experience. The data indicate that 
personality traits affect professional experience (H7). In particular, neuroticism has a negative 
effect (p = 0.039, Mann-Whitney-U) on years of experience, whereas conscientiousness 
positively influences years of experience (p = 0.016, Mann-Whitney-U). Panel C of Table 2.2 
presents personality traits for different levels of risk aversion. In line with H4, the data 
indicate that personality traits affect general risk aversion. Subjects, who are more open to 
experience (p = 0.030, Mann-Whitney-U) and are less neurotic (p = 0.000, Mann-Whitney-
U), display lower levels of risk aversion.  
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 TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Median Sign. 
Total 123 35.53 20.06 30.00  
Panel A: Reputation Loss  
Potential reputation loss 66 29.88 18.61 28.50 0.001 
No Potential reputation loss 57 42.07 19.84 50.00 
Panel B: Experience  
Tax Students 57 39.46 19.97 40.00 0.033 
0.043 
Tax Professionals 66 32.14 19.66 27.50 
Working experience ≤ 5 years 67 39.00 19.38 35.00 0.025 
0.245 
0.035 
Working experience > 5 years 56 31.37 20.25 27.50 
Panel C: Risk Propensity  
High risk aversion 52 29.65 19.66 20.00 0.003 
Low risk aversion 71 39.83 19.37 50.00 
Panel D: Personality Traits  
OPENNESS high 62 35.03 19.54 30.00 0.831 
low 61 36.03 20.73 33.00 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS high 61 34.87 20.81 30.00 0.581 
low 62 36.18 19.45 33.00 
EXTRAVERSION  high 62 31.03 20.01 26.00 0.010 
low 61 40.10 19.22 35.00 
AGREEABLENESS high 62 36.63 19.88 34.00 0.468 
low 61 34.41 20.35 30.00 
NEUROTICISM high 62 33.44 21.05 27.50 0.188 
low 61 37.66 18.94 35.00 
 
The table presents the descriptive results regarding subjects’ tax aggressiveness (measured as the maximum tax 
risk subjects are willing to accept in percent). Panel A displays tax aggressiveness for the two treatment groups, 
i.e., with and without potential reputation losses. Panel B shows tax aggressiveness for different levels of working 
experience. Panel C displays tax aggressiveness for different levels of risk propensity. Subjects must indicate their 
general risk propensity on a scale ranging from zero (“not at all willing to take risks”) to ten (“very willing to take 
risks”). Subjects with values ≤ 3 (>3) are classified as having high (low) risk aversion. Panel D shows tax 
aggressiveness for different levels of the Big Five personality traits. The personality traits are dichotomized at the 
median. High (low) denotes values above (below) the median. Statistical significance refers to the p-values for the 
Mann-Whitney-U-Test. 
Table 2.1: Descriptive results of subjects’ tax aggressiveness. 
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 Risk Propensity Personality Traits   
 Mean Sign. Open- 
ness 
Sign. Conscien-
tiousness 
Sign. Extra-
version 
Sign. Agree-
ableness 
Sign. Neuro-
ticism 
Sign. 
Panel A: Sample versus population    
Sample  
 4.14 
(1.95) 
0.372 
4.33 
(1.23) 
0.620 
5.51 
(0.84) 
0.000 
4.82 
(1.21) 
0.509 
5.24 
(0.81) 
0.220 
3.59 
(1.32) 
0.068 
German 
Population 
 4.31 
(2.31) 
4.35 
(1.29) 
5.79 
(1.00) 
4.76 
(1.17) 
5.33 
(1.01) 
3.82 
(1.23) 
Panel B: Experience   
Tax Students 4.11 
(1.94) 
0.886 
4.47 
(1.22) 
0.373 
5.40 
(0.89) 
0.258 
4.98 
(1.23) 0.116 
 
5.29 
(0.87) 
0.461 
3.70 
(1.46) 
0.459 
Tax Professionals 4.17 
(1.97) 
4.21 
(1.23) 
5.61 
(0.79) 
4.68 
(1.18) 
5.20 
(0.77) 
3.49 
(1.19) 
Years working as a tax professional ≤ 5  4.04 
(1.89) 
0.598 
4.46 
(1.17) 
0.272 
5.33 
(0.87) 
0.016 
4.85 
(1.23) 
0.674 
5.30 
(0.82) 
0.356 
3.82 
(1.44) 
0.039 
Years working as a tax professional > 5 4.25 
(2.03) 
4.17 
(1.27) 
5.73 
(0.75) 
4.78 
(1.19) 
5.17 
(0.81) 
3.30 
(1.10) 
Panel C: Risk Propensity 
High risk aversion   4.04 
(1.26) 
0.030 
5.56 
(0.75) 
0.484 
4.62 
(1.18) 
0.131 
5.29 
(0.76) 
0.603 
4.10 
(1.13) 
0.000 
Low risk aversion   4.54 
(1.16) 
5.47 
(0.91) 
4.97 
(1.22) 
5.21 
(0.86) 
3.21 
(1.32) 
The table shows the mean of subjects’ risk propensity and Big Five personality traits. Each of the five personality factors is measured with three items on a 7-point Likert scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The table displays the mean of the three items indicating the particular trait. Standard deviations are presented in brackets. Panel 
A compares risk aversion (according to the German SOEP year 2010) and personality traits (according to the German SOEP year 2009) between the population and our sample. 
Panel B shows risk aversion and personality traits for different measures of experience. Panel C presents personality traits for different levels of risk propensity. The 
dichotomization of RISK_PROP made for this purpose is the same as explained for Table 2.1. Statistical significance refers to the p-values for the Mann-Whitney-U-Test. 
Table 2.2: Descriptive results of subjects’ Big Five personality traits and risk aversion.  
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2.6.2 Multivariate Analysis 
2.6.2.1 Direct Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EXPERIENCE RISK_PROP TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS 
    
EXPERIENCE   -0.721*** 
   (0.242) 
RISK_PROP   3.214*** 
   (0.936) 
REP_LOSS   -9.662*** 
   (3.245) 
OPENNESS -1.255** 0.491*** -1.967 
 (0.616) (0.177) (1.592) 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 1.074** -0.0777 1.534 
 (0.498) (0.157) (1.354) 
EXTRAVERSION  0.0224 0.188 -3.683** 
 (0.501) (0.151) (1.628) 
AGREEABLENESS -0.319 -0.192 2.318 
 (0.579) (0.161) (1.425) 
NEUROTICISM -1.488*** -0.808*** 0.876 
 (0.497) (0.146) (1.639) 
Constant 5.427*** 4.138*** 31.33*** 
 (0.545) (0.152) (5.002) 
    
R-squared 0.121 0.255 0.223 
Wald Chi2 17.85** 47.47*** 53.90*** 
The first two models of the table display the direct effects of the personality traits represented by OPENNESS, 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, EXTRAVERSION, AGREEABLENESS and NEUROTICISM on participants’ 
experience (EXPERIENCE) and risk aversion (RISK_PROP). The third model in turn reflects the direct impact 
of all the aforementioned variables and potential reputational losses (REP_LOSS) on subjects’ tax 
aggressiveness (TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS). The number of observations amounts to 123 for all regression 
results depicted. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, p < 0.1 
Table 2.3: Regression results for direct effects. 
Table 2.3 displays the regression results for the direct effects hypothesized by H1-H4, 
H6 and H7. The results confirm the previous bivariate analysis. Personality traits affect 
professional experience (H7). In addition to the negative (positive) effect of neuroticism 
(conscientiousness) the regression results indicate that openness for experiences negatively 
influences years of experience (p = 0.042). In line with H4 and prior research (e.g., Nicholson 
et al. 2005, Soane & Chmiel 2005), risk propensity is affected by the Big Five. Neuroticism 
decreases (p = 0.000) and openness increases (p = 0.005) risk propensity. Finally, consistent 
with H1, H2, H3, tax experts’ tax aggressiveness is reduced by reputation risk (p = 0.003), 
increasing professional experience (p = 0.003), higher levels of risk aversion (p = 0.001). 
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Regarding the hypothesized direct effect of the Big Five personality traits (H6), we 
find limited evidence. Only extraversion (negatively) affects advice aggressiveness 
(p = 0.024).  
2.6.2.2 Indirect effects 
Table 2.4 displays the indirect effects of the personality traits via experience and 
general risk propensity on tax aggressiveness. First, regarding the indirect effects mediated by 
professional experience (H8), the results reveal a negative indirect effect of conscientiousness 
and a positive indirect effect of neuroticism on tax aggressiveness. Second, regarding the 
indirect effects mediated by risk propensity (H5), we observe significant indirect effects of 
openness and neuroticism.  
VARIABLES TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS 
Panel A: Indirect effects via professional experience 
 
 
EXPERIENCE × OPENNESS 0.9044 
 (0.572) 
EXPERIENCE × CONSCIENTIOUSNESS -0.7743* 
 (0.450) 
EXPERIENCE × EXTRAVERSION -0.0162 
 (0.361) 
EXPERIENCE × AGREEABLENESS 0.2299 
 (0.399) 
EXPERIENCE × NEUROTICISM 1.0724** 
 (0.489) 
Panel B: Indirect effects via risk propensity 
 
 
RISK_PROP × OPENNESS 1.5795** 
 (0.688) 
RISK_PROP × CONSCIENTIOUSNESS -0.2498 
 (0.516) 
RISK_PROP × EXTRAVERSION 0.6035 
 (0.488) 
RISK_PROP × AGREEABLENESS -0.6165 
 (0.559) 
RISK_PROP × NEUROTICISM -2.597*** 
 (0.821) 
  
Observations 123 
The table shows the indirect effect of the personality traits represented by OPENNESS, 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, EXTRAVERSION, AGREEABLENESS and NEUROTICISM on 
participants’ tax aggressiveness. Panel A presents the indirect effects via professional experience 
(EXPERIENCE), while Panel B presents the indirect effects via participants’ general risk propensity 
(REP_LOSS). Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, p < 0.1 
Table 2.4: Indirect effects on tax aggressiveness. 
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Openness indirectly increases tax aggressiveness by increasing subject’s risk 
propensity. By contrast, neuroticism lowers risk propensity such that we observe a negative 
indirect effect on tax aggressiveness. With respect to neuroticism we thus find two opposing 
indirect effects. On the one hand, neuroticism negatively affects the experience measure and 
thus (indirectly) increases tax aggressiveness. On the other hand, subjects’ neuroticism lowers 
their risk propensity which in turn reduces their advice aggressiveness. 
2.6.3 Robustness Checks 
In this subsection we present the results of two robustness checks. The first test 
demonstrates that the presented results are robust with respect to another measure of 
experience; the second test shows that our main results also hold if we consider the tax 
professionals’ sample only.  
2.6.3.1 Different Measure of Professional Experience 
As described above our experience measure is designed by referring to the years the 
particular subject works in the field of tax advisory services. In this section, we use a second 
indicator for experience, referring to the years of firm affiliation. The use of this alternative 
experience measure ensures that there are no distortions resulting from the difference between 
pure professional experience and organizational socialization. The corresponding variable is 
labeled FIRM_AFFILIATION. As subjects only indicated whether they already worked less 
than three years, between three and five, five and ten, ten and fifteen, fifteen and twenty, or 
more than twenty years in the firm, we chose the particular class-middle to design an 
experience measure that allows for a metric interpretation.
9
 Hence, we adjust equation (1) to 
calculate the direct effects of the Big Five personality traits on experience as follows: 
 
FIRM_AFFILIATION = 𝛼10 + 𝛼11OPENNESS + 𝛼12CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 
                                           +𝛼13EXTRAVERSION + 𝛼14AGREEABLENESS + 𝛼15NEUROTICISM + 𝜀1 
(4) 
 
The results for this robustness check are displayed in Appendix C and confirm our 
main results regarding the direct effects discussed before. Reputation risk, experience, and 
                                                     
9 The value of FIRM_AFFILIATION is 0 for the tax students, and 1.5, 4, 7.5, 12.5, 17.5, and 25 for participants working 
less than three years, between three and five, between five and ten years, between ten and fifteen years, between fifteen 
and twenty years, and more than twenty years in the field of tax advisory. 
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extraversion reduce tax aggressiveness, whereas risk propensity increases tax aggressiveness. 
In contrast to our previously presented results, we find an additional direct effect of one Big 
Five personality trait: Agreeableness positively affects tax aggressiveness (p = 0.069). 
However, regarding the indirect effects mediated by experience we find a (weakly) 
significant positive effect of openness on tax aggressiveness while we find no significant 
indirect effects of conscientiousness and neuroticism using FIRM_AFFILIATION as 
experience measure. Thus, we obtain slight differences between both experience measures. 
The indirect effects regarding the impact of personality traits on tax aggressiveness via risk 
propensity are consistent with the findings discussed above.  
2.6.3.2 Robustness of results for tax professionals’ sample 
Although using tax students as substitutes for junior tax staff having comprehensive tax 
knowledge but only minor working experience should be appropriate from our point of view, 
this approach might lead to distortions. To test the robustness of our results concerning this 
issue, we conduct additional analyses for the tax professionals’ sample only. The results are 
presented in Appendix D.  
First, the robustness test confirms our main results regarding the direct effects of 
personality traits on general risk aversion and professional experience irrespective of whether 
we use pure professional experience (EXPERIENCE) or organizational socialization 
(FIRM_AFFILIATION) as experience measure. However, conscientiousness is not found to 
influence experience in both variations anymore. 
The results of the robustness check also show negative significant effects for 
extraversion and reputation risk on tax aggressiveness, confirming our results above. 
However, experience is only found to affect tax aggressiveness directly if firm affiliation is 
used as experience indicator. Further research should investigate whether there is a kind of 
“organizational bias”, i.e., whether it is relevant for tax experts’ tax aggressiveness if working 
experience was gained in a certain company (type). 
Furthermore, irrespective of the experience measure used, we do not find any 
significant direct impact of general risk aversion on tax aggressiveness in the tax 
professionals’ sample. Hence, further research would be necessary to investigate whether there 
is a robust relationship between general risk propensity and experts’ tax risk taking or if the 
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results found in our main analysis are induced by the tax students who might use other inner 
landmarks to determine their level of tax aggressiveness than more experienced tax 
professionals.  
2.7 Conclusions 
This study analyzes how the Big Five personality traits, professional experience, 
overall risk propensity and reputation risk affect the aggressiveness of tax experts’ tax 
planning recommendations. We conduct an online survey among tax professionals working at 
a Big Four accounting firm as well as among tax students. As a measure of tax aggressiveness, 
we use the maximal chance of failure a professional is willing to accept for providing a 
positive recommendation. 
Our results indicate that reputation risk, professional experience, and risk aversion 
significantly decrease tax experts’ advice aggressiveness. Moreover, we find direct and 
indirect effects of the Big Five personality traits on tax aggressiveness. Regarding the direct 
effects of the Big Five, we only find extraversion to have a robust direct (negative) effect on 
tax aggressiveness. However, we find additional indirect effects of the personality traits via 
professional experience and risk attitude. Our results indicate that conscientiousness 
(neuroticism) is positively (negatively) related to professional experience and thus indirectly 
decreases (increases) tax aggressiveness. Regarding neuroticism there is an opposing negative 
indirect effect, via risk propensity, because neuroticism is negatively related to risk propensity 
which in turn is positively associated with tax aggressiveness. Finally, there is also an indirect 
positive effect of openness on tax aggressiveness, via risk propensity. Overall, we thus 
conclude that the Big Five personality traits should be considered in future tax compliance 
research. Moreover, we propose that future research should reconsider the relation between 
overall risk propensity and advice aggressiveness. While we obtain the expected positive 
relation in the total sample, we, surprisingly, do not find a significant effect of overall risk 
propensity in the sample using only experienced tax professionals. 
Of course, we are aware of the fact that our study is subject to limitations as especially 
the sample of tax professionals is relatively small, and we use a hypothetical scenario. Hence, 
it might be that subjects’ responses in real-life settings providing real monetary incentives are 
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different from the effects shown in our study. However, we use a randomized between-subject 
design and there is no theoretical reason why the observed direct and indirect effects should 
not extend to actual behavior in real-world settings.  
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2.8 APPENDIX A – Questionnaire (translated extract, original: German) 
2.8.1 Section I 
 
Setting I [II] 
Please imagine the following situation: 
An important client asks you for a cost estimate for the preparation of a tax opinion regarding a tax planning 
idea you proposed to her on the phone. The solely national restructuring should result in tax savings of 
€ 1,400,000. 
Because your tax planning idea is based on jurisprudence that is not yet affirmed by the Federal Fiscal Court, 
the likelihood that the financial administration will challenge the restructuring and will win in case of 
litigation is supposed to be ~50%. If this were the case, you would not have to fear a loss of the client; 
however, the client would reclaim the fees paid to you. Your liability insurance would not bear this amount 
due to the lack of a consulting error. 
Your company would not have to fear reputational losses. [Notwithstanding, your company would have to 
fear reputational losses due to negative press coverage that claims a consulting error.] 
For the preparation of the opinion, you assess 80 hours of work to be performed by a second-year assistant 
and an additional 20 hours for the review by a senior manager. [The preparation of the opinion should 
require 100 working hours that imply full costs of € 12,000.] 
 
Question 1: 
With a view to the risk mentioned above, would you prepare the requested memo advising the client to execute 
the restructuring? 
 I advise the client to execute the restructuring: □ yes □ no 
 
Question 2: 
According to your first answer, you would [not] advise the client to execute the restructuring if the failure 
probability amounts to approx. 50%. Please indicate the marginal failure probability that was allowed to be 
inherent to the tax planning task if you give a positive recommendation for the implementation. 
 [Answers must be indicated via a scrollbar comprising the values from 0% to 100%.] 
 
Question 3: 
With a view to the failure probability of [X]%, how high are the fees you would approx. quote to the client for the 
preparation of the memo? Please see below for a repetition of the setting. 
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2.8.2 Section II 
1) How many years of experience do you have as a tax accountant? 
a) less than 3 years b) 3-5 years c) 5-10 years 
d) 10-15 years  e) 15-20 years f) more than 20 years 
2) How many years have you already worked in your company? 
a) less than 3 years b) 3-5 years c) 5-10 years 
d) 10-15 years  e) 15-20 years f) more than 20 years 
3) What position do you hold in your firm? 
a) Manager  b) Senior Manager 
c) Director  d) Partner e) Other 
6) Which professional examinations did you pass? 
a) Tax Advisor  b) German CPA 
c) CPA   d) Other 
(…)10 
20) How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid 
taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means “not at all willing to take risks” and the 
value 10 means “very willing to take risks”. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Risk propensity            
  
                                                     
10
 The complete set of questions is accessible upon request at blaufus@steuern.uni-hannover.de.  
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2.8.3 Section III 
Now, let us turn to something completely different. Our everyday actions are influenced by our fundamental 
convictions. Today’s research indicates that little is known about these convictions. Below, you will find some 
characteristics that a person can have. Some characteristics may apply to your personality fully or not at all. 
Regarding other characteristics, you might not be sure. Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means 
“not applicable at all” and the value 7 means “fully applicable”. With the values between 1 and 7, you can adjust 
your assessment. 
I am someone who … 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… works thoroughly        
… is communicative, talkative        
… is sometimes a little bit rough to others        
… is original, brings in new ideas        
… often worries about things        
… is able to forgive        
… is rather lazy        
… is able to come out of her shell, is sociable        
… likes artistic experiences        
… gets nervous easily        
… fulfills tasks in an effective and efficient manner         
… is reserved        
… is considerate and friendly        
… has a vivid phantasy/imagination        
… is relaxed, can easily handle stress        
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2.9 APPENDIX B: Personality Traits (results of the factor analysis) 
Item Factor 
I am someone who 1 
OPENNESS 
2 
CONSCIEN-
TIOUSNESS 
3 
EXTRA-
VERSION 
4 
AGREE-
ABLENESS 
5 
NEURO-
TICISM 
…      
works thoroughly -.071 .781 -.023 .140 -.017 
is communicative, talkative .150 .132 .820 .021 -.103 
is sometimes a little bit rough to others (reverse coded) -.035 .027 -.074 .752 .014 
is original, brings in new ideas .754 .115 .267 -.111 -.141 
often worries about things .230 .035 -.182 .112 .817 
is able to forgive .000 .025 .522 .307 -.122 
is rather lazy (reverse coded) -.147 .667 .064 -.222 -.010 
is able to come out of her shell, is sociable .212 -.055 .835 -.028 -.052 
likes artistic experiences .663 -.072 .152 .193 .059 
gets nervous easily .001 -.091 -.013 .088 .852 
fulfills tasks in an effective and efficient manner  .203 .709 .041 .231 -.238 
is reserved (reverse coded) .260 -.028 .695 -.395 .078 
is considerate and friendly .093 .059 .085 .777 -.005 
has a vivid phantasy/imagination .812 -.097 .088 -.040 .149 
is relaxed, can easily handle stress (reverse coded) -.111 -.171 -.032 -.276 .794 
 -.071 .781 -.023 .140 -.017 
The table presents the rotated component matrix for the results of factor analysis (Method: principal component analysis). 
The rotation converged in 5 iterations (Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization). 
Table 2.5: Factor analysis for personality items. 
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2.10 APPENDIX C: Different Measure of Professional Experience 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES FIRM_AFFILIATION RISK_PROP TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS 
    
FIRM_AFFILIATION   -0.878*** 
   (0.280) 
RISK_PROP   3.074*** 
   (0.931) 
REP_LOSS   -9.624*** 
   (3.230) 
OPENNESS -1.316** 0.491*** -2.152 
 (0.583) (0.177) (1.594) 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 0.587 -0.0777 1.264 
 (0.474) (0.157) (1.313) 
EXTRAVERSION  -0.160 0.188 -3.816** 
 (0.476) (0.151) (1.622) 
AGREEABLENESS 0.0341 -0.192 2.552* 
 (0.550) (0.161) (1.403) 
NEUROTICISM -0.752* -0.808*** 1.173 
 (0.455) (0.146) (1.611) 
Constant 4.411*** 4.138*** 31.84*** 
 (0.515) (0.152) (5.032) 
    
R-squared 0.075 0.255 0.240 
Wald Chi2 8.97 47.47*** 65.88*** 
The first two models of the table display the direct effects of the personality traits represented by OPENNESS, 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, EXTRAVERSION, AGREEABLENESS and NEUROTICISM on participants’ 
experience made in the Big Four firm at hand (FIRM_AFFILIATION) and risk aversion (RISK_PROP). The third 
column in turn reflects the direct impact of the all the aforementioned variables and potential reputational losses 
(REP_LOSS) on subjects’ tax aggressiveness (TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS). The number of observations amounts to 
123 for all results depicted. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, p < 0.1 
Table 2.6: Robustness check for firm affiliation as indicator for experience. 
  
 34 
 
 
VARIABLES TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS 
Panel A: Indirect effects via alternative experience measure 
 
FIRM_AFFILIATION × OPENNESS 1.1552* 
 (0.668) 
FIRM_AFFILIATION × CONSCIENTIOUSNESS -0.5549 
 (0.456) 
FIRM_AFFILIATION × EXTRAVERSION 0.1403 
 (0.419) 
FIRM_AFFILIATION × AGREEABLENESS -0.2993 
 (0.486) 
FIRM_AFFILIATION × NEUROTICISM 0.6599 
 (0.433) 
Panel B: Indirect effects via risk propensity 
 
 
RISK_PROP × OPENNESS 1.5109** 
 (0.676) 
RISK_PROP × CONSCIENTIOUSNESS -0.2389 
 (0.493) 
RISK_PROP × EXTRAVERSION 0.5773 
 (0.469) 
RISK_PROP × AGREEABLENESS -0.5898 
 (0.539) 
RISK_PROP × NEUROTICISM -2.484*** 
 (0.805) 
  
Observations 123 
The table presents the indirect effect of the personality traits represented by OPENNESS, 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, EXTRAVERSION, AGREEABLENESS and NEUROTICISM on 
participants’ tax aggressiveness. Panel A presents the indirect effects via professional experience 
measured by years working at the Big Four firm in question (FIRM_AFFILIATION), while Panel B 
presents the indirect effects via participants’ general risk propensity (REP_LOSS). Asymptotic 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, p < 0.1 
Table 2.7: Indirect effects on tax aggressiveness for firm affiliation as indicator for experience. 
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2.11 APPENDIX D: Robustness of Results for Tax Professionals’ Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EXPERIENCE RISK_PROP TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS 
    
EXPERIENCE   -0.414 
   (0.433) 
RISK_PROP   2.120 
   (1.444) 
REP_LOSS   -7.887* 
   (4.626) 
OPENNESS -1.518** 0.673*** -1.801 
 (0.770) (0.211) (2.418) 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 0.422 -0.283 -0.804 
 (0.612) (0.229) (2.415) 
EXTRAVERSION  0.777 0.169 -4.401* 
 (0.484) (0.204) (2.384) 
AGREEABLENESS -0.0434 -0.145 1.252 
 (0.633) (0.241) (2.274) 
NEUROTICISM -2.583*** -0.747*** 0.812 
 (0.569) (0.246) (3.214) 
Constant 9.789*** 4.227*** 31.40*** 
 (0.537) (0.213) (8.770) 
    
R-squared 0.280 0.269 0.148 
Wald Chi2 25.18*** 24.99** 15.52** 
The first two models of the table display the direct effects of the personality traits represented by OPENNESS, 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, EXTRAVERSION, AGREEABLENESS and NEUROTICISM on participants’ 
experience (EXPERIENCE) and risk aversion (RISK_PROP). The third column in turn reflects the direct 
impact of the all the aforementioned variables and potential reputational losses (REP_LOSS) on subjects’ tax 
aggressiveness (TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS). The number of observations amounts to 66 for all results 
depicted. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, p < 0.1 
Table 2.8: Robustness check for tax professionals’ sample. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES FIRM_AFFILIATION RISK_PROP TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS 
    
FIRM_AFFILIATION   -0.780* 
   (0.401) 
RISK_PROP   1.825 
   (1.430) 
REP_LOSS   -7.829* 
   (4.551) 
OPENNESS -1.616* 0.673*** -2.238 
 (0.850) (0.211) (2.348) 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 0.00791 -0.283 -1.054 
 (0.702) (0.229) (2.230) 
EXTRAVERSION  0.469 0.169 -4.308* 
 (0.576) (0.204) (2.267) 
AGREEABLENESS 0.424 -0.145 1.561 
 (0.748) (0.241) (2.196) 
NEUROTICISM -1.227* -0.747*** 0.702 
 (0.714) (0.246) (2.837) 
Constant 8.015*** 4.227*** 34.81*** 
 (0.653) (0.213) (8.398) 
    
R-squared 0.113 0.269 0.179 
Wald Chi2 6.46 24.99*** 21.37*** 
The first two columns of the table display the direct effects of the personality traits represented by OPENNESS, 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, EXTRAVERSION, AGREEABLENESS and NEUROTICISM on participants’ 
professional experience measured by years working at the Big Four firm in question (FIRM_AFFILIATION) 
and risk aversion (RISK_PROP). The third column in turn reflects the direct impact of the all the 
aforementioned variables and potential reputational losses (REP_LOSS) on subjects’ tax aggressiveness 
(TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS). The number of observations amounts to 66 for all results depicted. Standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, p < 0.1. 
Table 2.9: Robustness check for tax professionals’ sample with firm affiliation as indicator for 
experience. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3 Do Tax Preparer Penalties Matter? An Experimental Investigation11 
3.1 Introduction 
Tax preparers play a crucial role in most countries’ tax system. In particular, in self-
assessment systems such as Canada, the United Kingdom, or the United States of America the 
majority of tax returns are prepared by professional tax preparers (estimates range up to 
70%
12
). But also in other countries such as Germany where the revenue service assesses tax 
liabilities the percentage of taxpayers who are seeking advice in preparing their tax return is 
significant at least if one looks at taxpayers with more complex returns, e.g., self-employed 
individuals (Blaufus et al. 2014). Against this background, tax preparers can play a very 
significant role in achieving high levels of compliance (OECD 2013: 254) and it seems to be 
an obvious approach to increase tax compliance by monitoring and regulating tax preparers’ 
behavior. Their presumed impact on clients’ compliance, which can be exploiting or enforcing 
tax law (e.g., Kaplan et al. 1988, Klepper & Nagin 1989, Kittl 2015), can be more easily 
monitored than taxpayers as tax professionals are a much smaller group. In this vein, some 
countries (e.g., Canada
13
) started discussing the introduction of tax preparer registration 
programs that enable the revenue service to match tax returns and tax preparers and therefore 
allow the revenue service to identify tax preparers that recurrently file erroneous or very 
aggressive tax returns. Other countries such as the United States introduced tax preparer 
penalties that apply if a tax preparer’s recommendation is considered to be too aggressive 
when compared to a given reporting standard. “Reporting standard” means a minimum 
likelihood of sustaining a tax position on its merits that must be established (Hansen & White 
2012: 141). Before introducing tax preparer penalties in other countries, it is worth to study the 
effectiveness of these penalties. This is the purpose of the current paper. 
                                                     
11 The research paper that is the basis for Chapter 3 was co-authored with Prof. Dr. Kay Blaufus, Leibniz University of 
Hanover, email: blaufus@steuern.uni-hannover.de. 
12 In the USA more than 125 million individual tax returns were filed electronically in 2014, and 62% were prepared with 
the help of a paid return preparer (TAS 2014: xvi). In the UK 63% of self-assessed income tax returns have been prepared 
by paid tax intermediaries in 2010 (NAO 2010: 11). The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) even states that approximately 
70% of individual and business tax returns are usually prepared by using tax preparers (CRA 2014: 5). 
13 See CRA 2014. 
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Despite the above-mentioned institutional facts, prior tax compliance research with 
regard to penalties mainly focuses on individual taxpayer compliance (e.g., Allingham & 
Sandmo 1972, Yitzhaki 1974, Friedland et al. 1978). Nevertheless, there are also a number of 
studies examining the effect of tax preparer penalties. In sum, prior studies provide mixed 
results. While some researchers do not find evidence for the general effectiveness of preparer 
sanctions (Kaplan 1988, Duncan et al. 1989, LaRue & Reckers 1989), some find the expected 
negative effect (Reckers 1991, Newberry 1993, Anderson & Cuccia 2000, Hansen 2012), and 
others even demonstrate that penalties might increase tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness 
(explained with reactance theory by Cuccia 1994). One potential reason for the mixed results 
found in prior studies may be that preparer penalties have two different effects. On the one 
hand, imposing penalties acts as deterrence to recommending “aggressive” tax positions. 
Consistent with the deterrent function, one expects that tax preparers reduce their 
aggressiveness (as predicted by theoretical models, e.g., Reinganum & Wilde 1991, Klepper & 
Nagin 1989, Scholz 1997). On the other hand, penalties also have a definitional function: they 
define the borderline between compliance with the tax law and non-compliance (Doran 2009). 
In particular the required reporting standard may cause different individual responses to the 
introduction of preparer penalties depending on the preparer’s inclination to recommend 
aggressive positions. Suppose, in the absence of any penalties a preparer would choose not to 
recommend a tax position with a chance of winning below 75% and now the lawmaker 
introduces a preparer penalty with a likelihood threshold of 51% (“more likely than not”). By 
introducing this threshold, the lawmaker signals that a probability of success amounting to 
51% is sufficient to be compliant with current law. As the law does not only set prices for 
being non-compliant (the size of the penalty), but also expresses social values (Cooter 1998) 
the preparer might follow this new norm by reducing her “internal” threshold to the newly 
expressed norm, i.e., the preparer increases the aggressiveness of her advice. In contrast, a 
preparer with an internal probability threshold below 51%, has an incentive to decrease 
aggressiveness to reduce expected penalty costs. Therefore, we hypothesize that the effect of 
preparer penalties depends on the preparer’s ex ante inclination to recommend aggressive tax 
positions. 
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To test this hypothesis, we conduct a between-subject (survey) experiment with 62 
German tax professionals of a Big Four accounting firm. Participants are presented a 
hypothetical scenario with a client for whom they prepare the tax return. The client wishes to 
make a tax deduction. However, the legal facts are unclear and so we ask the preparer to 
indicate the minimum likelihood of client’s success in case of litigation which she feels 
necessary before taking the tax deduction in client’s tax return. Participants are randomly 
assigned to one of two treatment groups that differ solely with respect to the preparer penalty 
(with/without penalties being applicable). 
Our results confirm the expected interaction between preparer penalty and the 
individual inclination towards aggressive advice. Only tax preparers having a high inclination 
to provide aggressive tax advice decrease their level of tax aggressiveness if preparer penalties 
are introduced. Tax professionals with a low inclination to recommend aggressive tax 
positions increase their level of tax aggressiveness. Thus, the overall effectiveness of preparer 
penalties depends on the percentage of low-risk and high-risk preparers in a population. In our 
sample, the two opposing effects make preparer penalties on average an ineffective 
instrument. This challenges the general appropriateness of preparer penalty rules using 
likelihood thresholds to combat aggressive tax advice. Of course, our study is subject to some 
severe limitations. First, the sample size is relatively small. This is due to the difficulties to 
achieve high response rates of professional subjects. Second, we use a hypothetical scenario. It 
might be that subjects’ responses to real monetary incentives and penalties are more 
pronounced. We are keenly aware of these limitations, but we use a randomized between-
subject design and there is no theoretical reason why the observed opposing effects should not 
extend to actual behavior in real-world settings. We thus believe that our study provides a 
useful first step regarding the investigation of the complex effects of tax preparer penalties. 
Moreover, while we restrict our study to a tax setting, our results may be of interest for the 
general discussion regarding the impact of legal limits. Also, in other areas such as setting 
blood alcohol limits for driving or speed limits on highways the legal thresholds could trigger 
opposing behavioral effects.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we outline the 
basic institutional framework of tax preparers’ profession in Germany and derive our 
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hypotheses. In the third section, we describe the survey instrument and the sample. Section 
four describes the estimation strategy, and section five presents the results. Section six 
concludes.  
3.2 Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1 Institutional Framework for German Tax Professionals  
The German market for tax advisory services is uniformly and highly regulated since 
1972. Only lawyers, CPAs, or tax advisors, who have passed the required examination are 
allowed to provide advisory services in the field of taxes. Tax preparers in Germany are 
subject to professional supervision and are bound by professional ethics such as discretion or 
conscientiousness. The latter also comprises the need for a disclosure of all connected risks 
when providing advice to clients. At the same time, tax advisors are client advocates
14
 who are 
free to recommend every tax position that can be defended by evidence from law, literature, or 
case law. Tax avoidance as such is neither prohibited nor punishable as long as the taxpayer 
does not provide any inaccurate or incomplete information to the revenue service (Brown 
2011:165). There are especially no specific reporting standards like in U.S. law that must be 
fulfilled. Thus, even very aggressive tax positions can be endorsed as long as the tax advisor 
complies with professional ethics - in particular, unlimited client enlightenment - and does not 
support the client in tax evasion. If the latter is ensured tax preparers do not run the risk of 
being subject to penalties. In contrast to prior studies which all use U.S. professionals who are 
confronted with actual preparer penalties in their real working life, using a German sample has 
the advantage that German preparers could not mix the experimental penalty setting with a 
real-world penalty setting. This makes German preparers particularly appropriate to study the 
effect of an introduction of preparer penalties. 
3.2.2 Effectiveness of Introducing Preparer Penalty Provisions 
The question whether penalties are effective tools to increase compliance with legal 
rules has been extensively discussed in prior research. However, up to now studies 
                                                     
14 In Germany tax professionals are “independent bodies of the administration of justice”. Even though the younger literature 
emphasizes that the client advocacy role should be predominant when interpreting this term, there are still substantial 
voices in the literature and the jurisprudence highlighting that tax professionals are also a kind of longa manus (extended 
arm) of the financial administration. 
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investigating the effect of sanctions do only pay attention to the instrumental role of penalties, 
i.e., promoting tax compliance, and come to partly contradictory conclusions. On the one 
hand, the “economics of crime” based deterrence model assumes that taxpayers maximize 
their expected utility given a tax rate, detection probability, and fine (Allingham & Sandmo 
1972, Becker 1968, Andreoni et al. 1998). Because the expected fine reduces the return of 
non-compliance, an increasing penalty increases compliance. On the other hand, based on 
social psychology the “norms model” interprets the relationship between the government and 
the taxpayer as “psychological contract” (e.g., Feld & Frey 2007). As with normal contracts, 
behavior of the contracting parties is primarily affected by perceived exchange equity, i.e., 
fairness regarding the balance between taxes paid and benefits derived from public goods 
(e.g., Kirchler et al. 2008) as well as procedural equity, i.e., fairness regarding the procedural 
rules of the tax system and the interaction between taxpayers and tax administration (e.g., van 
Dijke & Verboon 2010, Verboon & van Dijke 2011). Within this context, expected penalties 
are considered only additionally and in interaction with subjects’ intrinsic motivation to pay 
taxes. In particular, it is argued that penalties can crowd out the intrinsic motivation to comply 
because they could be seen as a sign of distrust, which in turn reduces trust in authorities by 
honest taxpayers as suggested by the “slippery slope” model of Kirchler (2007) and Kirchler et 
al. (2008). Similarly, Wahl et al. (2010) and Kastlunger et al. (2013) find evidence for 
reactance to penalties based on the respective tax climate. With the exception of Doran (2009) 
prior research investigating the economic impact of penalties on tax compliance generally 
ignores the definitional function of penalties. The definition of reporting standards “marks off 
the boundaries of tax compliance” and establishes the standards of conduct that determine 
whether taxpayers comply with their tax obligations or not (Doran 2009: 139).  
Particularly, previous preparer penalty studies focus on the deterrent effect. The first 
studies investigating the effect of preparer penalties stimulated by deterrence theory do not 
find evidence for the effectiveness of sanctions (Kaplan et al. 1988, Duncan et al. 1989, LaRue 
& Reckers 1989). However, this might be due to the mere indirect introduction of penalties 
where the applicability of sanctions is varied by manipulating audit rates and, therefore, 
expected penalties. Studies varying the applicability of preparer penalty provisions in a direct 
way tend to confirm the basic effectiveness of these sanctions. Newberry et al. (1993) 
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conclude that there is a significantly lower likelihood that a tax practitioner would sign a tax 
return containing a large deduction associated with an ambiguous tax issue if tax preparer 
penalties are communicated with high enforcement. In their experiment, penalty itself is not 
varied across subjects, but one of the groups was told that the IRS district director intended to 
vigorously apply existing penalties. Using the same type of variation in the applicability of 
sanctions, Reckers et al. (1991) find that the threat of sanctions causes CPAs to be more 
conservative, at least with regard to signing decisions. Although moderated by locus of 
control, McGill’s (1988) results support the effectiveness of preparer penalty provisions, too. 
A more differentiated analysis of the effects of preparer penalties is provided by Anderson & 
Cuccia (2000). They show that increasing penalties provide incentives for practitioners to 
increase their fees as well as to reduce the aggressiveness of their advice. Both incentives were 
found to be moderated by the levels of competition and moral hazard in the environment. 
Besides the latter study only Cuccia (1994) pays attention to further potential responses of 
introducing or increasing penalty levels. His results suggest that increased sanctions may 
affect the effort invested by paid preparers in identifying legitimate ways of reducing their 
client’s tax liability while having little effect on how aggressively they interpret ambiguous 
issues. Although all aforementioned studies have been conducted in the USA none of them 
communicates the potential applicability of preparer penalties in a way that is comparable to 
the penalty provisions included in U.S. professional law.  
In the USA, tax preparers are subject to the Circular 230 rules which impose specific 
penalties on the tax preparer if her work does not meet certain reporting standards. As 
mentioned above “reporting standard” means a minimum likelihood of sustaining a tax 
position on its merits that must be established (Hansen & White 2012: 141). The required level 
of support depends on the nature of the item in question (Rothman 2011: 77). For items related 
to a tax shelter or a reportable transaction it must be reasonable to believe that a position 
would be more likely than not to be sustained. Items not related to tax shelters or reportable 
transactions that are (not) specifically disclosed on the return must be based on reasonable 
basis (substantial authority) which should be represented by a likelihood of 20%-30% (40%). 
If the required reporting standard is not met the penalty is equal to the greater of $1,000 or 
50% of the income derived by the preparer with respect to the questionable return. 
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The only studies testing the impact of preparer penalty provisions referring to a certain 
reporting standard are Hansen & White (2012) and Cuccia et al. (1995). The latter authors do 
not investigate the effect of introducing preparer penalties per se but examine whether 
replacing a reporting standard that employs a vague, verbal disclosure threshold with a 
standard that employs a more stringent, numerical threshold mitigates the aggressiveness of 
reporting decisions. The results indicate that tax preparers use either the latitude inherent in a 
verbal standard or the latitude available in assessing evidential support to justify aggressive 
reporting decisions. Hansen & White (2012) find that higher reporting standards significantly 
reduce both, tax preparers' willingness to recommend an aggressive position and to sign a tax 
return containing an aggressive position. However, their study only investigates the effect of 
replacing a real-life reporting standard requiring at least a one in three chance of being 
sustained on its merits by a new reporting standard referring to a “more likely than not” 
possibility. Under the one in three chance reporting standard tax professionals might have 
shifted their inner willingness to provide aggressive tax advice to the new threshold resulting 
in an average ex ante tax risk taking level of 66.66%. Hence, introducing a stricter reporting 
standard would only allow for a decrease in the ex-ante tax aggressiveness no matter if 
referring to the ideas of deterrence theory or the definitional function of law. Therefore, the 
results of Hansen & White (2012) might not be suitable to predict the effects of the 
introduction of a preparer penalties referring to a reporting standard into a market where no 
such penalties exist before. In sum, prior evidence on the effectiveness of preparer penalties is 
mixed and no previous study has investigated a potential interaction between penalty and 
subjects’ ex ante inclination to recommend risky tax advice. 
We suggest that the effect of introducing preparer penalties including a reporting 
standard as a point of reference will be twofold. First, in line with the deterrence literature we 
assume that those preparers providing advice with a higher level of tax aggressiveness than 
allowed by the reporting standard prior to its introduction (in the following referred to as 
“high-risk preparers”) will reduce the aggressiveness of their recommendations as the 
expected return of providing aggressive advice will decrease. 
H1: Preparer penalties reduce the tax aggressiveness of preparers having a high 
inclination to recommend aggressive tax positions (high-risk preparers).   
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Second, with regard to tax preparers who have a low inclination to recommend 
aggressive tax positions (in the following referred to as “low-risk preparers”) penalty 
provisions comprising a reporting standard that is less strict than their internal norms cannot 
promote further tax compliance. However, these tax preparers might generally be affected by 
the definitional role penalties play within the compliance process. Tax preparer penalties 
including a certain reporting standard define the boundaries of advice aggressiveness that is 
suggested to be compliant behavior within the view of the legislator or the professional 
supervision. Thus, low-risk preparers might be motivated to shift their habitual standard of tax 
aggressiveness to a higher level. Suppose, in the absence of any penalties a preparer would 
choose not to recommend a tax position with a chance of winning below 75% and now the 
lawmaker introduces a preparer penalty with a reporting standard of 51% (“more likely than 
not”). By introducing this threshold, the lawmaker signals that a probability of 51% is 
sufficient to be compliant with current law. Hence, the tax preparer in question has an 
incentive to provide more aggressive advice to the clients at least if this change in behavior 
conveys an advantage to the preparer. As higher tax savings are expected to increase clients’ 
satisfaction and in turn their willingness to pay higher fees the proposed shift in tax 
aggressiveness seems to be reasonable. This suggestion is in line with the “theory of 
expressive law” (e.g., Cooter 1998). Pursuant to this concept, legal provisions express social 
values that can tip a system of social norms (here: the question what is accepted to be 
compliant behavior) into a new equilibrium and thereby destroy former social norms (here: 
preparers’ ex ante beliefs about what is compliant behavior) with or without changing 
individual values. Rational individuals will internalize a new norm when commitment conveys 
an advantage relative to the former standard. Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
H2: Preparer penalties increase the tax aggressiveness of preparers having a low 
inclination to recommend aggressive tax positions (low-risk preparers).   
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3.3 Survey Instrument and Description of the Sample 
3.3.1 Survey Instrument 
We invited tax employees of a Big Four firm in Germany to participate in an online 
survey.
15
 The invitation email with the link has been sent to approximately 100 employees of 
different grades with the request to forward the included link within the service line “Tax” of 
their firm and city. The questions of the survey can be found in Appendix E. Subjects did not 
receive any payments. However, as an incentive the subjects were told that they will take part 
in a short (debriefing) quiz at the end of the survey. The instructions state that for every 
participant who successfully answers all questions, we donate €3 for charity. Thanking all the 
other participants who fail to answer all five debriefing questions correctly but completely 
absolve the survey, we promised to give €1 to a good cause. Subjects answering all questions 
correctly can (voluntarily) also take part in a lottery whose winner may determine the charity 
that will receive the amount of money which is earned by all participants of the study.
16
  
Having started the survey, every subject had to choose from several tasks presented, 
which best describes her everyday work (marking of multiple answers has been allowed). 
Moreover, the probands had to indicate how often they are concerned with tax planning or tax 
optimization tasks in their daily work on a five-item scale. Then, we presented a setting to the 
subjects that describes an important client who wants to take a certain deduction for tax 
purposes that is based on ambiguous/conflicting legal authority.  
Subjects were randomly assigned to either a PENALTY or a NO-PENALTY treatment. 
Subjects in the PENALTY treatment read: “Please suppose the legislator introduced a new 
provision punishing aggressive tax preparers. Pursuant to this new provision, your firm has to 
expect a penalty amounting to 50% of the client’s tax savings resulting from an issue that is 
classified as being too aggressive. The provision would not be applicable if third-party experts 
conclude that client’s success in case of litigation was more likely than not.” 
 We asked the subjects to indicate the minimum likelihood of client’s success in case of 
litigation that should be inherent before she would feel comfortable to prepare the tax return 
                                                     
15 The survey has been designed and performed by using LimeService a service platform of Carsten Schmitz - 
LimeSurvey.com: http://www.limeservice.com. 
16 Pursuant to the will of the winner of our lottery we donated the amount of €89 to the Burgverein Kronberg e.V., an 
association that is committed to maintain the substance (especially a “green classroom” outdoors used for visiting school 
classes) of a castle from the High Middle Ages near Frankfurt/Main, Germany.  
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including the deduction in question. We transformed the minimum likelihood the subjects 
indicated into our dependent variable TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS representing our measure of 
tax aggressiveness by referring to the remaining risk allowed (100% minus indicated 
percentage). This approach of directly measuring the willingness to take tax risks has the 
advantage that we are able to isolate the direct effects of the different factors on the 
willingness to take tax risks. If we had given the participants a specific tax case and then asked 
for their recommendations, the independent variables would have also affected the outcome 
expectations (e.g., subjects’ estimated probability to prevail in negotiations with the IRS). 
Indeed, as noticed by O’Donnell et al. (2005) the vast majority of previous studies does not 
control for the interactions of the independent variables and outcome expectations. Our 
approach avoids this potential drawback as we make sure that the tax risk objectively included 
in the task of our study equals the tax risk subjectively recognized by the participants. 
The described setting controls for a set of variables found to influence tax 
aggressiveness in prior literature, namely reputational losses, the importance of the client, the 
value of tax savings, client’s payment status and risk propensity, the presence and value of 
preparer penalty provisions and the height of potential penalties, client loss, the ambiguity and 
kind of prior evidence, the risk of being audited, the possibility of being liable to client, the 
relationship with the client as well as the client’s relationship with the IRS. Hence, there 
should be no differences in perceptions about these variables among the participants and 
therefore no influence on tax aggressiveness.  
In the second chapter we used a set of nine items with a seven-point scale to measure 
client advocacy as proposed by Mason & Levy (2001). This is the most prevalent instrument 
to identify differences in the client- vs. revenue agency-disposition of tax professionals (Bobek 
et al. 2010). The third chapter asked the subjects to state some personal information such as 
gender, age, working experience, professional examinations, religiousness and general risk 
attitudes. The fourth chapter comprises among others questions investigating different 
attitudes of the tax professionals including patriotism, perceived fairness of the tax system and 
tax morale. In the last chapter of the questionnaire we used a 15-item design as developed by 
Gerlitz and Schupp (2005) - the so called “BFI-S” - to control for the influence of the Big Five 
personality traits on tax aggressiveness as suggested by Blaufus & Zinowsky (2013). 
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Having finished all survey-chapters, subjects were forwarded to the quiz announced at 
the beginning of the survey. The quiz consists of five voluntary debriefing questions, which 
control whether subjects understood and remembered some details of the task’s setting 
including risk of reputational loss, relationship of the client with the IRS, payment status of the 
client, applicability of penalty provisions and the exact amount of tax savings reachable.
17
  
3.3.2 Description of the Final Sample 
We received 116 answers with only 68 tax professionals having answered at least the 
full set of mandatory questions. However, six subjects have been removed from the sample as 
they were suggested having not answered the questions seriously. To identify these cases we 
used the reverse scored items of the client advocacy questions and the questions measuring the 
personality traits for plausibility check in the middle and at the end of the survey. The 
personality dimensions of conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism 
were each measured by three items where one item is always reverse scored. If a proband just 
pointlessly clicks from page to page, large differences between the positive and negative items 
can accrue. To check this, we compared the value on the seven-point scale for the reverse 
scored item with the mean of the positive scored items. If the difference between these values 
(implausibility score) was 4 or bigger we excluded the subject from the sample due to the lack 
of plausibility.
18
 As a result, six subjects have been removed from the sample.
19
 Therefore, the 
final sample comprises 62 observations. 
All tax professionals in our sample work in different areas of the service line “Tax” for 
the same Big Four firm in Germany. The average participant is 35 years old and has 
professional experience between 5-10 years, 29 participants work as consultant or senior 
consultant, 19 as manager, and 14 as senior manager or partner. The final sample consists of 
24 females and 38 males. 30 (32) participants are randomly assigned to the NO-PENALTY 
(PENALTY) treatment. There are no significant differences between the two treatment groups 
                                                     
17 To test whether our results are affected by a misunderstanding of the setting, we conducted additional regressions 
including control variables for the manipulation checks. The results reported in this paper remain qualitatively unchanged. 
The debriefing questions can be found in Appendix E, Section VII. 
18 The same procedure has been applied to the client advocacy questions. Here, eight items are positively scored and one 
item is reverse scored.  
19 In detail we excluded the following observations: Three subjects scoring 4 or higher in the implausibility score regarding 
client advocacy, and each one subject scoring 4 or higher in the implausibility scores regarding conscientiousness and 
extraversion. We furthermore compared the time the particular subject needed to answer the questionnaire to a threshold 
that we suggest to be the required minimum time. However, no observations have been removed from the sample in 
course of this plausibility test. 
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regarding age, overall risk propensity, client advocacy or the personality traits (Mann-
Whitney-U-Tests) and no significant differences regarding gender, grade, professional exam 
and main field of working expertise
20
 (Chi-squared tests). 
3.4 Estimation Strategy 
3.4.1 Identification of Low-Risk and High-Risk Preparers 
In order to identify the probability to be a low-risk preparer 
Pr(LOW_RISK_PREPARER=1), we conduct a binary logit regression using the participants 
in the NO-PENALTY treatment (see equation (1)). For these participants, the dependent 
variable LOW_RISK_PREPARER takes on the value of 1 if TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS ≤ 
40.00%, and 0 otherwise. Note that the penalty provisions in the PENALTY treatment use a 
reporting standard of 51% (“more likely than not”). Hence, the threshold used to identify low-
risk prepares should be substantially lower than 51%.
21
  
Pr (LOW_RISK_PREPARER = 1)  = 
1
1+𝑒−z
 , (1) 
with z= β0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
× 𝑥𝑗 + 𝑢, and 𝑥𝑗 representing the independent variables tested for the 
question whether they are suitable to predict the probability to be a low-risk preparer, e.g., 
gender, age, etc. (see below).  
Next, we use the results of (1) to conduct an out-of-sample prediction for subjects in 
the PENALTY treatment group. The value of LOW_RISK_PREPARER in the penalty 
treatment group is assigned as follows: 
   1, if Pr (LOW_RISK_PREPARER* = 1) ≥ 0.5 
LOW_RISK_PREPARER =    (2) 
  0, otherwise, 
with Pr(LOW_RISK_PREPARER* = 1) denoting the estimated probability for subjects in the 
PENALTY treatment according to the results obtained from (1). 
                                                     
20 We use the main field of working expertise to describe the task familiarity, represented by the variable COMPLIANCE in 
the following. 
21 We also conducted our analysis by using a dichotomization at the 30%-level of tax aggressiveness. However, this does not 
change the results presented in the following. 
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We conducted several logistic regression models with LOW_RISK_PREPARER being 
the dependent variable controlling for various combinations of independent variables that have 
been found to influence tax aggressiveness in prior research. This includes participants’ sex 
(GENDER, 1 = female, 0 = male) as males have been found to take more aggressive tax-
reporting positions than females (e.g., Koski & Ehlen 2011), participants’ age, grade, 
professional exam and task familiarity (COMPLIANCE
22
). The last three measures indicate 
differences in experience which has been found to influence tax aggressiveness in prior 
research (for a review see O’Donnell et al. 2005). Using the nine item score created by Bobek 
et al. (2010) we furthermore reviewed the impact of participants’ client advocacy as it has 
been found to influence tax professionals’ judgments (for a review see, e.g., Hansen & White 
2012). Finally, we tested whether there is a potential impact of personality traits on tax 
aggressiveness as suggested by Blaufus & Zinowsky (2013), a potential effect of overall risk 
propensity as suggested by Hansen & White (2012) and of attitudes and perceptions of the tax 
system as the latter has been found to influence at least taxpayers’ compliance (e.g., Cowell 
1992, Kirchler et al. 2008). 
Table 3.1: Logistic regression for having a low inclination to provide aggressive tax advice. 
The model providing the highest percentage of correct predictions while showing an 
acceptable model fit (83.33%, Nagelkerkes R
2
 = 0.534, p = 0.007) is displayed in Table 3.1. 
                                                     
22 As our task is not a planning but rather a compliance task we recognize the dummy variable COMPLIANCE as a measure 
of task familiarity with value 1 for subjects who primarily work in the field of compliance and 0 otherwise. 
 Logistic regression, dependent variable: LOW_RISK_PREPARER 
Predictors B(SE) Sig. Wald  Odds Ratio 95% CI for OR 
    Lower Upper 
Constant 2.63 (3.02) 0.38 0.76 13.85   
GENDER 2.76 (1.48) 0.06 3.47 15.73 0.86 286.26 
COMPLIANCE 2.80 (1.57) 0.07 3.2 16.46 0.77 353.99 
PROF_EXAM -2.22 (1.43) 0.12 2.4 0.11 0.01 1.80 
RISK_PROP -0.84 (0.44) 0.06 3.6 0.43 0.18 1.03 
N = 30, Nagelkerkes R
2
 = 0.534, p = 0.007. 
The table shows the results of a logit regression with LOW_RISK_PREPARER being the dependent variable. 
GENDER represents participants sex (1 = female, 0 = male), COMPLIANCE is an indicator for task familiarity 
referring to subjects main field of working expertise (1 = mainly compliance expertise, 0 = mainly other expertise, 
like, e.g., tax planning), PROF_EXAM indicates whether participants are a lawyer, CPA or professional tax advisor 
(value = 1) or not (value = 0). RISK_PROP reflects subjects’ overall risk propensity comprising values from 0 (not 
at all willing to take risks) to 10 (very willing to take risks). The percentage of correct predictions performed by the 
above model is 83.33%. 
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Thus, the probability to be a low-risk preparer is higher for females (B = 2.76, p = 0.06 
for GENDER) and for employees working primarily in the field of compliance rather than in 
tax planning or other technical subgroups (B = 2.80, p = 0.07 for COMPLIANCE). At the 
same time the probability to be a low-risk preparer decreases with higher levels of overall risk 
propensity (B = -0.839, p = 0.06), whereas there is no significant effect of a professional 
examination (PROF_EXAM)
23
.  
3.4.2 Bivariate and Regression Analysis of Penalties’ Effect on Tax Aggressiveness 
Using the dichotomization made by LOW_RISK_PREPARER we conduct Mann-
Whitney-U-Tests as well as linear regression analysis to test whether the impact of preparer 
penalties differs between the subgroups. We estimate the following model: 
TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS = β0 + β1 × PENALTY + β2 × LOW_RISK_PREPARER 
+ β3 × (PENALTY× LOW_RISK_PREPARER)+ ε, 
(3) 
where PENALTY is a dummy variable with value = 1 if preparer penalties are 
applicable in the setting, and 0 otherwise. LOW_RISK_PREPARER indicates whether the 
particular participant is a high-risk preparer (value = 0) or a low-risk preparer (value = 1). The 
independent variable whose impact is measured by β3 is an interaction term between 
PENALTY and LOW_RISK_PREPARER. Thus, β3 measures whether low-risk preparers 
respond differently to the introduction of sanctions than high-risk preparers. 
Finally, we conduct subsample regressions separately for low-risk and high-risk 
preparers using the control variables already used for the identification of low-risk preparers: 
gender, age, grade, professional examination, task familiarity, risk propensity, client advocacy 
and the Big Five personality traits.  
3.5 Results  
3.5.1 Bivariate Analysis 
Table 3.2, Panel A reveals that participants are on average ready to accept a failure 
probability of 45.50%. Thus, the average subject is slightly less aggressive than a more-likely-
                                                     
23 The value of PROF_EXAM is zero if the participant under review does not hold an exam as being professional tax 
advisor, CPA or lawyer, value =1 otherwise. 
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than not standard would allow (one-sample t-test, two-sided p = 0.065). Table 3.2, Panel B 
demonstrates that on average, penalties do not affect the tax aggressiveness of preparers in our 
sample (p = 0.252, Mann-Whitney-U). However, if we split the sample into high- and low-risk 
preparers (Table 3.2, Panel C and D), the results are in line with both, H1 and H2, as tax 
aggressiveness decreases with the introduction of sanctions in the high aggressiveness group 
(p = 0.009, Mann-Whitney-U) and increases with penalties being applicable for low-risk 
preparers (p = 0.043, Mann-Whitney-U). 
3.5.2 Regression Analysis of Penalties’ Effect on Tax Aggressiveness 
The multivariate analysis (see Table 3.3) shows a significant negative impact of 
LOW_RISK_PREPARER and PENALTY on tax aggressiveness. The negative main effect of 
penalty indicates that there is a deterrence effect of preparer sanctions. However, the 
interaction effect between PENALTY and LOW_RISK_PREPARER confirms both of our 
hypotheses, H1 and H2, as the coefficient is negative and significant. In Figure 3.1 we depict 
the interaction effect as given by the coefficients. Thus, the deterrence effect of penalties as 
indicated by β1 is even crowded out by the definitional effect the included reporting standard 
has for low-risk preparers as suggested by H2 in our sample. These results hold when 
including several or all of the control variables. Table 3.3, column (2), shows the regression 
 Tax Aggressiveness   
 Observations Mean Std. dev. Median Significance 
Panel A: Total  62 45.50 18.89 49.00  
Panel B: Treatment      
 Penalty 32 42.44 21.67 49.00 
5.00 
0.252 
 No Penalty 30 48.77 15.07 49.00 
Panel C: High-risk preparers 
 No Penalty 21 55.90 11.87 50.00 0.009 
 Penalty 22 40.41 19.71 49.00  
Panel D: Low-risk preparers  
 No Penalty 9 32.11 5.01 30.00 0.043 
Penalty 10 46.90 26.06 46.00 
The table shows descriptive results of subjects’ tax aggressiveness (measured as the maximum tax risk 
subjects are ready to accept). Panel A shows tax aggressiveness for the whole sample while Panel B reflects 
tax aggressiveness for the two treatment groups (with or without penalty provisions being applicable). Panel 
C (D) shows tax aggressiveness with or without penalties being applicable for those participants having a 
high (low) inclination to provide aggressive tax advice referring to the dichotomization made by 
LOW_RISK_PREPARER. Statistical significance refers to the p-values for the Mann-Whitney-U-Test. 
Table 3.2: Descriptive results of subjects' tax aggressiveness depending on the setting. 
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results while controlling for the impact of gender, age, grade, professional examination, task 
familiarity, risk propensity, client advocacy and the Big Five personality traits. 
Table 3.3, columns (3) and (4), display the results for the high-risk and low-risk 
preparers’ group while controlling for the impact of gender, age, grade, professional 
examination, task familiarity, risk propensity, client advocacy and the Big Five personality 
traits. These results again suggest a deterrence effect of penalties for high-risk preparers 
(p = 0.010) as hypothesized by H1. In the low-risk preparer group we find the regression 
coefficient of PENALTY to be positive, however, this effect is not significant. This is 
probably due to the small sample size of only 19 subjects in the low-risk preparer group.
24
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sample 
OLS regression 
Total Total 
High-Risk 
Preparers 
Low-Risk 
Preparers 
Dependent variable: TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS 
     
PENALTY -15.496*** -16.922*** -15.834*** 5.640 
 (5.267) (5.540) (5.786) (8.226) 
LOW_RISK_PREPARER
 
-23.794*** -20.851**   
 (6.879) (8.067)   
PENALTY×LOW_RISK_PREPARER 30.285*** 23.696**   
 (9.522) (9.500)   
Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 55.905*** 14.461 30.658 -159.742 
 (3.767) (34.780) (40.268) (114.353) 
     
Observations 62 60 43 19 
R-squared 0.206 0.427 0.414 0.855 
Adj. R-squared 0.165 0.240 0.152 0.564 
The table shows the regression results for subjects’ tax aggressiveness in the combined sample with and without 
controlling for subjects’ gender, age, grade, professional examination, task familiarity, overall risk propensity, client 
advocacy and the Big Five personality traits (column (1) and column (2)). Column (3) shows the corresponding results 
for the high-risk preparer sample while column (4) reflects the results for the group of low-risk preparers. PENALTY 
reflects whether penalty provisions have been applicable in participants’ task (value = 1) or not (value = 0). 
LOW_RISK_PREPARER indicates whether the particular participant is a high-risk preparer (value = 0) or a low-risk 
preparer (value = 1). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, p < 0.1 
Table 3.3: Linear regressions testing the effectiveness of preparer penalties. 
 
                                                     
24 If we control only for gender the penalty effect remains significant also in the low-risk preparer subsample.  
 53 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The interaction between the introduction of preparer penalties and tax preparers’ inclination (high vs. low) to 
provide aggressive tax advice. 
3.6 Conclusion 
We investigate whether the introduction of preparer penalties referring to a certain 
reporting standard results in the effect intended by the legislator, i.e., a reduction in tax 
professionals’ tax aggressiveness. Motivated by Doran (2009) and the “theory of expressive 
law” (e.g., Cooter 1998) we expect that the introduction of preparer penalties will result in two 
opposing effects. First, in line with the deterrence theory we hypothesize that penalty 
provisions including a certain reporting standard will fulfill their instrumental role by deterring 
tax preparers having a high inclination to recommend aggressive tax positions from doing so. 
Hence, the risk of being subject to penalties will reduce tax aggressiveness of these high-risk 
preparers. Second, at the same time, newly introduced penalties will have a definitional 
function as they express what activities are accepted to be tax compliant behavior. As a result, 
tax preparers having an inclination to provide aggressive tax advice that is below the threshold 
defined by the reporting standard included in preparer sanctions will internalize this new 
boundary of compliant behavior and will therefore increase their level of tax aggressiveness.  
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The results we find when testing these two hypotheses for a sample of 62 tax 
professionals from a Big Four firm in Germany confirm the proposed interaction effect 
between the penalty and the individual inclination towards aggressive advice. Hence, if 
legislators or professional supervisions intend to introduce preparer penalties referring to a 
certain reporting standard into a market where no such provisions are applicable before, it is 
very important to define a threshold for the reporting standard that is sufficiently high to not 
provide an incentive for low-risk preparers to increase the level of tax aggressiveness included 
in their advice. Based on the observations we make for our sample this reporting standard 
should at least require a should-level (~75%) to avoid notable adverse effects of preparer 
sanctions. However, such rather strict penalties are assumed to increase the perceived power of 
the revenue agency, i.e., the perceived authorities’ capacity to detect and punish aggressive tax 
avoidance. This might undermine trust in the tax system and therefore voluntary compliance 
(Wahl et al. 2010 and Kastlunger et al. 2013). Moreover, if tax professionals perceive the 
introduction of penalties as a threat or loss of their freedom to act as a client advocate this 
might result in reactance, meaning an increase in tax aggressiveness as well, as proposed by 
Cuccia (1994). Finally, penalty rules using specific likelihood thresholds introduce much 
uncertainty for tax preparers because the likelihood that a tax position is sustainable in a future 
tax dispute is almost unpredictable (Blaufus et al. 2015). 
If the introduction of preparer penalties along the lines of the U.S. preparer penalties 
was intended by other countries, the legislators should balance the advantages for tax 
compliance resulting from the deterrence effect against the disadvantages resulting from the 
suggested crowding-out effect in any case. Overall, this study should be a first step into 
gaining a more detailed understanding of the effects of preparer penalties. Further research 
should extend this study by enlarging the tests for, first, the impact of the norms model on the 
effectiveness of sanctions for tax intermediaries and, second, for the definitional role of 
sanctions as discussed in this study.  
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3.7 APPENDIX E – Survey materials 
3.7.1 Introduction 
 
Welcome to our survey among tax professionals! 
At first, we would like to thank you for your willingness to take part in this scientific survey! 
All the information that you enter in the following, will only anonymously be available for our evaluation 
purposes. We treat all information with the utmost care and will not forward any data to third parties. 
Please note that navigating back is not possible during the survey. However, you can save your results 
temporarily under a pseudonym and a password, so you are able to complete the survey in several steps.  
For technical questions or other problems please do not hesitate to contact us under steuerforschung@tax.uni-
hannover.de at any time. 
We would ask you to answer all the questions alone and as conscientiously as possible. 
At the end of the survey we ask you to take part in a very short quiz that we use for plausibility purposes. For 
every participant who successfully answers the five questions, we donate € 3 for charity. Thanking all the other 
participants who fail to answer the quiz correctly but completely absolve the survey, we give € 1 to a good cause. 
Determine the charitable organization! 
If you answered all the questions in the quiz correctly, you will take part in a lottery (provided this corresponds to 
your desire). The winner of this lottery may determine the charity that will receive the amount of money which is 
earned by all participants in this study. 
Now, we hope you will enjoy the interview! 
 
3.7.2 Section I 
1) Which of the following tasks best describes your everyday work? 
a) Preparation of tax returns/compliance b) Preparation of tax opinions c) Advocacy 
d) Advisory e) Mediation f) Development 
(e.g., of tax optimized restructurings) 
2) How often are you concerned with tax planning or tax optimization tasks in your everyday work? 
a) Never b) Seldom c) From time to time 
d) Often e) (Almost) solely  
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3.7.3 Section II 
(Subjects are randomly assigned to either the NO-PENALTY [PENALTY] treatment) 
[Please suppose the legislator introduced a new provision punishing aggressive tax preparers. Pursuant to this 
new provision, your firm has to expect a penalty in the amount of 50% of the client’s tax savings resulting from 
an issue that is classified as being too aggressive. The provision would not be applicable if third-party experts 
conclude that client’s success in case of litigation was more likely than not. 
Now,] one of your important clients contacts you due to a question about a deduction she would like to take for 
tax purposes. The resulting tax savings would amount to $1.4M. Anyhow the client has underpaid estimated taxes 
and withholdings and faces further payments at year end. 
The sources of legal authority and the view of the IRS regarding this issue are ambiguous and the specialist 
literature only provides conflicting evidence. The client asks whether you would recommend to take the 
deduction when filing the tax return.  
You have a very good relationship with the client and the latter is quite willing to take greater risks, depending on 
your recommendation. Regardless of whether the deduction of the item in question is successful, you would 
neither lose the client, nor would you have to worry about the assertion of liability claims. Furthermore, your firm 
would not have to fear reputational losses. 
The client had no major disputes with the tax authority in recent years. However, you have to expect that the 
deduction in question will be audited by the IRS. 
Please specify the minimum likelihood of client’s success in case of litigation which you would feel comfortable 
before signing the client’s tax return including the deduction in question (probability of success). 
Question: 
Please specify the minimum likelihood of client’s success in case of litigation which you would feel comfortable 
before signing the client’s tax return including the deduction in question (probability of success). 
I sign the tax return including the uncertain position if the probability of success is at least…  
[Answers must be indicated via a scrollbar comprising the values from 0% to 100%.]    
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3.7.4 Section III 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following nine statements from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
a) In an instance where no judicial authority exists with respect to 
an issue and where the Code and Regulations are ambiguous, I 
feel the taxpayer is entitled to take the most favorable tax 
treatment. 
       
b) Generally speaking, my loyalties are first to the tax system, then 
to the taxpayer. 
       
c) I feel I should apply ambiguous tax law to the taxpayer’s benefit.        
d) When examining negotiations of the taxpayer with the financial 
administration, I tend to point out to taxpayers reasonable 
positions they could have taken which would have contributed to 
minimizing their tax liability. 
       
e) I believe it is important that I encourage taxpayers to pay the 
least amount of taxes possible. 
       
f) I always interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in favor of the 
taxpayers. 
       
g) It is important to use trends in the law by trying to establish a 
pattern of more favorable treatment for the taxpayer and then 
extending this pattern to the taxpayer’s position. 
       
h) Where no judicial authority exists with respect to an issue, I feel 
that the taxpayer is entitled to take the most favorable treatment. 
       
 
3.7.5 Section IV 
A few questions regarding your person... 
1) How many years of experience do you have as a tax preparer/tax accountant?  
a) less than one year b) 1-3 years c) 3-5 years 
d) 5-10 years e) 10-15 years f) 15-20 years 
g) more than 20 years   
2) What position do you hold in your firm? 
a) Trainee b) Consultant or Senior Consultant 
c) Manager d) Senior Manager, Director or Partner 
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3) Do you work at a Big4-firm? 
a) Yes b) No 
 
4) Which professional examinations did you pass? 
a) None b) Registered Tax Return Preparer c) CPA 
d) Enrolled Agent e) (Tax) Lawyer f) Other: 
 
5) Are you currently on secondment in the USA [Germany]? 
a) Yes b) No 
 
6) How old are you? (Answer must be entered in a cell) 
  
7) What is your gender?  a) female b) male 
 
8) How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid 
taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means “not at all willing to take risks” and the 
value 10 means “very willing to take risks”. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Risk propensity            
 
9) About how often do you pray? 
a) No answer b) Never c) Less than once a year 
d) About once or twice a year e) Several times a year f) About once a month 
g) 2-3 times a month h) Nearly every week i) Every week 
j) Several times a week k) Once a day l) Several times a day 
 
3.7.6 Section V 
1) Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). 
a) Being a member of the German community is important to me. 
b) The government predominantly uses the tax revenues for things that are useful for the citizens 
c) I feel a sense of pride in being a member of the German community. 
d) Field audits performed by the Revenue Agency are generally very effective. 
e) All things considered, I feel that the amount of income tax I am asked to pay is about right. 
f) Generally, I get a reasonable level of service from the government for the amount of taxes I pay. 
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2) Please respond to the following four questions by circling the number that most closely represents your 
observations about your society.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 aggressive      not aggressive 
a) In this society, people are generally:        
 individual 
interests 
     collective 
interests 
b) The economic system in this society is designed to 
maximize: 
       
 not at all 
concerned 
about others 
     very 
concerned 
about others 
c) In this society, people are generally:        
 strongly 
disagree 
     strongly agree 
d) In this society, people are rewarded for excellent 
performance. 
       
 not at all 
important 
     very important 
e) There are different opinions as to what it takes to 
be a good citizen. As far as you are concerned 
personally how important is it that a good citizen 
never tries to evade taxes? 
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3.7.7 Section VI 
Finally, let us turn to something completely different. Our everyday actions are influenced by our fundamental 
convictions. Today’s research indicates that little is known about these convictions. Below, you will find some 
characteristics that a person can have. Some characteristics may apply to your personality fully or not at all. 
Regarding other characteristics, you might not be sure. Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means 
“not applicable at all” and the value 7 means “fully applicable”. With the values between 1 and 7, you can adjust 
your assessment. 
I am someone who … 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… works thoroughly        
… is communicative, talkative        
… is sometimes a little bit rough to others        
… is original, brings in new ideas        
… often worries about things        
… is able to forgive        
… is rather lazy        
… is able to come out of her shell, is sociable        
… likes artistic experiences        
… gets nervous easily        
… fulfills tasks in an effective and efficient manner         
… is reserved        
… is considerate and friendly        
… has a vivid phantasy/imagination        
… is relaxed, can easily handle stress        
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3.7.8 Section VII 
Quiz 
If you answer the following five questions correctly, the jackpot for charity will raise by 3€. 
Then, you can take part in our lottery - and get the chance to determine the charitable 
organization that will receive the whole jackpot. 
If you do not participate in the quiz or do not answer all questions correctly we will donate 1€ 
for your participation in our survey! 
1. The setting described an average client of you. 
 □ Correct. □ Incorrect. 
2. Your company had to fear reputational losses, depending on your recommendation. 
 □ Correct. □ Incorrect. 
3. The amount of potential tax savings was $ 2.4M. 
 □ Correct. □ Incorrect. 
4. The client had underpaid taxes. 
 □ Correct. □ Incorrect. 
[For treatment group:] 
5. Facing a probability of success of 50% the tax preparer penalties introduced in the setting                      
 would have been applicable. 
 □ Correct. □ Incorrect. 
[For control group:] 
5. The client had a tense relationship with the IRS. 
 □ Correct. □ Incorrect. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4 Regulation of Tax Advisory Markets: The Impact on Tax Preparer 
Aggressiveness – A Comparison between the USA and Germany 
4.1 Introduction 
Tax professionals support the taxpayer in being compliant with all sources of legal 
authority and assist her in dealing with the IRS. At the same time, tax professionals are free to 
minimize client’s tax liability within the latitude allowed by the IRC as they should be client 
advocates in tax matters (AICPA 2008). Consequently, it is not surprising that the OECD 
identifies tax advisers to be, at least in part, a driver of tax avoidance by designing and 
offering aggressive tax planning schemes to their clients (OECD 2008). The concept used to 
describe tax professionals’ behavior in ambiguous situations measuring their willingness to 
exploit loopholes and blurs in tax law or to make use of legal base erosion and profit shifting 
activities is labeled “tax aggressiveness”. Serving the interest of the OECD as well as of 
standard-setters, governments, tax authorities and employers all over the world, a vast number 
of studies has investigated the determinants of tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness in the last 
decades (for a review see Roberts 1998, Blaufus & Zinowsky 2013). However, to enable the 
stakeholders of this research stream to utilize the results found for certain determinants in prior 
studies it is necessary that the particular impact suggested is universally valid and not limited 
to a certain country, market or jurisdiction.  
When looking at the results of a study performed by Anderson & Cuccia (2000) the 
generalizability of almost all prior studies seems to be at least questionable. The 
aforementioned authors find different levels of competition having direct impact on tax 
professionals’ tax aggressiveness as well as an indirect effect on other drivers of tax 
aggressiveness. Up to now, studies investigating tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness have 
almost exclusively been conducted in the USA. Thus, against the background of the results 
found by Anderson & Cuccia (2000) the transferability of the corresponding results to other 
tax preparation markets outside the USA is not evident. 
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The addressed doubts become even more visible when looking at cross-country studies 
concerned with taxpayers’ compliance that show significant differences in tax morale between 
countries (e.g., Bame-Aldred et al. 2011, Richardson 2006, Alm & Torgler 2006). A 
substantial part of tax returns is prepared by or with the collaboration of professional tax 
preparers. Consequently, a considerable fraction of tax compliance decisions is not made by 
taxpayers themselves but is at least significantly influenced by tax preparers who – depending 
on their level of tax aggressiveness – can be either enforcers or exploiters of tax law (e. g. 
Kaplan, Reckers et al. 1988; Klepper, & Nagin, 1989). If there were no differences in tax 
professionals’ tax aggressiveness among countries, the explanatory power of studies 
investigating cross-country differences in tax morale should be partially negligible for the 
public tax revenue as hiring a tax intermediary would moderate country-specific differences in 
tax morale. As this should not be the case when looking at tax compliance between countries 
(see, e.g., Richardson 2006, Alm & Torgler 2006), the idea that there should be cross-country 
differences in tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness as well is further nourished. This inkling is 
finally underlined by massive differences in the regulation of tax preparation markets between 
countries (see, e.g., Thuronyi & Vanistendael 1996), where providing tax advice is a highly 
regulated task reserved for state-certified professionals on the one end and everyone being 
allowed to provide tax consultancy services even as an annex activity to running a grocery 
store or a massage parlor on the other end. 
This study fills the resulting gap in tax aggressiveness research by conducting a cross-
country study among tax professionals in the USA and Germany as we suggest that these 
countries are characterized by quite different regulatory environments comprising among 
others differences in (1) admission to the profession, (2) maintenance and enforcement of 
quality standards (e.g., penalties), (3) mandatory early disclosure rules, (4) the freedom to 
determine advertising and fees, and (5) differences in the boundaries of multidisciplinary 
professional practice like provisions governing the possibility to collaborate with providers of 
other legal services. Using a sample of 100 tax professionals comprising 44 (45) employees of 
the same Big Four firm working in the USA (Germany) we study whether market regulation 
has an impact on tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness.  
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Performing linear regression modeling we disentangle the effect of market regulation 
from the effect of other factors that have been in the focus of tax aggressiveness research up to 
now as well as from other cross-country differences, e.g., differences in culture traits. 
By doing this, we are the first to provide a comprehensive review of the regulatory 
differences between the tax advisory markets in the USA and Germany. We further contribute 
to the existing literature by replicating the test for universally accepted factors of tax 
professionals’ tax aggressiveness in a multinational context. In this way, the present study 
should help the OECD, legislators and standard setters to better understand cross-national 
differences in tax aggressiveness.  
Furthermore, we show how aggressive tax professionals act when providing advice to 
their clients in the two countries examined. If the absolute value of tax aggressiveness found 
in our results does not match the conception the governments or the professional supervisions 
have about tax preparer’s aggressiveness, they are free to introduce new codes of behavior, 
new countering strategies or other guidance into professional law. In turn, both legislators 
could overthink the organization or regulation of tax preparers’ profession in their country if 
tax aggressiveness is found to be relatively too high when compared to the respective other 
country according to their conception.  
Finally, depending on the magnitude of cross-national differences in tax preparers’ tax 
aggressiveness, globally operating accounting firms like the Big Four are able to understand 
differences in the risk of the advice provided by their employees. If desired, these firms could 
provide country-specific stimuli in their internal guidelines to reach a harmonized behavior 
that matches the firm’s culture. 
Our results show that tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness is affected by differences in 
market regulation at least when looking at that segment of the tax preparation market that is 
dominated by the Big Four firms as represented by our data. Pursuant to the direction of our 
results tax professionals working under the “Full Regulation Model” (Germany) for the Big 
Four firm in question are less tax aggressive than tax professionals working for the same firm 
under the less regulated “Partial Regulation Model” (USA). Hence, future research should take 
a deeper look into the role of regulatory differences when studying tax professionals’ tax 
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aggressiveness to highlight the effect of specific regulatory actions for legislators and standard 
setters interested in the role of tax professionals on the tax revenue.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we outline the basic 
institutional and regulatory framework of tax preparers’ profession in the USA and Germany 
resulting in the open hypothesis formulated in the third section. Next, we describe the survey 
instrument and the resulting sample. The fifth section defines the estimation strategy employed 
as well as the control variables used to disentangle the effect of market regulation from other 
effects. In the sixth section we present and discuss the results of our analysis. Finally, we 
present conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
4.2 Market Regulation in the Field of Tax Advisory Services 
The current study refers to survey data from tax professionals working in the USA or 
Germany. In both countries, the law distinguishes between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax 
evasion, which share in common taxpayers’ attempts to reduce their tax liabilities. It should be 
noted that tax aggressiveness being the object of investigation of the current study only covers 
legal tax avoidance. In line with U.S. preparer penalty provisions (IRC Sec. 6694 (a) (2)), we 
measure tax aggressiveness as the likelihood that a recommended tax position will not prevail 
before a tax court, i.e., subjects had to state the highest failure probability which they are 
willing to accept in case of a positive recommendation regarding the tax planning idea.  
To be able to evaluate whether differences in market regulation impact tax preparers’ 
tax aggressiveness it is essential to understand the institutional framework of tax 
professionals’ business in both countries. While Germany has a long-established legal 
organization of the tax consultancy profession that provides a monopoly for tax advice with 
extensive conditions for professional services, flagged as Full Regulation Model by Thuronyi 
& Vanistendael (1996), the USA provide for a Partial Regulation Model (Thuronyi & 
Vanistendael 1996) that regulates tax practice much less extensively than in Germany. In the 
following, we briefly describe the main differences between the two regulatory models and 
make deliberations whether or not these differences might be suitable to impact the level of tax 
preparers’ tax aggressiveness between the two countries in general, or between the two 
samples under review specifically. 
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4.2.1 Admission to the Profession - Monopolistic versus Competitive Practice 
The most important reasons for regulating the tax advisory market should be to protect 
the taxpayer from unscrupulous or incompetent tax advisors and to balance tax professionals’ 
loyalty to the system against their loyalty to the client (Thuronyi & Vanistendael 1996). These 
aspects are typically handled by imposing conditions for the admission to the tax preparers’ 
profession and by defining certain minimum standards of experience and education. 
4.2.1.1 USA 
In the U.S. there are some licensed and professionally-trained specialists that are 
predestinated to prepare tax returns, including basically CPAs, (tax) attorneys and enrolled tax 
agents (Leviner 2012). However, the IRS did not provide oversight or set national standards 
for tax preparers prior to August 2011. Thus, anyone, regardless of training, experience, skill, 
or knowledge, was allowed to prepare federal income tax returns for others for compensation 
(TIGTA 2011: 2). This lack of regulation results in car dealers, appliance stores, travel agents, 
contractors, furniture stores, and massage parlors in most states having as much right to 
prepare tax returns as those trained to prepare it (Cords 2008-2009: 352).  
In January 2010, the IRS published its “Return Preparer Review” analyzing the status 
quo of the tax preparation industry and recommending extensive increases in oversight, 
institute testing, and continuing education requirements (IRS 2009). As a consequence of these 
recommendations, effective August 2011, all tax return preparers who charge a fee for their 
services are required to register and obtain a unique Preparer Tax Identification Number 
(PTIN). Moreover, certain tax preparers were required to pass (1) a competency examination, 
(2) a suitability check, (3) to complete 15 hours of continuing education credits annually, and 
(4) pay the amount required in the PTIN User Fee regulations (31 C.F.R. § 10.4(d) 2011). The 
“Tax Return Preparer Test” was an exam timed at 2.5 hours that comprises a combination of 
120 questions in multiple choice and true or false format. There was no limit on the number of 
times the test could be taken but each try required the payment of a fixed fee ($116). 
Professionals already enrolled to practice before the IRS, including especially CPAs, tax 
attorneys, and enrolled agents, are not obliged to pass the examination. Nevertheless, this 
exemption did not eliminate the need to obtain a PTIN. At the time we performed our survey 
the increased requirements triggered by the Return Preparer Review have been suspended due 
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to a ruling of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. However, as we 
limit our analysis to the group of licensed tax preparers, the suspension of the new 
requirements for untrained tax preparers should not have an impact on the behavior of the 
probands in our study.  
4.2.1.2 Germany 
The German market for tax advisory services is uniformly and highly regulated since 
1972. The law provides for a monopoly for tax advice and prohibits unauthorized persons 
from providing tax services against remuneration (Thuronyi & Vanistendael 1996: 25). Today, 
only lawyers, CPAs, or tax advisors, who have passed the required examination are allowed to 
provide advisory services in the field of taxes. Our samples consists of tax professionals 
working in the service line “Tax” of a Big Four Firm. There, the tax advisors’ exam is 
typically the most relevant and prevalent examination. To get access to the tax advisors’ exam, 
people must generally have tertiary education in business, law, or economics and must have 
worked in the field of taxes for two or three years (depending on the years of study) 
afterwards
25
. The state examination consists of three written exams lasting six hours each and 
an oral examination lasting between four and six hours. The preparatory courses for this 
examination cover a period of up to 18 months and require a considerable high and constant 
workload for the candidates. Due to these efforts, more than 10% of the registered examinees 
abandon the preparation even before the exam is taken, every year. Another 10% of the 
enrolled candidates quits the exam during the three days of testing. In the last ten years, the 
portion of registered aspirants that successfully passed the examinations ranged from 28% to 
48%. The test is offered only once a year and can be repeated only twice. Every attempt 
requires a test fee payment of ~$1,600. Overall, a candidate for the German tax preparer 
examination typically faces costs between $7k and $25k even if she is successful at the first 
attempt.
26
  
                                                     
25 There are also other ways to get access to the exam, however, the necessary duration of practical experience increases to 
up to ten years as the level of education decreases. 
26 These cost estimates do not comprise for the opportunity costs reflected by the wage lost during the four or five month 
prior to the exam which are typically taken off for preparatory courses or rehearsals. However, for the first attempt the Big 
Four firms typically bear part of these costs for their employees. 
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4.2.1.3 Impact of Differences on Tax Professionals’ Tax Aggressiveness 
The provisions governing the access to the U.S. and German tax preparation markets 
have two basic features which might have an impact on tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness. 
First, as portrayed above, the entrance to the German tax preparation market is limited 
in an extraordinary strict manner while the access to the U.S. tax preparation market is 
comparatively less regulated. This difference could generally immediately influence the 
competitive pressure in the respective tax advisory market as suggested by Thuronyi & 
Vanistendael (1996: 2). By limiting the access to a tax preparation market the number of 
actors allowed to offer tax preparation services is reduced. As a result, the market competition 
would be relaxed and tax preparers should have less incentive to stand out from the 
competitors by offering very attractive tax services, meaning mostly very offensive tax 
declaration or tax planning services. However, as already found by Anderson & Cuccia 
(2000), this mechanism should not create a distinction in tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness 
between the countries in our sample as we only investigate the behavior of tax professionals’ 
working at a Big Four firm. The “Big Four” are supposed to create an own submarket in which 
they are not expected to compete with unregistered preparers. The latter is already suggested 
by Thuronyi & Vanistendael (1996: 8, 26), who claim a “kind of factual division of labor 
whereby ordinary tax returns are prepared by enrolled agents or by unregistered preparers, 
while more complicated cases are handled by lawyers or accountants”. Hence, the fact that 
there is a real monopoly in Germany and only a less regulated access to the tax preparers’ 
profession in the USA should not inevitably result in differences in the tax aggressiveness of 
employees working for the same Big Four firm in the two countries under review. 
Second, regardless of the question whether or not there is a monopoly for tax advisory 
services, the regulatory models described above provide for different minimum standards in 
professional education. These differences include, among others, different accentuation of tax 
ethics
27
, differences in the workload during the preparation for an exam, differences in the 
difficulty of professional examinations, and also the monetary and non-monetary costs of the 
                                                     
27 In the U.S. the professional examination does not necessarily provide an ethics-exam. Only some U.S.-states have a 
mandatory exam covering ethical responsibilities of tax professionals. In Germany, usually every candidate has to absolve 
a special section during the oral examinations covering professional law/professional ethics. 
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particular professional education. Differences in professional education might have various 
effects on the subjects acting in a tax advisory market:  
(a) Differences in the costs or difficulty levels of professional education might, e.g., 
result in a selection process that prefers or discriminates certain personality traits like 
conscientiousness or neuroticism. However, the impact of certain personality traits on tax 
professionals’ aggressiveness is rather insufficiently studied up to now (see Blaufus & 
Zinowsky 2013).  
(b) The extent or accentuation of tax ethics in the professional education process might 
affect tax professionals’ commitment to the tax system and might therefore result in different 
levels of client advocacy. Mason and Levy (2001) who designed the most common measure of 
client advocacy define this construct as being “a state of mind in which one feels one’s 
primary loyalty belong to the taxpayer.” Thus, professionals scoring high in client advocacy 
can be characterized as having an increased “desire to represent the taxpayer zealously within 
in the bounds of the law” and by “having a desire to be a fighter on behalf of the taxpayer” 
(Mason and Levy 2001: 127). In fact, this tendency has been found in several prior studies 
investigating the relationship of client advocacy and tax professionals’ judgments (for a 
review see Roberts 1998, Bobek et al. 2010) such as the likelihood assessments of favorable 
IRS outcomes or the weighting of evidence items. However, professional education should not 
be the only driver of client advocacy as the latter is suggested to be a function of client and 
context specifics (Bobek et al. 2010). Thus, although there might be an indirect impact of 
professional education on tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness via its direct influence on 
general client advocacy the overall impact might be moderated by other drivers of client 
specific advocacy or even by the effect of other regulatory aspects. 
(c) Besides these indirect effects of professional education, the latter might also have a 
direct effect on tax aggressiveness by influencing the professional knowledge of tax 
professionals. If the professional education in one market leads to a situation where the 
average tax professional is typically better trained than the corresponding IRS staff this might 
result in higher tax aggressiveness when compared to a market where the IRS employees are 
on average better educated than the client representatives as this edge in knowledge should 
improve tax preparers’ bargaining position. 
 70 
 
To sum up the deliberations above, it is not evident that the differences regarding 
admission to the profession between the USA and Germany must impact tax preparers’ tax 
aggressiveness. 
4.2.2 Maintenance and Enforcement of Quality Standards 
The way in which quality standards are maintained or enforced typically differs 
between countries. This also holds for the countries under review. 
4.2.2.1 USA 
In the U.S. the quality control of tax professionals’ work is mostly maintained by tax 
preparers’ signature on the return, which subjects preparers to liability for any fraud or error in 
the returns they prepare and obligates them to defend their clients before the IRS or in the 
event of an audit (Berube et al. 2002). Being “any person who prepares […] for compensation 
[…] all or a substantial portion of any return” tax professionals fulfill the statutory definition 
of a “tax return preparer” (Reg. § 301.7701-15(a)). As such, tax preparers are subject to the 
Circular 230 rules which impose specific penalties on the tax preparer if her work does not 
meet certain reporting standards or, in other words, is found to be too tax aggressive. Within 
this context “reporting standard” means a minimum likelihood of sustaining a tax position on 
its merits that must be established (Hansen & White 2012: 141). The required level of support 
depends on the nature of the item in question (Rothman 2011: 77). However, regardless of 
how a transaction is reported, a penalty could be imposed if the claimed position is ultimately 
determined not to be correct (Rothman 2011: 25, 31). 
4.2.2.2 Germany 
By having successfully passed the exam, tax advisors are subject to professional 
supervision and are bound by certain professional ethics such as discretion or 
conscientiousness. The latter also comprises the need for a disclosure of all connected risks 
when providing advice to clients. At the same time, tax advisors are client advocates
28
 who are 
free to recommend every tax position that can be defended by evidence from law, literature, or 
case law. Tax avoidance as such is neither prohibited nor punishable as long as the taxpayer 
                                                     
28 In Germany tax professionals are “independent bodies of the administration of justice”. Even though the younger literature 
emphasizes that the client advocacy role should be predominant when interpreting this term, there are still substantial 
voices in the literature and the jurisprudence highlighting that tax professionals are also a kind of longa manus (extended 
arm) of the financial administration. 
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does not provide any inaccurate or incomplete information to the revenue service (Brown 
2011:165). In the tax returns that are always only signed by the client in Germany
29
, even very 
aggressive tax positions can be endorsed as long as the tax advisor complies with professional 
ethics - in particular, unlimited client enlightenment - and does not support the client in tax 
evasion. The latter would be the case if taxpayers provide intentionally inaccurate or 
incomplete information to the tax authorities to reduce their tax burden. As a result the tax 
advisor runs the risk of being liable to pay the whole profit she gained from a certain activity 
or a fine if she is found guilty of having participated in client’s tax evasion. Pursuant to case 
law of the German Federal Supreme Court the taxpayer or her tax advisor has to disclose all 
relevant facts “particularly in questionable” circumstances to circumvent an accusation for a 
participation in tax evasion. Besides this rather uncommon case, preparer penalties, which are 
prevalent in the USA, do not exist in German law. 
4.2.2.3 Impact of Differences on Tax Professionals’ Tax Aggressiveness 
The differences regarding the maintenance and enforcement of quality standards 
between Germany and the USA might impact tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness. The most 
intuitive impact could be due to the presence/absence of preparer penalty provisions in the two 
countries. However, the evidence for the effectiveness of preparer sanctions has been 
conflicting up to now (for a review see Hansen & White 2012). In fact, the introduction of 
penalty provisions might even encourage tax preparers to increase advice aggressiveness 
(explained with reactance theory by Cuccia 1994). Furthermore, a more differentiated analysis 
of the effects of preparer penalties performed by Anderson & Cuccia (2000) shows that 
increasing penalties provides incentives for other evasive maneuvers like increasing fees 
instead of tax aggressiveness. Hence, a difference in tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness between 
the two countries resulting from preparer penalties should not be a compulsory effect. We vary 
between two different treatments to avoid that our results are distorted by the fact that U.S. 
law provides for preparer penalties while there are no corresponding rules in Germany.  
4.2.3 Mandatory Early Disclosure Rules 
In the U.S. tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness is curtailed by early mandatory disclosure 
rules. These provisions require certain tax shelter or tax avoidance schemes to be disclosed to 
                                                     
29 However, the tax preparer is typically announced to the tax authorities as being client’s representative.  
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the tax administration in advance of the tax return filing process. German law does not provide 
for such rules. We are not aware of any study investigating the impact of early disclosure rules 
on tax aggressiveness. Nevertheless, we assume that it is possible to draw some inferences 
from studies targeting the impact of audit probabilities as the early disclosure of a specific 
setting to the tax authorities should result in an audit probability of 100%. However, audit 
probability was not found to impact tax professionals’ aggressiveness in prior research (Cloyd 
& Spilker 1999, Duncan et al. 1989, LaRue & Reckers 1989) or just under certain conditions 
(Kaplan et al. 1988, McGill 1990). Hence, a cross-country difference in tax aggressiveness as 
a result of differences regarding the early disclosure rules should not be compulsory. Finally, a 
potential impact of early disclosure rules should be eliminated in the present study as the 
setting of our study reads that the deduction in question will definitely be audited by the tax 
authorities to exclude an effect of this rather specific counteraction from the effect of more 
general differences in market regulation as discussed before. 
4.2.4 Advertising and Fees 
German tax preparers and tax preparation firms are also regulated regarding their daily 
business operations. So the German Rules of Professional Practice for Tax Preparers provide 
for narrow bounds regarding advertising of tax preparers in general and the enticement of 
customers in particular. Moreover, preventing price wars (and a potentially connected loss of 
quality) in the tax preparation industry, the German Official Fee Schedule for Certified Tax 
Advisers defines bottom prices that are mandatory for the provision of particular activities. 
Furthermore, with regard to the activities allowing an agreement of contingent fees, German 
law is more rigorous than U.S. law. While the latter enables tax lawyers and accountants to do 
work on a contingent fee basis relating to IRS audits or challenges of original tax returns for 
example, German law does not provide for an activity-based exemption from the general 
prohibition of contingent fees. A potential effect of this difference on tax preparers’ tax 
aggressiveness should be excluded in our study as the task in question deals with a rather 
simple compliance task than with an engagement that would allow for the agreement of 
contingent fees, like a complex tax planning task. 
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4.2.5 Multidisciplinary Practice 
One issue that is less regulated in Germany when compared to the U.S. but again 
enhances monopolistic tendencies is multidisciplinary practice. While lawyers and nonlawyers 
are prohibited from forming joint partnerships as well as from agreeing on fee splitting 
arrangements, in the U.S., German law explicitly allows joint practice of these parties. Hence, 
there is a more distinct tendency for the development of firms offering the full spectrum of 
advisory services in legal and accounting purposes creating higher market power of single 
players in Germany. As lawyers are allowed to provide tax advisory services while 
nonlawyers are not allowed to provide legal services other than tax advice in the U.S., the 
competitive pressure for the Big Four firms should be higher than in Germany. Thus, in the 
USA the Big Four firms compete with the big law firms with regard to clients that prefer to 
receive tax advice and legal advice from one firm instead of engaging different parties for the 
legal and tax work streams. 
Pursuant to our knowledge, there is only one prior study recognizing the potential 
effect of differences in the level of competition on tax preparers’ aggressiveness (Anderson & 
Cuccia 2000). The authors suggest, among others, that the level of competition directly affects 
tax aggressiveness. Furthermore, it should be able to draw some inferences from studies 
investigating client importance, as an increased level of competition should make every client 
relatively more important for the particular tax preparer. Evidence from prior studies (for a 
review see Roberts 1998) suggests that clients of high importance make tax professionals 
being more willing to provide aggressive advice when compared to clients of lower 
importance (e.g., Reckers et al. 1991, McGill 1988). Hence, considered in isolation, the higher 
competitive pressure in the U.S. tax preparation market with regard to this feature might make 
tax professionals more tax aggressive when compared to German tax preparers.  
4.3 Derivation of Hypothesis 
Summing up the institutional differences discussed above, only the different 
competition levels induced by multidisciplinary practice rules in the U.S. might allow for a 
directional hypothesis. At the same time, it was questionable whether this effect would not be 
moderated by the differences regarding the other institutional features. However, facing the 
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plurality of differences between the two regulation models it would be at least astonishing if 
their particular impact on tax aggressiveness was exactly balanced in a way that makes both, 
the Full- and the Partial Regulation Model, result in the same level of tax aggressiveness 
among professional tax preparers. Given the variety of direct and indirect effects of regulative 
features, we formulate the following open hypothesis. 
H1: Regulation matters, i.e., tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness will be influenced by 
differences between the Full Regulation Model (Germany) and the Partial Regulation 
Model (USA). 
4.4 Survey Instrument and Description of the Final Sample 
4.4.1 Survey Instrument 
Standard setters, tax authorities and other institutions like the OECD are working on 
the development of strategies to counter exaggerated tax aggressiveness. In the spotlight of 
these efforts are base erosion and profit shifting activities of big multinational firms (see, e.g., 
OECD 2015). In the field of taxes the largest of these firms are typically advised by the Big 
Four companies. Thus, we focus our study onto this subsegment of the tax advisory market. 
Therefore, we invited tax employees of a Big Four firm from the USA and Germany to 
participate in an online survey.
30
 In the USA the invitation email with the link has been sent to 
181 partners all over the U.S. with the request to participate and to forward the link to 
employees at lower grades. In Germany the email was sent to approximately 100 employees of 
different grades with the request to forward the included link within the service line “Tax” of 
their firm and city. The questions of the survey can be found in Appendix F. Subjects did not 
receive any payments. However, as an incentive, the subjects were told that they will take part 
in a short (debriefing) quiz at the end of the survey. The instructions read that for every 
participant who successfully answers all questions, we donate € 3 for charity. Thanking all the 
other participants who fail to answer all five questions correctly but completely absolve the 
survey, we promised to give € 1 to a good cause. Subjects answering all questions correctly 
                                                     
30 The survey has been designed and performed by using LimeService a service platform of Carsten Schmitz - 
LimeSurvey.com: http://www.limeservice.com. 
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can (voluntary) also take part in a lottery whose winner may determine the charity that will 
receive the amount of money which is earned by all participants of the study.
31
  
Having started the survey, every subject had to choose from several tasks presented, 
which one best describes her everyday work (marking of multiple answers has been allowed) 
in a first step. Moreover, the probands had to indicate how often they are concerned with tax 
planning or tax optimization tasks in their daily work on a five-item scale. Then, we presented 
a setting to the subjects that describes an important client who wants to take a certain 
deduction for tax purposes that is based on ambiguous/conflicting legal authority. To test 
whether or not there are differences in participants’ tax aggressiveness that result from 
differences in market regulation but do not only reflect the fact that preparer penalties are 
applicable in U.S. law while the German law does not provide for corresponding rules this 
setting has been modified at random and either excludes or introduces preparer penalty 
regulations (replacing all existent rules). The applicability of penalty provisions in the penalty 
setting was introduced as follows for the U.S. participants: “Please imagine all existing 
preparer penalties have been abolished
32
 and replaced by a new provision punishing 
aggressive tax preparers. Pursuant to this new provision, your firm has to expect a penalty in 
the amount of 50% of the client’s tax savings resulting from an issue that is classified as being 
too aggressive. The provision would not be applicable if third-party experts conclude that 
client’s success in case of litigation was more likely than not.” The instructions for the 
German participants read: “Please imagine the legislator introduced provisions punishing 
exaggerated tax aggressiveness of tax professionals. Pursuant to this new provision, […].” 
We asked the subjects to indicate the minimum likelihood of client’s success in case of 
litigation that should be inherent before she would feel comfortable to prepare the tax return 
including the deduction in question.  
The described setting controls for a set of variables found to influence tax 
aggressiveness in prior literature, namely reputational losses, the importance of the client, the 
value of tax savings, client’s payment status and risk propensity, the presence and value of 
                                                     
31 Pursuant to the will of the winner of our lottery we donated the amount of €165 to the Burgverein Kronberg e.V., an 
association that is committed to maintain the substance (especially a “green classroom” outdoors used for visiting school 
classes) of a castle from the High Middle Ages near Frankfurt/Main, Germany. 
32 The introduction of the no-penalty setting for the participants from the U.S. ends here. Thus, it just reads: “Please imagine 
all existing preparer penalties have been abolished”. 
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preparer penalties, client loss, the ambiguity and kind of prior evidence, the risk of being 
audited, the possibility of being liable to client, the relationship with the client as well as the 
client’s relationship with the IRS. Hence, we expect no differences in participants’ perceptions 
about these variables and therefore no influence on tax aggressiveness.  
We transformed the minimum likelihood the subjects indicated into our measure of tax 
aggressiveness by referring to the remaining risk allowed (equals 100% minus indicated 
percentage). This approach of directly measuring the willingness to take tax risks has the 
advantage that we are able to isolate the direct effects of the different factors under review on 
the willingness to take tax risks. If we would have given the participants a specific tax case 
and then asked for their recommendations, the independent variables would have also affected 
the outcome expectation (e.g., subjects’ estimated probability to prevail in negotiations with 
the IRS). Indeed, as noticed by O’Donnell et al. (2005) the vast majority of previous studies 
does not control for the interactions of the independent variables and outcome expectations. 
Our approach avoids this potential drawback as we make sure that the tax risk objectively 
included in the task of our study equals the tax risk subjectively recognized by the participants. 
In the second chapter we used a set of nine items with a seven-point scale to measure 
client advocacy as proposed by Mason & Levy (2001). This is the most prevalent instrument 
to identify differences in the client- vs. IRS-disposition of tax professionals (Bobek et al. 2010, 
Hansen & White 2012).  
The third chapter asked the subjects to state some personal information like sex, age, 
working experience, professional examinations, religiousness and general risk attitudes. 
Hereinafter, the fourth chapter comprises questions investigating different attitudes of the tax 
professionals including patriotism, perceived fairness of the tax system and tax morale. 
Furthermore, this chapter included four questions used to measure four culture traits suggested 
to influence tax aggressiveness when referring to institutional anomie theory (IAT). We come 
back to this point when describing the independent variables.  
In the last chapter of the questionnaire we used a 15-item design as developed by 
Gerlitz and Schupp (2005) - the so called “BFI-S” - to control for the influence of the Big Five 
personality traits on tax aggressiveness as suggested by Blaufus & Zinowsky (2013). 
 77 
 
After having finished all survey-chapters, subjects were forwarded to the quiz 
announced at the beginning of the survey. The quiz consists of five voluntary debriefing 
questions, which control whether subjects understood/or remembered some details of the 
task’s setting including risk of reputational loss, relationship of the client with the IRS, 
payment status of the client, applicability of penalty provisions and the exact amount of tax 
savings reachable.
33
 
4.4.2 Final Sample 
We received 96 (116) answers from the USA (Germany) with only 51 (68) tax 
professionals having answered at least the full set of mandatory questions. As we are 
interested in the impact of regulatory differences on tax professional’s tax aggressiveness we 
limit our sample to tax professionals who already passed a professional exam. So we removed 
all subjects from the sample who are neither CPA, nor lawyer or certified tax professional 
resulting in a preliminary sample of 50 (50) tax professionals from the USA (Germany).
34
  
Furthermore, we removed fourteen subjects from the sample because these subjects did 
not answer the questions seriously. To identify these cases we reviewed the seriousness of 
answers at three stages of the survey. First, we reviewed the indications for tax aggressiveness 
at the beginning of the questionnaire. Pursuant to this, three tax professionals from the U.S. 
stated to approve a tax structuring that bears a risk of 100%, which is an expression of 
rejection from our point of view. Next, we used the reverse scored items of the client advocacy 
questions and the questions measuring the personality traits for a second and third plausibility 
check in the middle and at the end of the survey. The personality dimensions of 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism are each measured by three 
items where one item is always reverse scored. If a proband just pointlessly clicks from page 
to page big differences between the positive and negative items can accrue. To check this, we 
compared the value on the seven-point scale for the reverse scored item with the mean of the 
positive scored items. If the difference between these values (implausibility score) was 4 or 
bigger we excluded the subject from the sample due to a lack of 
                                                     
33
 The debriefing questions can be found in Appendix F, Section VII. 
34 In the U.S.-sample only one subject does not have passed a professional exam as being certified tax advisor, lawyer or 
CPA, whereas the German sample comprises 18 subject with no professional examination at all. As a robust check we 
calculated all following descriptive statistics and regression models also for the sample including the tax professionals 
having no professional examination. All main results also hold for this (extended) sample.  
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plausibility/conscientiousness.
35
 As a result, six subjects from the U.S. and six subjects from 
Germany have been removed from the sample.
36
 Therefore, the final sample consists of two 
peer groups comprising 44 tax professionals from the USA and 45 tax professionals from 
Germany. We refer to the isolated groups of examined tax professionals from the U.S. or 
Germany by talking about the “split samples” or the “country samples” (together the 
“combined sample”). 
All tax professionals in the combined sample work in different areas of the service line 
“Tax” for the same Big Four firm in the USA/Germany. The subjects’ grades in the U.S.-
sample (German sample) are as follows: 6 (13) consultants or senior consultants, 10 (18) 
managers, 25 (14) senior managers, directors or partners. The U.S.-sample consists of 10 
females and 34 males while the German sample consists of 18 females and 27 males.  
4.5 Estimation Strategy 
To test our hypothesis we use linear regression modeling. Inspired by Alm & Torgler 
(2006) we perform our analysis in several steps. Alm & Torgler (2006) examine whether there 
are differences in the tax morale between the U.S. and European countries at the individual 
level. For this purpose they create a dummy-variable indicating the country of origin. To 
investigate whether the cross-country differences are driven by other socio-demographic, 
socio-economic or cultural factors like religiosity they include several control variables 
together with the country dummy in the same equation. They present different models starting 
with a model including only the country dummy-variable and the socio-demographics and 
extend this model stepwise by including different control variables.  
As we want to investigate whether or not there is an impact of market regulation on tax 
preparers’ tax aggressiveness, it is also important to disentangle this effect from the potential 
impact of further socio-demographic, cultural or other factors. Like Richardson (2006) does to 
                                                     
35 The same procedure has been applied to the client advocacy questions. Here, eight items are positively scored and one 
item was reverse scored.  
36 In detail we excluded the following observations: Three subjects from Germany scoring 4 or higher in the implausibility 
score regarding client advocacy, each one subject from the U.S. and Germany scoring 4 or higher in the implausibility 
score regarding conscientiousness, one subject from Germany scoring 4 or higher in the implausibility score regarding 
extraversion, five subjects from the U.S. scoring 4 or higher in the implausibility score regarding agreeableness. We 
furthermore compared the time the particular subject needed to answer the questionnaire to a threshold that we suggest to 
be the required minimum time. However, no observations have been removed from the sample in course of this 
plausibility test. 
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investigate cross-country differences in tax evasion, we start with a basic model that is 
supplemented by further variables in the following. Our base regression model only includes 
our variables representing market regulation. In the next step, we add several control variables 
that have been found to influence tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness in prior research or that 
might have an impact based on tax compliance research. For a parsimonious presentation of 
the results we present the inclusion of control variables block by block.
37
  
4.5.1 Base Regression Model 
As explained above, we start with a basic model comprising only variables suggested 
to indicate differences in market regulation:  
TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS = β0 + β1 × USA + β2 × PENALTY + ε, (1) 
with TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS representing the remaining risk that is connected with 
the minimum likelihood of client’s success in case of litigation which should be inherent in the 
case under review before the particular tax professional would feel comfortable to sign the tax 
return including the deduction. Consequently, this variable is calculated by subtracting the 
indicated minimum likelihood from 100% and should take on values between 0% and 99%
38
. 
USA is the independent variable (1 = tax professional from the U.S., 0 = tax professional from 
Germany) that is indispensable for the testing of our hypothesis and indicates the differences 
in market regulation between the Full Regulation Model (Germany) and the Partial Regulation 
Model (USA). Hence, the sub-groups that are the result of the dichotomization made by USA 
refer to the “split-” or “country samples”. PENALTY represents the treatment the particular 
participant faces (1 = preparer penalties are applicable in the task, 0 = all preparer penalties are 
abolished) and shall ensure that the coefficient of USA is not distorted by the fact that U.S. 
law provides for preparer penalties while there are no corresponding rules in Germany. There 
are no significant differences between the two treatment groups and the other independent 
variables pursuant to Mann-Whitney-U-/Chi-squared testing. 
                                                     
37 However, we did ensure that neither the definition of blocks nor the order of including them into the regression has an 
impact on our results.  
38 Using a scrollbar, only integer indications could be made. Since the value of 100% for TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS would 
mean that the subject under review would sign a return with a 0% chance of being sustained on its merits or – in other 
words – a 100% risk of failure, we excluded these observations from the sample as not being answered seriously. 
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4.5.2 Extended Models 
The control variables we recognize to disentangle the effect of market regulation from 
other influences take into account the potential effect of sociodemographic factors, client 
advocacy, the Big Five personality traits, attitudes towards and perceptions of the tax system, 
cultural differences and tax morale. Including all control variables the extended model is 
finally estimated as follows: 
TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS = β0 + β1 × USA + β2 × PENALTY  
+ β3 × GENDER + β4 × AGE  
+ β5 × ABOVE_MANAGER + β6 × COMPLIANCE 
+ β7 × CLIENT_ADVOCACY 
+ β8 × OPENNESS 
+ β9 × CONSCIENTIOUSNESS  
+ β10 × EXTRAVERSION + β11 × AGREEABLENESS  
+ β12 × NEUROTICISM + β13 × RISK_PROP  
+ β14 × PERCEIVED_INJUSTICE  
+ β15 × AUDITS_EFFECTIVE  
+ β16 × ASSERTIVENESS + β17 × INDIVIDUALISM  
+ β18 × HUMANE_ORIENT 
+ β19 × ACHIEVEMENT_ORIENT  
+ β20 × IDENTIFICATION  
+ β21 × TAX_MORALE + ε 
(2) 
4.5.2.1 Sociodemographic Factors 
The first block of control variables includes a set of sociodemographic characteristics 
that has been found to influence tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness in prior research. These 
comprise first subjects’ sex (GENDER, 1 = female, 0 = male) as males have been found to 
take more aggressive tax-reporting positions than females (e.g., Koski & Ehlen 2011). Second, 
we recognize participants’ age (AGE), grade (ABOVE_MANAGER), and task familiarity 
(COMPLIANCE) as they could indicate differences in experience which have been found to 
influence tax aggressiveness in prior research (for a review see Blaufus & Zinowsky, 2013). 
ABOVE_MANAGER is a dummy indicating highly experienced subjects as its value is 1 for 
subjects being at least senior manager and 0 otherwise. As our task is not a planning but rather 
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a compliance task we recognize the dummy variable COMPLIANCE as a measure of task 
familiarity with value 1 for subjects who primarily work in the field of compliance and 0 
otherwise. 
4.5.2.2 Client Advocacy 
In the second extension of the basic regression model we include our measure of 
participants’ client advocacy (CLIENT_ADVOCACY) as this predisposition has been found 
to influence tax professionals’ judgments in several prior studies (for a review see Roberts 
1998, Bobek et al. 2010, Hansen & White 2012). 
4.5.2.3 Personality Traits 
The third type of controls comprises variables representing the personality factors of 
the Big Five (OPENNESS, CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, EXTRAVERSION, 
AGREEABLENESS, and NEUROTICISM), as they might influence tax professionals’ tax 
aggressiveness (Blaufus & Zinowsky 2013), as well as a measure of overall risk propensity 
since the latter was suggested to influence tax aggressiveness in prior literature (Hansen & 
White 2012). For the generation of the Big Five factors we simply summed up the three items 
supposed to represent one particular factor. Participants’ overall risk propensity was measured 
by using an experimentally validated question (Dohmen et al. 2011) where subjects had to 
indicate their general risk propensity on a scale ranging from zero (“not at all willing to take 
risks”) to ten (“very willing to take risks”). The corresponding variable is labeled 
RISK_PROP. 
4.5.2.4 Attitudes Towards and Perceptions of the Tax System 
The fourth category of controls comprises two variables that shall reflect subjects’ 
perceptions of the conception of the tax system and its enforcement effectiveness.  
As many authors highlight the role of perceptions of justice and fairness when trying to 
explain taxpayers’ compliance (e.g., Alm et al. 1993, Cowell 1992, Falkinger 1995) this 
relationship could also hold for tax professionals. Therefore, subjects’ perceptions about the 
concept of the tax system are measured by three questions each requiring a statement 
regarding the level of agreement on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree): “The government predominantly uses the tax revenues for things that are useful for the 
citizens”, “All things considered, I feel that the amount of income tax I am asked to pay is 
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about right”, “Generally, I get a reasonable level of service from the government for the 
amount of taxes I pay”. We borrowed these questions from Scott & Grasmick (1981) who 
used them (among others) to design a measure of “perceived injustice in the exchange”. We 
conducted a principal components factor analysis to obtain a parsimonious representation of 
our measure of perceived injustice of the tax system. The analysis resulted in a one-factor 
solution that emerged with eigenvalues of 2.122, 0.452, and 0.337 for the above questions, 
explaining 73.71% of the total variance in the data. All items have factor loadings of 0.830 or 
higher. We labeled the resulting variable PERCEIVED_INJUSTICE.  
The functioning of the tax system is measured by referring to the perceived 
enforcement effectiveness since differences in enforcement power are generally suitable to 
influence tax compliance, although the evidence in prior research is conflicting (for a review 
see Kirchler et al. 2008). Thus, it cannot be excluded that enforcement effectiveness also has 
an impact on tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness. We fixed the audit risk in our setting so that all 
subjects face an audit probability of 100%. However, different levels of tax aggressiveness 
could arise if the tax professionals differently evaluated the effectiveness of IRS-audits. 
Indeed, different levels of recent audit success have been found to impact tax professionals’ 
tax aggressiveness (Kaplan et al. 1988, Duncan et al. 1989). It should be intuitive that 
differences in recent audit success influence practitioners’ perceived audit effectiveness. 
Therefore, we asked the subjects to indicate their agreement to the statement “Field audits 
performed by the IRS are generally very effective” on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The resulting measure is labeled AUDITS_EFFECTIVE.  
4.5.2.5 Cultural Differences 
The fifth block of control variables considers the possibility that differences in tax 
aggressiveness are induced by the cultural background of the probands. This is suggested by 
prior research investigating the relationship of cultural background and tax compliance (for a 
review see Richardson 2006). For the purpose of measuring cultural influences we refer to the 
Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) study dimensions 
(House et al. 2004). The GLOBE study investigates how culture is related to societal, 
organizational, and leader effectiveness by incorporating Hofstede’s (1980) cultural 
dimensions. As Bame-Aldred et al. (2011) do not use all dimensions included in the GLOBE 
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study but identify the relevant traits by referring to institutional anomie theory (IAT) as 
developed by Messner and Rosenfeld (2001; Rosenfeld & Messner 1997) we use this approach 
as well. Bame-Aldred et al. (2011) only examine four specific culture dimensions that are 
suggested to likely promote or suppress illegal tax evasion pursuant to IAT. These dimensions 
include individualism, achievement orientation, assertiveness, and humane orientation and are 
also used in the present analysis. In the GLOBE study all of these culture traits are measured 
by several questions that are presented to the proband in two variants. The first variant of each 
question investigates the way the society is, whereas the second variant targeting the same 
content investigates the beliefs of the probands about what the norms, values, and practices 
should be in the society. To design a parsimonious questionnaire we measure every dimension 
by using only one question instead of referring to the full set of questions provided by the 
GLOBE study. Furthermore, we only presented the first variant of the questions looking at the 
way the tax professionals describe the status quo of their society. The resulting variables are 
labeled INDIVIDUALISM, ACHIEVEMENT_ORIENT, ASSERTIVENESS, and 
HUMANE_ORIENT.
39
  
However, as a kind of substitute for the “should-be-questions” we measure subjects’ 
degree of national identification as we expect this dimension to reflect the level of satisfaction 
with the way the society is described. For this purpose we borrow two items from Haslam 
(2001): “Being a member of the U.S. [German] community is important to me” and “I feel a 
sense of pride in being a member of the U.S. [German] community” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 
= strongly agree). Since Wenzel (2002) – using the same two items – suggests that national 
identification impacts taxpayers’ compliance it cannot be excluded that national identification 
also has an influence on the advice aggressiveness of professional preparers. The 
corresponding variable (labeled IDENTIFICATION) was generated by conducting a principal 
components factor analysis for the two items above. The analysis resulted in a one-factor 
                                                     
39 Each of the cultural dimensions is measured by one question. The answers are given by circling the number that most 
closely represents the subjects’ observations about the society on a seven-point scale. Assertiveness is measured by the 
statement “In this society, people are generally…”, with answers ranging from “aggressive” (value = 1) to “non-
aggressive” (value = 7). We reverse coded this question to transform it into ASSERTIVENESS. INDIVIDUALISM was 
measured by reverse coding the answers to the statement “The economic system in this society is designed to 
maximize...”, with answers ranging from “individual interests” (value = 1) to “collective interests” (value = 7). The 
statement for HUMANE_ORIENT has been “In this society, people are generally“, with answers ranging from “not at all 
concerned about others” (value = 1) to “very concerned about others” (value = 7). The level of agreement (strongly 
disagree = 1, strongly agree = 7) to the statement “In this society, people are rewarded for excellent performance” was 
used to measure ACHIEV_ORIENT. 
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solution that emerged with eigenvalues of 1.827, 0.173 explaining 91.35% of the total variance 
in the data. Both factor loadings are 0.954.  
4.5.2.6 Tax Morale 
The last control variable that is presented in our regression results reflects participants’ 
tax morale as the latter was found to have at least an impact on tax compliance (for a review 
see Torgler 2011), so an impact on tax professionals’ advice aggressiveness cannot be 
excluded. To develop our measure for tax morale we refer to the International Social Survey 
Program (ISSP). The ISSP is a continuing annual program of cross-national collaboration on 
surveys covering topics important for social science research, whereas the waves are 
concerned with different repeating topics each year.
40
 Pursuant to the self-conception of the 
ISSP, its researchers concentrate on developing questions that are meaningful and relevant to 
all countries, and can be expressed in an equivalent manner in all relevant languages. The 
question we borrowed from the wave concerned with “citizenship” (as performed in 2004) 
asks: “There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a good citizen. As far as you are 
concerned personally how important is it that a good citizen never tries to evade taxes?” (1 = 
not at all important, 7 = very important). We labeled the corresponding variable 
TAX_MORALE.  
4.5.3 Additional Regressions for Split Samples 
We want to provide a supplementary contribution to the existing literature by 
replicating the test for universally accepted factors of tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness in a 
multinational context. Thus, we perform additional ordinary least square regressions for the 
split samples including independent variables that have been found to influence tax 
professionals’ aggressiveness in prior U.S. studies. Thus, we test whether tax professionals 
working under the Full Regulation Model (Germany) determine their level of advice 
aggressiveness by referring to other (inner) landmarks than tax professionals working under 
the Partial Regulation Model in the USA. In this way, the present study should help the 
OECD, legislators and standard setters to better understand cross-national differences in tax 
aggressiveness.  
                                                     
40 See http://www.issp.org/ for more details. 
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We include PENALTY to control for the treatment the particular participant faces, and 
sociodemographic factors suggested to impact tax aggressiveness (for a review see Robert 
1998). The latter comprise subjects’ sex (GENDER), overall experience (AGE), and task 
familiarity (COMPLIANCE). We furthermore add our indicators of client advocacy 
(CLIENT_ADVOCACY), and general risk propensity (RISK_PROP) as suggested by Hansen 
& White (2012). Finally, we include participants’ perceptions about the effectiveness of IRS 
audits (AUDITS_EFFECTIVE) as different levels of recent audit success have been found to 
impact tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness (Kaplan et al. 1988, Duncan et al. 1989). 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 4.1 to 4.3 present descriptive results for tax aggressiveness. Apart from the 
variables of the basic model we only present dichotomizations of those control variables that 
show significant differences in tax aggressiveness between the Full- and the Partial Regulation 
Model or the countries respectively. On average, subjects are willing to give a positive 
recommendation for the ambiguous deduction up to a failure probability of 48.97%. 
Investigating tax aggressiveness in the split samples in a first step, we find tax aggressiveness 
to be greater for tax professionals from the U.S. when compared to their German colleagues 
(see Table 4.1, Panel A). However, this difference does not reach significance when looking at 
the univariate results.  
When separating the regulative effect of preparer penalties on tax aggressiveness the 
descriptive statistics show lower tax aggressiveness if preparer penalty provisions are 
applicable in the combined sample (see Table 4.1, Panel B) as well as in the split samples (see 
Table 4.1, Panel C). However, only the difference in the combined sample (p = 0.061)
41
 
reaches significance. 
Table 4.2, Panel A, shows tax aggressiveness for different levels of client advocacy. 
For this purpose CLIENT_ADVOCACY has been dichotomized at the split samples’ median 
since the impact of client advocacy on tax aggressiveness should be disentangled from a 
potential effect of the differences in the regulatory environments of the USA and Germany. As 
                                                     
41 All p-values in this subsection (4.6.1) refer to the Mann-Whitney-U-Test. 
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intuitional, higher levels of client advocacy enhance tax aggressiveness (p = 0.083). However, 
if this analysis is split to the two country-samples (Table 4.2, Panel B), a (weakly significant) 
difference in tax aggressiveness for different levels of client advocacy is only found for the 
German sample (p = 0.051). Hence, the tax preparers from the USA in our sample are not 
influenced by their client- versus IRS-dispositions when choosing their level of tax 
aggressiveness - at least when providing advice to their clients that is comparable to the rather 
simple judgment of the task in our setting. 
When looking at the two groups resulting from our split in client advocacy (high vs. 
low) we find a significant (p = 0.047) difference in tax aggressiveness between the Full 
Regulation Model (Germany) and the Partial Regulation Model (USA) indicating higher tax 
aggressiveness in the U.S.-sample for those participants who score low in client advocacy. 
Thus, it is important to control for different levels of client advocacy to correctly estimate the 
effect of market regulation on tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness in our sample as already 
suggested when determining the control variables for the regression equation. 
Pursuant to the univariate results presented in Table 4.3, Panel A, tax preparers in our 
sample who are more extraverted (more neurotic) than their peers are more (less) tax 
aggressive (p = 0.079 for extraversion; p = 0.088 for neuroticism). However, when looking at 
 Tax Aggressiveness  
 Observations Mean Std. dev. Median Sign. 
Total  89 48.97 16.55 49.00  
Panel A: Country 
USA 44 51.50 14.79 49.00 
0.210 
Germany 45 46.49 17.93 49.00 
Panel B: Setting 
Penalty 40 44.93 17.45 49.00 
0.061 
No Penalty 49 52.27 15.18 49.00 
Panel C: Country and Setting  
Penalty  
USA 18 48.67 14.82 49.00 
0.427 
Germany 22 41.86 19.12 49.00 
No Penalty 
USA 26 53.46 14.73 49.50 
0.484 
Germany 23 50.91 15.89 49.00 
The table shows descriptive results of subjects’ tax aggressiveness (measured as the maximum tax risk subjects 
are ready to accept) for the independent variables reflecting differences between the Full Regulation Model 
(Germany) and the Partial Regulation Model (USA). Panel A shows tax aggressiveness for the split country-
samples while Panel B reflects tax aggressiveness for the two treatment groups (with or without penalty 
provisions being applicable). Panel C shows tax aggressiveness at the particular country level for the two 
treatment groups (with and without penalty provisions). Statistical significance shows p-values for the Mann-
Whitney-U-Test. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive results of subjects' tax aggressiveness depending on country and setting. 
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the split samples (Table 4.3, Panel B), a corresponding (significant) difference in tax 
aggressiveness for different levels of extraversion can only be found for the German sample 
(p = 0.01) and a corresponding (significant) difference in tax aggressiveness for different 
levels of neuroticism can only be found for the U.S. sample (p = 0.007). Furthermore, tax 
preparers in the U.S. sample scoring high in openness acted significantly less tax aggressive 
than their U.S.-counterparts scoring low in openness (p = 0.023). 
Table 4.2: Descriptive results of subjects' tax aggressiveness depending on country and client advocacy. 
These results imply that tax preparers in the U.S. are guided by different personality 
traits when making judgments in the field of taxes than their German counterparts. As already 
suggested by Blaufus & Zinowsky (2013), further research should be spent on the impact of 
personality traits on tax professionals’ judgment and decision making to clarify whether this 
impact is embanked by the regulatory framework surrounding tax professionals’ work and 
whether it is advisable consider personality traits in future studies. 
When looking at the two groups resulting from our split in openness, extraversion, 
neuroticism (high vs. low) we consistently find significant differences in tax aggressiveness 
 
 Tax Aggressiveness  
 Observations Mean Std. dev. Median Sign. 
Total  89 48.97 16.55 49.00  
Panel A: Client Advocacy 
High 43 50.98 17.41 49.00 
0.083 
Low 46 47.09 15.66 49.00 
Panel B: Impact of Client Advocacy in the respective country    
USA Client Advocacy = 
High 22 51.50 16.75 49.00 
0.742 
Low 22 51.50 12.93 49.00 
Germany Client Advocacy = 
High 21 50.43 18.48 49.00 
0.051 
Low 24 43.04 17.08 42.50 
Panel C: Impact of country of origin dependent from level of Client Advocacy  
Client Advocacy = 
High 
USA 22 51.50 16.75 49.00 
0.980 
Germany 21 50.43 18.48 49.00 
Low 
USA 22 51.50 12.93 49.00 
0.047 
Germany 24 43.04 17.08 42.50 
The table shows descriptive results of subjects’ tax aggressiveness (measured as the maximum tax risk subjects 
are ready to accept). Panel A shows tax aggressiveness for different levels of client advocacy. High (low) 
denotes values above (below) the split samples’ median. Panel B and C show tax aggressiveness in the particular 
country-sample for the two levels of client advocacy and vice versa: While Panel B shows statistical significance 
for the difference in tax aggressiveness between the two levels of client advocacy for the respective country-
sample, Panel C shows statistical significance for the difference in tax aggressiveness between the Full 
Regulation Model (Germany) and the Partial Regulation Model (USA) dependent from the level of subjects’ 
client advocacy. Statistical significance refers to the p-values for the Mann-Whitney-U-Test. 
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 Tax Aggressiveness  
 Observations Mean Std. 
dev. 
Median Sign. 
Total  89 48.97 16.55 49.00  
Panel A: Impact of Personality Traits    
Openness 
High 37 46.95 15.32 49.00 
0.268 
Low 52 50.40 17.38 49.00 
Extraversion 
High 39 52.51 15.46 49.00 
0.079 
Low 50 46.20 17.00 49.00 
Neuroticism 
High 39 46.26 14.39 49.00 
0.088 
Low 50 51.08 17.92 49.00 
Panel B: Impact of Personality traits in the respective country   
USA Openness = 
High 20 46.30 15.80 49.00 
0.023 
Low 24 55.83 12.63 50.00 
Germany Openness = 
High 17 47.71 15.19 49.00 
0.628 
Low 28 45.75 19.65 49.00 
USA Extraversion = 
High 21 50.29 14.72 49.00 
0.715 
Low 23 52.61 15.09 49.00 
Germany Extraversion = 
High 18 55.11 16.31 49.50 
0.010 
Low 27 40.74 16.87 45.00 
USA Neuroticism = 
High 22 45.59 13.31 49.00 
0.007 
Low 22 57.41 14.02 52.50 
Germany Neuroticism = 
High 17 47.12 16.03 49.00 
0.991 
Low 28 46.11 19.27 49.00 
Panel C: Impact of country of origin dependent from personality traits    
Openness = High USA 20 46.30 15.80 49.00 
0.557 
Germany 17 47.71 15.19 49.00 
Low USA 24 55.83 12.63 50.00 
0.046 
Germany 28 45.75 19.65 49.00 
Extraversion = High USA 21 50.29 14.72 49.00 
0.335 
Germany 18 55.11 16.31 49.50 
Low USA 23 52.61 15.09 49.00 
0.020 
Germany 27 40.74 16.87 45.00 
Neuroticism = High USA 22 45.59 13.31 49.00 
0.900 
Germany 17 47.12 16.03 49.00 
Low USA 22 57.41 14.02 52.50 
0.048 
Germany 28 46.11 19.27 49.00 
The table shows descriptive results of subjects’ tax aggressiveness (measured as the maximum tax risk 
subjects are ready to accept). Panel A shows tax aggressiveness for different levels of openness, extraversion 
and neuroticism. High denotes values above the split samples’ median. Panel B and C show tax 
aggressiveness in the particular country-sample for the two manifestations of the respective personality trait 
and vice versa: While Panel B shows statistical significance for the difference in tax aggressiveness between 
the two levels of openness, extraversion, neuroticism for the respective country-sample, Panel C shows 
statistical significance for the difference in tax aggressiveness between the Full Regulation Model (Germany) 
and the Partial Regulation Model (USA) dependent from the level of subjects’ openness, extraversion, and 
neuroticism. Statistical significance refers to the p-values for the Mann-Whitney-U-Test. 
Table 4.3: Descriptive results of subjects' tax aggressiveness depending on country and selected 
personality traits. 
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between the Full Regulation Model (Germany) and the Partial Regulation Model (USA) for 
those participants who score low in these personality traits (p-values are 0.046, 0.020, and 
0.048 for the split in OPENNESS, EXTRAVERSION, and NEUROTICISM). Therefore, the 
idea that participants who work under the Full Regulation Model (Germany) act less tax 
aggressive than participants who stem from the USA and are subject to less regulation is 
further nourished.  
Again, it is important to control for these variables to correctly estimate the effect of 
market regulation on tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness as suggested when determining the 
control variables for the regression equation. 
All other control variables not depicted in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 have not been found to 
produce a significant difference in tax aggressiveness dependent from the regulative 
environment the particular participant stems from when looking at the univariate results.  
4.6.2 Correlations 
Table 4.4 summarizes the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients for this study’s 
dependent and independent variables. First, there is no significant correlation between 
TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS and USA as suggested by our hypothesis. Second, we find that 
there are a number of at least weak significant correlations between tax aggressiveness and the 
independent variables. Besides the effect already indicated in Table 4.1 for the variable 
representing penalty provisions, PENALTY (r = -0.22, p = 0.037)
42
, there are fairly high 
correlations of TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS with ABOVE_MANAGER (r = 0.24, p = 0.021) 
and COMPLIANCE (r = -0.26, p = 0.013). Furthermore, there are weak significant 
correlations of TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS with AGE (r = 0.21, p = 0.052) and the sum of 
personality items representing NEUROTICISM (r = -0.9, p = 0.068).  
However, there are some significant correlations of USA with the other independent 
variables indicating among others that the tax professionals from the U.S. show significantly 
higher IDENTIFICATION (r = 0.335, p = 0.001) with their country and describe people in 
their society as being significantly more concerned about others when compared to the opinion 
of the German participants (p = 0.040 for HUMANE_ORIENT, r = 0.22). Another culture 
trait, ASSERTIVENESS, is significantly (r = 0.211, p = 0.047) correlated with USA, too, 
                                                     
42 All p-values in this subsection (4.6.2) refer to a two-tailed t-test. 
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reflecting that tax professionals in the U.S.-sample describe people in their society as being 
significantly more aggressive when compared to the perceptions of the German tax 
professionals. Hence, USA also measures at least part of the variation included in 
IDENTIFICATION, ASSERTIVENESS and HUMANE_ORIENT. Therefore, including these 
variables into the regression model is essential to test whether the residual information 
reflected by USA, i.e. the differences between the Full- and the Partial Regulation Model, has 
an impact on participants’ tax aggressiveness.  
The correlations of USA with GENDER (p = 0.081, r = -0.19) and 
ABOVE_MANAGER (p = 0.014, r = 0.26) show that the ratio of men and women is higher in 
the U.S.-sample (34:10; 27:18 in the German sample) and that there are more subjects above 
the manager’s grade than below (25:19) while it is the other way round in the German sample 
(14:31).  
The results also show a significant correlation of USA with CLIENT_ADVOCACY. In 
this context it seems to be conflicting that USA is significantly negative correlated with 
TAX_MORALE (r = -0.25, p = 0.019) and CLIENT_ADVOCACY (r = -0.34, p = 0.001) at 
the same time, suggesting that tax professionals from the U.S. are less client advocates than 
their German colleagues but have a less strict tax morale. The concepts of tax morale and 
client advocacy are different in terms of lawfulness. While the question used to measure tax 
morale refers to the impact of an illegal behavior (cheating on taxes) of a third party (a “good” 
citizen), client advocacy measures the degree of being willing to exploit the latitude of legal 
tax saving options for their clients on their own. Normally, one would expect that a subject 
scoring high in tax morale does correspondingly score low in client advocacy. However, the 
correlations show a more strict rejection for cheating on taxes of others with regard to the 
German sample but a tendency to more excessively use ambiguous situations to take sides 
with their clients. We come back to this point when analyzing the regression results. 
Finally, Table 4.4 expresses that some of the determinants impacting tax 
aggressiveness also have an influence on subjects’ level of CLIENT_ADVOCACY as the 
latter variable shows noteworthy correlations with AGE (r = 0.27, p = 0.011), 
ABOVE_MANAGER (r = 0.24, p = 0.021) and NEUROTICISM (r = -0.21, p = 0.005). 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
1) TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS 1.00                     
2) USA 0.15 1.00                    
3) PENALTY -0.22** -0.08 1.00                   
4) GENDER -0.03 -0.19* 0.17 1.00                  
5) AGE 0.21* 0.05 -0.07 -0.29*** 1.00                 
6) ABOVE_MANAGER 0.24** 0.26** -0.12 -0.26** 0.62*** 1.00                
7) COMPLIANCE -0.26** -0.13 0.09 0.07 -0.12 -0.34*** 1.00               
8) CLIENT_ADVOCACY 0.13 -0.34*** 0.07 -0.13 0.27** 0.24** -0.04 1.00              
9) OPENNESS -0.09 0.06 0.16 -0.08 -0.01 -0.07 -0.15 0.09 1.00             
10) CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 0.04 0.05 0.15 0.14 -0.11 0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.32*** 1.00            
11) EXTRAVERSION 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.17 -0.04 0.18* -0.20* 0.08 0.34*** 0.53*** 1.00           
12) AGREEABLENESS -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.10 0.06 1.00          
13) NEUROTICISM -0.19* 0.09 0.12 0.22** -0.15 -0.17 0.25** -0.30*** -0.15 -0.21* -0.09 -0.04 1.00         
14) RISK_PROP 0.01 0.05 -0.09 -0.29*** 0.35*** 0.29*** -0.17 0.34*** 0.25** 0.09 0.03 0.03 -0.23** 1.00        
15) PERCEIVED_INJUSTICE 0.05 -0.03 -0.12 0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.13 -0.12 -0.16 -0.13 -0.14 0.31*** 0.09 -0.09 1.00       
16) AUDITS_EFFECTIVE 0.17 -0.14 0.06 0.09 0.06 -0.18* 0.15 -0.05 0.03 -0.16 -0.16 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.30*** 1.00      
17) ASSERTIVENESS -0.17 0.21** -0.07 -0.08 -0.17 0.00 -0.03 -0.10 -0.03 -0.04 0.10 -0.13 0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.25** 1.00     
18) 
INDIVIDUALISM 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.21* 0.24** 0.12 0.07 -0.09 0.11 0.19* 0.13 -0.18* 0.11 0.15 -0.14 0.14 
-
0.30*** 1.00    
19) HUMANE_ORIENT 0.08 0.22** -0.03 -0.02 0.23** 0.10 0.03 -0.06 0.20* 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.17 0.03 -0.23** 0.29*** 1.00   
20) ACHIEVEMENT_ORIENT 0.14 0.11 -0.10 -0.08 0.03 0.12 -0.03 -0.02 -0.12 0.07 0.00 0.24** -0.08 -0.14 0.28*** -0.12 -0.15 -0.06 0.36*** 1.00  
21) IDENTIFICATION 0.15 0.34*** 0.16 -0.02 0.23** 0.28*** -0.06 -0.06 0.07 0.21** 0.20* -0.07 0.08 0.15 0.19* -0.01 0.04 0.30*** 0.25** 0.20* 1.00 
22) TAX_MORALE 0.07 -0.25** -0.07 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.08 -0.10 0.20* 0.17 0.13 0.06 -0.09 0.28*** -0.02 -0.10 -0.01 0.18* 0.30*** 0.19* 
 
The table summarizes the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients for this study’s dependent and independent variables. 
The number of observations amounts to 89. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 4.4: Bivariate correlations of main variables. 
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However, the correlations underpin the idea of the concept of client advocacy as 
defining a robust and more general client- vs. authority-disposition that is not influenced by 
context specifics (e.g., no significant correlation with PENALTY) but is dependent from tax 
professionals experience (here: AGE, ABOVE_MANAGER) and overall risk propensity 
(here: significant correlation with RISK_PROP (r = 0.34, p = 0.001). As client advocacy is 
suggested to be the more stable phenomenon when compared to the context-specific concept 
of tax aggressiveness further research should spend more effort on investigating the drivers of 
client advocacy. 
4.6.3 Regressions Results for Combined Sample 
Table 4.5 summarizes the results of the ordinary least square regression analysis for 
the basic regression model (1) as well as for the extended models which include the control 
variables we recognize to disentangle the effect of differences between the Full Regulation 
Model (Germany) and the Partial Regulation Model (USA) from other potential influences 
(models 2-7). 
The variable USA indicating differences in the regulation of the tax preparation 
markets in the USA and Germany does not reach significance in the basic regression model. 
However, when looking at the other models which provide higher explanatory power than the 
basic model as they include the variables found to be essential for the testing of our 
hypothesis when looking at the descriptive results and the correlations we find at least weak 
significant evidence for a positive influence of USA on tax aggressiveness. Thus, market 
regulation is found to be relevant for tax professionals’ behavior at least when looking at the 
differences between the Full- (Germany) and the Partial Regulation Model (USA) and 
referring to the submarket created by the Big Four firms. Pursuant to the regression 
coefficient of USA, tax professionals working under the Partial Regulation Model in the USA 
are ceteris paribus more tax aggressive than their German colleagues working under the Full 
Regulation Model.
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Furthermore, model 1 shows at least weak significance for the control variable 
indicating regulatory differences with regard to the (non-)applicability of preparer penalty 
provisions. As the coefficient of PENALTY is negative, the introduction of penalty provisions 
                                                     
43 As some voices in the literature suggest a relationship between religiosity and tax compliance we performed additional 
analysis to be sure that our results are not due to differences in religiosity. To measure religiosity we again used a 
question from ISSP-waves concerned with “religion” last performed in 2008: “About how often do you pray?”. Answers 
could be given on a scale from 1 to 11 (1 = never, 2 = less than once a year, 3 = about once or twice a year, 4 = several 
times a year, 5 = about once a month, 6 = 2-3 times a month, 7 = nearly every week, 8 = every week, 9 = several times a 
week, 10 = once a day, 11 = several times a day). Answering this question has been voluntary as we suppose this question 
to be very intimate. As a consequence we have only a limited sample of 74 subjects (38 from the USA, 36 from 
Germany) when testing the influence of this variable. However, our results remain unaffected by controlling for 
religiosity. 
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made the tax professionals in our sample being less tax aggressive when compared to a setting 
without preparer penalties. This result is confirmed by all regression models we calculated.  
Having a look at the other independent variables we controlled for, the results for the 
sociodemographic factors show that neither GENDER, nor AGE or ABOVE_MANAGER 
have a significant effect on tax aggressiveness. However, we find evidence for an at least 
weak significant negative impact of COMPLIANCE on TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS in all 
models performed. Consequently, tax professionals being more familiar with compliance 
tasks like the one in question took less aggressive tax-reporting decisions than those with less 
experience regarding this kind of task. This finding is contrary to the results of prior research 
(Duncan et al. 1989, Newberry et al. 1993, Reckers et al. 1991). An explanation for this 
phenomenon might be that tax professionals whose main field of work is compliance 
normally do the preparation and filing of tax returns in the first step and are obliged to defend 
potentially aggressive filing positions in course of a tax audit in the second step. This is 
generally not the case in teams mainly concerned with project-related business like, e.g., tax 
planning where tax optimization opportunities for particular client are developed and 
implemented while the corresponding filing work is done by another preparer. It should be 
obvious that tax professionals who learned from their experience that aggressive filing 
positions might result in extensive discussions with the tax authorities and other adverse 
consequences like clients’ dissatisfaction act more conservative than others. 
CLIENT_ADVOCACY is found to significantly increase TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS 
in our data. Hence, tax preparers scoring high in client advocacy showed higher tax 
aggressiveness when providing tax advice than others. Within this context, it is noteworthy 
that tax professionals from Germany are more client advocates than the U.S. tax professionals 
in our sample when referring to the correlations, whereas the coefficient for USA in the 
regression results hint at U.S.-tax professionals being more tax aggressive than their German 
colleagues. This seems to be contradictory and would imply a disentanglement of the 
concepts of client advocacy and tax aggressiveness with regard to the impact of differences in 
market regulation. 
The same contradictory result was already mentioned for the relationship between 
USA, CLIENT_ADCOCACY and TAX_MORALE depicted in Table 4.4 before. A possible 
explanation for the suggestion that German tax preparers are more client advocates but less 
tax aggressive than their U.S. counterparts might be the fact that audit rates in Germany are 
higher. Consequently, German tax professionals more easily run the risk of becoming a 
“repeat player” in the tax audit process than their U.S. colleagues. Likewise, it might be 
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possible that Germans perceive the tax compliance process to a fewer extent as a game than 
the U.S. tax professionals do and therefore are less prone to “gambling” behavior. In this 
context it is also conceivable that the negotiation tactics differ significantly between the 
German and U.S. tax preparers, whereas the latter might have a disposition to start with “an 
aggressive bid” while the Germans might rather prefer more cooperative tactics. Moreover, 
U.S. tax professionals could be subject to an anchoring phenomenon as they could have get 
used to large latitudes of tax aggressiveness that are allowed by the present penalty provisions 
in their country while the Germans face no corresponding provisions. This would be in line 
with the results of Cuccia et al. (1995) who show that tax practitioners use the latitude 
inherent in penalty provisions to support aggressive reporting decisions. The coefficient for 
PENALTY contradicts this idea, however, whether this could be a possible explanation must 
be clarified by a split-sample analysis. Similarly, differences regarding other aspects as the 
importance of face saving or reputation might hamper the German tax professionals to 
transform their high client advocacy to corresponding high levels of tax aggressiveness in the 
case at hand. Finally, choosing a level of tax aggressiveness should always be a procedure 
which comprises an ethical judgment. Pursuant to a study of Burns & Kiecker (1995) tax 
professionals’ ethical judgments are dependent on both deontological and teleological 
considerations while individuals have either a basically deontological or a basically 
teleological orientation toward assessing ethical situations. This basic orientation is likely to 
influence their predominant use of either deontological or teleological factors, respectively, 
when responding to ethical questions. Deontological evaluations judge ethical behavior by 
using rather general beliefs regarding whether essential characteristics of a certain behavior 
lead individuals to view it as being right or wrong (Burns & Kiecker, 1995: 22). Teleological 
evaluations judge ethical behavior by determining whether the consequences of a certain 
behavior are viewed as favorable or unfavorable to the involved parties (Burns & Kiecker, 
1995: 22). We suggest that client advocacy should be a reflection of tax professionals’ general 
evaluations regarding ambiguous situations involving ethical questions, i.e., of their 
deontological norms. While this norms seem to be stronger in the U.S. sample the final 
response to the ethical question at hand, here: the level of tax aggressiveness accepted, seems 
to be less ethical than in the German sample. Referring to the results of Burns & Kiecker 
(1995) this occurrence might be due the fact that tax professionals in the USA have a 
basically teleological orientation when making decisions in the field of tax advisory while the 
Germans tax professionals have a rather deontological orientation. However, as we do not 
measure the orientation regarding the aforementioned dispositions it must be left for further 
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research whether this assumption is accurate to explain the contradictory results found 
between the variables in question. 
OLS regressions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Dependent variable: TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS 
 
 
USA 4.454 3.587 6.036 7.668* 8.673** 8.676** 8.964* 
 (3.439) (3.545) (3.906) (3.992) (3.861) (4.299) (4.532) 
PENALTY -6.981** -6.386* -6.902** -6.492* -6.840* -7.546** -7.423* 
 (3.457) (3.424) (3.420) (3.549) (3.447) (3.670) (3.740) 
GENDER  3.439 4.239 2.651 1.322 0.902 0.869 
  (3.860) (3.874) (4.128) (3.995) (4.261) (4.294) 
AGE  0.302 0.276 0.430 0.312 0.229 0.225 
  (0.253) (0.252) (0.264) (0.258) (0.283) (0.285) 
ABOVE_MANAGER  1.646 0.015 -3.238 -1.523 -1.996 -1.945 
  (4.758) (4.858) (5.249) (5.130) (5.225) (5.267) 
COMPLIANCE  -6.709* -6.799* -7.163* -8.195** -7.894** -7.886** 
  (3.613) (3.589) (3.830) (3.713) (3.802) (3.829) 
CLIENT_ADVOCACY   0.373 0.449 0.532* 0.518* 0.515* 
   (0.257) (0.278) (0.269) (0.276) (0.278) 
OPENNESS    -0.867 -1.027 -1.010 -0.993 
    (0.645) (0.623) (0.653) (0.662) 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS    0.473 0.832 0.452 0.409 
    (0.994) (0.964) (1.011) (1.037) 
EXTRAVERSION    0.521 0.629 0.747 0.733 
    (0.634) (0.611) (0.638) (0.646) 
AGREEABLENESS    -0.472 -0.536 -0.610 -0.610 
    (0.681) (0.700) (0.767) (0.772) 
NEUROTICISM    -0.574 -0.523 -0.527 -0.544 
    (0.596) (0.574) (0.594) (0.603) 
RISK_PROP    -1.381 -1.555 -1.469 -1.455 
    (1.157) (1.116) (1.184) (1.194) 
PERCEIVED_INJUSTICE     0.377 -0.187 -0.255 
     (1.865) (2.135) (2.173) 
AUDITS_EFFECTIVE     3.993*** 3.649** 3.662** 
     (1.501) (1.595) (1.607) 
ASSERTIVENESS      -2.475 -2.467 
      (1.801) (1.815) 
INDIVIDUALISM      -0.006 0.021 
      (1.423) (1.439) 
HUMANE_ORIENT      -0.318 -0.360 
      (1.757) (1.780) 
ACHIEVEMENT_ORIENT      0.675 0.624 
      (1.410) (1.439) 
IDENTIFICATION      1.505 1.416 
      (2.161) (2.215) 
TAX_MORALE       0.287 
       (1.330) 
Constant 49.902*** 39.932*** 24.126* 34.132 16.317 36.066 35.584 
 (2.944) (9.458) (14.389) (25.420) (25.351) (30.359) (30.656) 
        
R-squared 0.067 0.155 0.177 0.235 0.312 0.345 0.345 
Adj. R-squared 0.046 0.093 0.105 0.1025 0.171 0.152 0.139 
The table shows the regression results for subjects’ tax aggressiveness for the combined sample with (models 2-7) and 
without (model 1) controlling for subjects’ sociodemographic characteristics, client advocacy, personality traits, attitudes 
towards and perceptions about the tax system, cultural differences and tax morale. Standard errors in parentheses. The 
number of observations amounts to 89 in all seven models. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,  
* p < 0.1 
Table 4.5: Regression results for the combined sample. 
Looking at the variables that should reflect participants’ perceptions of the tax system, 
we find robust evidence for a significant influence of AUDITS_EFFECTIVE on tax 
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aggressiveness. To our surprise, the regression coefficient indicates that subjects perceiving 
IRS-audits as being efficient show higher tax aggressiveness than subjects degrading the 
effectiveness of IRS work. This would deny a deterrence effect of IRS-audits at least with 
regard to tax professionals. Normally, we would expect that tax professionals choose their 
level of tax aggressiveness at least basically in accordance with the expected utility theory. 
Thus, higher audit effectiveness should lower the expected profit of tax aggressiveness by 
increasing the expected costs due to additional tax payments or preparer penalties. However, 
there are prior studies that yield results similar to this, as Strümpel (1969) found tax morale to 
be lower in Germany than in England although he suggested the German government to make 
use of more coercive tax enforcement techniques than the English system. Furthermore, there 
are some studies that report a negative correlation between perceived audit probabilities and 
tax evasion (Spicer & Lundstedt 1976, Mason & Calvin 1978, Spicer & Thomas 1982) what 
should be comparable to the study at hand since the perceived audit effectiveness should 
reflect a kind of subjective detection probability. Both risks, perceived audit probability as 
well as subjective detection probability, should increase the expected costs of tax 
aggressiveness. Blumenthal et al. (1998) find a similar result. In a controlled experiment 
where taxpayers were informed by the IRS in advance that their income tax returns will 
certainly be closely examined, high-income taxpayers’ reported income fell sharply relative to 
a control group. This effect was not induced by the hiring of tax preparers and is explained by 
the authors in different ways. One argument that could also be applicable to the tax preparers 
in this study is that subjects see the compliance process as a costly negotiation process under 
imperfect and asymmetric information where it may make sense to begin with “a low bid”.  
Another possible guess could be that the payment status of the client is responsible for 
the contra-intuitive result at hand as the client has underpaid taxes in our setting. Chang et al. 
(1987) show that taxpayers do not react on higher audit risks in the way intuitively expected if 
the tax payment is perceived as being a loss rather than decreased income. However, this 
result, highlighting the validity of prospect theory also in the field of tax compliance was not 
found for tax professionals up to date as they do not tend to internalize the client’s payment 
status and thus have no psychological commitment to the decision outcome (Koski & Ehlen 
2002).  
A further possible explanation might be derived from Kirchler et al. (2008) who 
design a framework for tax compliance emphasizing the interaction of power (defined as 
taxpayers’ perception of enforcement effectiveness) and trust in the tax authorities. Pursuant 
to the “slippery slope” they describe in their study low trust in the tax systems might explain 
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why higher enforcement effectiveness does not necessarily lead to higher tax compliance. In 
an empirical investigation of this framework Wahl et al. (2010) actually find a kind of 
taxpayers’ reactance for cases with low trust and high power, designated to be a “cops-and-
robbers”-setting. Hence, the increase in tax aggressiveness of the tax professionals perceiving 
the audits effectiveness to be higher than in the control group might also be due to differences 
in trust in the present study.  
We do not find a robust direct effect of the Big Five personality traits, culture traits, 
general risk propensity, or tax morale on participants’ tax aggressiveness.  
4.6.4 Regressions Results for the Split Samples 
As the regression results for the combined sample show a difference in tax experts’ tax 
aggressiveness between the country samples it is interesting whether tax professionals 
working under the Full Regulation Model (Germany) determine their level of advice 
aggressiveness by referring to other (inner) landmarks than tax professionals working under 
the Partial Regulation Model in the USA. Indeed, the regressions performed for the split 
samples to answer this question result in differences in the determinants of participants’ tax 
aggressiveness between countries. 
Pursuant to the results in Table 4.6 there is a remarkable differences between the U.S. 
tax professionals and their German colleagues: The introduction of penalty provisions did not 
result in a reduction of tax aggressiveness in the U.S. sample but only in the German sample. 
While this result might be due to the small sample size, it was also thinkable that the U.S. tax 
professionals have already got used to the penalty provisions applicable in the USA, e.g., 
because they have never been subject to them or against the background of the rather low 
audit rates in the USA. However, it might also be the case that subjects did not internalize the 
instructions we provided for the fictitious penalty provision in our setting but referred to their 
real-world penalties they got used to and which allow for a larger latitude of tax 
aggressiveness than the penalty introduced in our study. This could help to explain why the 
tax professionals from the USA are less client advocates than the German tax professionals 
but show higher tax aggressiveness in our study. However, client advocacy is furthermore 
found to increase tax aggressiveness only in the German sample. Thus, also the deliberations 
we made with regard to the findings of Burns & Kiecker (1995) seem to be underlined as the 
response to the ethical question of our task (defining the level of tax aggressiveness) is 
influenced by rather deontological norms in the German sample (i.e., subject’ client 
advocacy) while this does not apply for the U.S. tax professionals.  
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The split samples’ analyses both confirm the surprising result found for 
AUDITS_EFFECTIVE indicating higher tax aggressiveness at higher levels of perceived 
audit effectiveness so further research on the impact of power and trust on tax professionals’ 
tax aggressiveness should be performed. Finally, we find at least weak significant results for a 
positive impact of experience represent by subjects age (AGE) on tax aggressiveness in the 
U.S. sample, while neither age (AGE) nor task familiarity (COMPLIANCE) is found to 
impact advice aggressiveness of the German tax preparers in our data. These split sample 
results also hold if we control for other variables, like, e.g., participants personality traits. 
OLS regression results        
Dependent variable: TAX_AGGRESSIVENESS    
 U.S. sample German sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
PENALTY -4.795 -2.896 -2.902 -2.945 -4.191 -10.507** -10.927** -10.464** -9.793* -9.049* 
 (4.528) (4.552) (4.623) (4.673) (4.519) (4.861) (4.996) (5.073) (5.195) (5.231) 
GENDER  2.379 2.381 0.958 -0.934 6.835 7.147 6.433 4.205  
  (5.531) (5.604) (6.481) (6.277) (5.247) (5.396) (5.468) (5.467)  
AGE  0.493** 0.492* 0.495* 0.433* 0.150 0.237 0.039 0.192  
  (0.234) (0.251) (0.253) (0.245) (0.368) (0.376) (0.359) (0.358)  
COMPLIANCE  -4.432 -4.438 -5.128 -7.805 -8.406* -8.367 -8.465 -9.972*  
  (4.556) (4.628) (4.920) (4.889) (4.878) (5.019) (5.105) (5.170)  
CLIENT_ADVOCACY   0.006 0.050 0.039 1.085*** 0.889** 0.650*   
   (0.352) (0.369) (0.354) (0.395) (0.390) (0.364)   
RISK_PROP    -0.768 -1.318 -2.717 -2.535    
    (1.700) (1.651) (1.610)* (1.653)    
AUDITS_EFFECTIVE     4.252** 3.555*     
     (2.052) (1.980)     
Constant 53.462*** 35.144*** 34.949** 38.354 32.134* 0.498 18.483 21.833 47.564*** 50.913*** 
 (2.896) (10.217) (15.243) (17.151) (16.707) (21.827) (19.953) (20.174) (14.500) (3.658) 
           
R-squared 0.026 0.162 0.162 0.166 0.255 0.324 0.265 0.219 0.156 0.065 
Adj. R-squared 0.003 0.076 0.051 0.031 0.110 0.196 0.149 0.119 0.071 0.043 
The table shows the regression results for subjects’ tax aggressiveness in the split samples. While models 1 to 5 refer to the 
U.S. sample, models 6 to 10 refer to the German sample. The independent variables control for the treatment the participant 
faces (with or without reputational losses, represented by PENALTY), subject sex (GENDER), age (AGE), main field or 
working experience (COMPLIANCE), client advocacy (CLIENT_ADVOCACY), overall risk propensity (RISK_PROP), 
and perceptions about the effectiveness of tax audits performed by the IRS (AUDITS_EFFECTIVE). The number of 
observations amounts to 44 in the U.S. sample and 45 in the German sample. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, 
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 4.6: Regression results for the split samples. 
Overall, our split sample analysis is only suggested to be a first step into gaining a 
more detailed understanding of cross-national differences in tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness. 
Further research comprising larger datasets is necessary to shed further light on potential 
differences between the determinants of professional decision-making.  
4.7 Conclusions 
This study analyzes whether market regulation has an impact on tax preparers’ tax 
aggressiveness. Conducting an online survey experiment among tax professionals of a Big 
Four firm in the USA and Germany, we discuss the major differences between the two tax 
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preparation markets flagged as the Full Regulation Model (Germany) and the Partial 
Regulation Model (USA). The latter are suggested to essentially differ with regard to (1) 
admission to the profession, (2) maintenance and enforcement of quality standards (e.g., 
penalties), (3) mandatory early disclosure rules, (4) the freedom to determine advertising and 
fees, and (5) differences in the boundaries of multidisciplinary professional practice like 
provisions governing the possibility to collaborate with providers of other legal services. 
Given the plurality of differences between the two regulation models we hypothesize that 
market regulation matters, i.e., has an impact on tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness. We use 
ordinary least square regression modeling including a wide set of control variables to test this 
hypothesis.  
By doing this, we contribute to prior tax aggressiveness research by providing the first 
study that investigates cross-country differences in tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness. 
Furthermore, by using one of the major culture models we are the first to examine the 
influence of culture traits on experts’ tax aggressiveness. 
In line with our hypothesis, we find a difference in participants’ tax aggressiveness 
between the countries that cannot be explained by differences in sociodemographic factors, 
client advocacy, personality traits, attitudes towards and perceptions about the tax system, 
cultural differences or tax morale. Pursuant to the direction of this result, tax professionals 
working under the Full Regulation Model (Germany) for the Big Four firm in our sample are 
less tax aggressive than tax professionals working for the same firm under the less regulated 
Partial Regulation Model in the USA. As prior studies on tax professionals’ tax 
aggressiveness have almost exclusively been conducted in the USA our result raises the 
question whether the determinants found in prior research are valid also for tax professionals 
working in other jurisdictions or regulatory environments respectively. This question becomes 
even more pressing when looking at the results of our split sample regressions which show 
that participants’ tax aggressiveness is influenced by different determinants between the 
countries in our data.  
Hence, future research should take a deeper look into the role of regulatory differences 
when studying tax professionals’ tax aggressiveness to highlight main differences between 
countries that might enable governments, professional supervisions as well as the setters of 
tax standards interested in the role of tax professionals on the tax revenue to assess the 
potential effect of specific regulatory actions. These stakeholders should especially be 
interested in the latitude of tax aggressiveness that is predetermined by the institutional and 
regulatory framework in their country. Furthermore, to provide more robust evidence for the 
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validity or non-validity of the results found in prior (mainly U.S.) research on tax 
professionals behavior future studies comprising larger datasets will be required to shed 
further light on potential cross-country differences between the determinants of professional 
decision-making.  
Finally, further research might also help to better understand cross-national differences 
in taxpayers’ aggressiveness as tax professionals are suggested to play a very significant role 
in the compliance process. Thus, cross-national differences in tax preparers’ advice 
aggressiveness are expected to impact the level of taxpayers’ compliance in a market.   
4.8 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Although the main results, are supposed to be unaffected, our study is subject to some 
limitations. Besides the small sample sizes and the common points of criticism regarding the 
use of surveys among experts that are not conducted in a laboratory
44
, there a five further 
points. First, our results suggest that there is a between-country difference in experts’ tax 
aggressiveness. We suggest that this difference is driven by dissimilarities in the institutional 
and regulatory framework between the Full- and Partial Regulation Model as the between-
country difference cannot be explained by differences in sociodemographic factors, client 
advocacy, personality traits, attitudes towards and perceptions about the tax system, cultural 
differences or tax morale. However, we cannot exclude that there is a kind of omitted-
variable-bias, being responsible for the difference found. 
Second, we measure the culture traits by using single questions from the GLOBE 
questionnaire. We do not use the full questionnaire and the guidelines for the use of GLOBE 
read that “The GLOBE scales were designed to be psychometrically sound at the 
organizational and societal levels of analysis. This means that the scales were designed to 
explain ‘between-organization’ differences or ‘between-society’ differences. The scales were 
not designed to explain ‘between-individual’ differences.” Hence, there might be distortions 
from that point.  
Third, we were not successful in trying to confirm the results of Gerlitz & Schupp 
(2005) when performing a factor analysis to extract the Big Five personality traits from the 
single items of the questionnaire. So we simply added the single items found to reflect one 
                                                     
44 Of course, we are aware of the fact as we use a hypothetical scenario. Hence, it might be that subjects’ responses in real-
life settings providing real monetary incentives are different from the effects shown in our data. However, we use a 
randomized between-subject design and there is no theoretical reason why our results should not extend to actual 
behavior in real-world settings. 
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personality dimension in prior research. Thus, there might be distortions from this leakage as 
well. 
Fourth, the rather simple setting in our study should not have allowed for an 
applicability of early disclosure rules in the U.S. and should also not allow for a large latitude 
in setting the fees for the task in question. Therefore, we suggest that both aspects should not 
have influenced the results found. However, it cannot be excluded that recognizing the impact 
of both issues would result in a levelling of the difference found for the two regulatory 
models. 
Fifth, our data only represents one subsegment of the tax advisory market, i.e., the 
submarket created by the Big Four firms, and only examines the differences between the Full- 
und Partial Regulation Model as represented by German and U.S. law. Hence, our results 
might not be valid for the particular tax advisory markets under review as a whole and might 
not be applicable for other regulatory models. Our results should especially not allow for 
compulsory inferences regarding the impact of differences between the “Model of No 
Regulation” as classified by Thuronyi & Vanistendael (1996) and the other regulatory models 
on tax preparers’ tax aggressiveness. Further research should therefore extend the present 
study by using data from countries where the provision of tax advice and return preparation is 
generally unrestricted like Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain, or the United Kingdom. 
A final point that we leave for further research is connected with the findings in our 
data: Tax aggressiveness was higher for tax professionals considering IRS-audits as being 
more effective when compared to the statement of other colleagues. As this is at least 
astonishing further research should investigate whether tax professionals’ reactions to high 
enforcement power is dependent from their perceptions of trust in the tax system as suggested 
for taxpayers by the “slippery slope” framework of Kirchler et al. (2008).  
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4.9 APPENDIX F – Survey materials 
4.9.1 Introduction 
 
Welcome to our survey among tax professionals! 
At first, we would like to thank you for your willingness to take part in this scientific survey! 
All the information that you enter in the following, will only anonymously be available for our evaluation 
purposes. We treat all information with the utmost care and will not forward any data to third parties. 
Please note that navigating back is not possible during the survey. However, you can save your results 
temporarily under a pseudonym and a password, so you are able to complete the survey in several steps.  
For technical questions or other problems please do not hesitate to contact us under steuerforschung@tax.uni-
hannover.de at any time. 
We would ask you to answer all the questions alone and as conscientiously as possible. 
At the end of the survey we ask you to take part in a very short quiz that we use for plausibility purposes. For 
every participant who successfully answers the five questions, we donate € 3 for charity. Thanking all the other 
participants who fail to answer the quiz correctly but completely absolve the survey, we give € 1 to a good cause. 
Determine the charitable organization! 
If you answered all the questions in the quiz correctly, you will take part in a lottery (provided this corresponds 
to your desire). The winner of this lottery may determine the charity that will receive the amount of money 
which is earned by all participants in this study. 
Now, we hope you will enjoy the interview! 
 
4.9.2 Section I 
1) Which of the following tasks best describes your everyday work? 
a) Preparation of tax returns/compliance b) Preparation of tax opinions  
 c) Advocacy d) Advisory  
 e) Mediation f) Development (e.g., of tax optimized restructurings) 
 
2) How often are you concerned with tax planning or tax optimization tasks in your everyday work? 
a) Never  b) Seldom c) From time to time 
d) Often  e) (Almost) solely 
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4.9.3 Section II 
(Subjects have randomly been faced with Setting I or Setting II) 
Setting I 
For the purpose of your answer, please imagine all preparer penalties have been abolished by the legislature and 
your only obligation is to declare all existing risks to the client and not to support the client in tax evasion. 
One of your important clients contacts you due to a question about a deduction she would like to take for tax 
purposes. The resulting tax savings would amount to $1.4M. Anyhow the client has underpaid estimated 
taxes and withholdings and faces further payments at year end. 
The sources of legal authority and the view of the IRS regarding this issue are ambiguous and the specialist 
literature only provides conflicting evidence. The client asks whether you would recommend to take the 
deduction when filing the tax return.  
You have a very good relationship with the client and the latter is quite willing to take greater risks, 
depending on your recommendation. Regardless of whether the deduction of the item in question is 
successful, you would neither lose the client, nor would you have to worry about the assertion of liability 
claims. Furthermore, your firm would not have to fear reputational losses. 
The client had no major disputes with the tax authority in recent years. However, you have to expect that the 
deduction in question will be audited by the IRS. 
Please specify the minimum likelihood of client’s success in case of litigation which you would feel 
comfortable before signing the client’s tax return including the deduction in question (probability of 
success). 
Setting II 
Please imagine all existing preparer penalties have been abolished and replaced by a new provision punishing 
aggressive tax preparers. Pursuant to this new provision, your firm has to expect a penalty in the amount of 50% 
of the client’s tax savings resulting from an issue that is classified as being too aggressive. The provision would 
not be applicable if third-party experts conclude that client’s success in case of litigation was more likely than 
not. 
Now, one of your important clients contacts you due to a question about a deduction she would like to take 
for tax purposes. The resulting tax savings would amount to $1.4M. Anyhow the client has underpaid 
estimated taxes and withholdings and faces further payments at year end. 
The sources of legal authority and the view of the IRS regarding this issue are ambiguous and the specialist 
literature only provides conflicting evidence. The client asks whether you would recommend to take the 
deduction when filing the tax return. 
You have a very good relationship with the client and the latter is quite willing to take greater risks, 
depending on your recommendation. Regardless of whether the deduction of the item in question is 
successful, you would neither lose the client, nor would you have to worry about the assertion of liability 
claims. Furthermore, your firm would not have to fear reputational losses. 
The client had no major disputes with the tax authority in recent years. However, you have to expect that the 
deduction in question will be audited by the IRS. 
Please specify the minimum likelihood of client’s success in case of litigation which you would feel 
comfortable before signing the client’s tax return including the deduction in question (probability of 
success). 
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Question: 
Please specify the minimum likelihood of client’s success in case of litigation which you would feel comfortable 
before signing the client’s tax return including the deduction in question (probability of success). 
I sign the tax return including the uncertain position if the probability of success is at least…  
 [Answers must be indicated via a scrollbar comprising the values from 0% to 100%.] 
          
4.9.4 Section III 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following nine statements from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
a) In an instance where no judicial authority exists with respect to 
an issue and where the Code and Regulations are ambiguous, I 
feel the taxpayer is entitled to take the most favorable tax 
treatment. 
       
b) Generally speaking, my loyalties are first to the tax system, then 
to the taxpayer. 
       
c) I feel I should apply ambiguous tax law to the taxpayer’s benefit.        
d) When examining negotiations of the taxpayer with the financial 
administration, I tend to point out to taxpayers reasonable 
positions they could have taken which would have contributed to 
minimizing their tax liability. 
       
e) I believe it is important that I encourage taxpayers to pay the 
least amount of taxes possible. 
       
f) I always interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in favor of the 
taxpayers. 
       
g) It is important to use trends in the law by trying to establish a 
pattern of more favorable treatment for the taxpayer and then 
extending this pattern to the taxpayer’s position. 
       
h) Where no judicial authority exists with respect to an issue, I feel 
that the taxpayer is entitled to take the most favorable treatment. 
       
 
4.9.5 Section IV 
A few questions regarding your person... 
1) How many years of experience do you have as a tax preparer/tax accountant?  
a) less than one year b) 1-3 years c) 3-5 years 
d) 5-10 years e) 10-15 years f) 15-20 years 
g) more than 20 years   
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2) What position do you hold in your firm? 
a) Trainee b) Consultant or Senior Consultant 
c) Manager d) Senior Manager, Director or Partner 
 
3) Do you work at a Big4-firm? 
a) Yes  b) No 
 
4) Which professional examinations did you pass? 
a) None b) Registered Tax Return Preparer c) CPA 
d) Enrolled Agent e) (Tax) Lawyer f) Other: 
 
5) Are you currently on secondment in the USA [Germany]? 
a) Yes  b) No 
 
6) How old are you? (Answer must be entered in a cell) 
  
7) What is your gender?  a) female b) male 
 
8) How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid 
taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means “not at all willing to take risks” and the 
value 10 means “very willing to take risks”. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Risk propensity            
 
9) About how often do you pray? 
a) No answer b) Never c) Less than once a year 
d) About once or twice a year e) Several times a year f) About once a month 
g) 2-3 times a month h) Nearly every week i) Every week 
j) Several times a week k) Once a day l) Several times a day 
 
4.9.6 Section V 
1) Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). 
g) Being a member of the German community is important to me. 
h) The government predominantly uses the tax revenues for things that are useful for the citizens 
i) I feel a sense of pride in being a member of the German community. 
j) Field audits performed by the Revenue Agency are generally very effective. 
k) All things considered, I feel that the amount of income tax I am asked to pay is about right. 
l) Generally, I get a reasonable level of service from the government for the amount of taxes I pay.  
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2) Please respond to the following four questions by circling the number that most closely represents your 
observations about your society.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 aggressive      not aggressive 
a) In this society, people are generally:        
 individual 
interests 
     collective 
interests 
b) The economic system in this society is designed to 
maximize: 
       
 not at all 
concerned 
about others 
     very 
concerned 
about others 
c) In this society, people are generally:        
 strongly 
disagree 
     strongly agree 
d) In this society, people are rewarded for excellent 
performance. 
       
 not at all 
important 
     very important 
e) There are different opinions as to what it takes to 
be a good citizen. As far as you are concerned 
personally how important is it that a good citizen 
never tries to evade taxes? 
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4.9.7 Section VI 
Finally, let us turn to something completely different. Our everyday actions are influenced by our fundamental 
convictions. Today’s research indicates that little is known about these convictions. Below, you will find some 
characteristics that a person can have. Some characteristics may apply to your personality fully or not at all. 
Regarding other characteristics, you might not be sure. Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means 
“not applicable at all” and the value 7 means “fully applicable”. With the values between 1 and 7, you can adjust 
your assessment. 
I am someone who … 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… works thoroughly        
… is communicative, talkative        
… is sometimes a little bit rough to others        
… is original, brings in new ideas        
… often worries about things        
… is able to forgive        
… is rather lazy        
… is able to come out of her shell, is sociable        
… likes artistic experiences        
… gets nervous easily        
… fulfills tasks in an effective and efficient manner         
… is reserved        
… is considerate and friendly        
… has a vivid phantasy/imagination        
… is relaxed, can easily handle stress        
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4.9.8 Section VII 
Quiz 
If you answer the following five questions correctly, the jackpot for charity will raise by 3€. 
Then, you can take part in our lottery - and get the chance to determine the charitable 
organization that will receive the whole jackpot. 
If you do not participate in the quiz or do not answer all questions correctly we will donate 1€ 
for your participation in our survey! 
1. The setting described an average client of you. 
 □ Correct. □ Incorrect. 
2. Your company had to fear reputational losses, depending on your recommendation. 
 □ Correct. □ Incorrect. 
3. The amount of potential tax savings was $ 2.4M. 
 □ Correct. □ Incorrect. 
4. The client had underpaid taxes. 
 □ Correct. □ Incorrect. 
[For treatment group:] 
5. Facing a probability of success of 50% the tax preparer penalties introduced in the setting 
 would have been applicable. 
 □ Correct. □ Incorrect. 
[For control group:] 
5. The client had a tense relationship with the IRS. 
 □ Correct. □ Incorrect. 
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